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In the Beta part of Existential Graphs (EG) and Synechistic Graphs (SG),
names describe abstract concepts, lines of identity designate concrete
objects, and the syntax connects these to each other by continuous
relations. Peirce's pragmatism purports to establish the meaning of
"intellectual concepts,--the only concepts properly so called" (R
318:95[11], 1907), which "are general or derivatives of generals, and
therefore their meanings must be general" (R 318:115[31]).
For a time, Peirce is convinced that he can prove the truth of his
pragmatism using EG. "Namely, a sufficient study of the Graphs should show
what nature is truly common to all significations of concepts; whereupon a
comparison will show whether that nature be or be not the very ilk that
Pragmaticism (by definition of it) avers that it is" (R 298:2, 1906).
Toward that end, he initially tackles "the puzzle of the mode of
composition of concepts" (R 498:15, 1906).
CSP: A mystery, or paradox, has always overhung the question of the
Composition of Concepts. ... But the Method of Existential Graphs solves
this riddle instantly by showing that ... there is but one general way in
which their Composition can possibly take place; namely, each component
must be indeterminate in some respect or another; and in their composition
each determines the other. (CP 4.572, 1906)
CSP: The System of Existential Graphs recognizes but one mode of
combination of ideas, that ... by which two indeterminate propositions
mutually determine each other in a measure. ... The truth is that concepts
are nothing but indefinite problematic judgments. The concept of *man*
necessarily involves the thought of the possible being of a man; and thus
it is precisely the judgment, "There may be a man." (CP 4.583, 1906)
A concept appears on the sheet as a name by itself, merely suggesting a
possibility. Predicating it of an object by attaching it to a line asserts
an *actual* state of things. Multiple concepts are compounded by being
attributed to the same object, which is quantified universally ("anything")
where its line crosses a boundary between areas and its outermost portion
is oddly enclosed/shaded with cuts/ovals or in the outer close of a scroll;
otherwise, it is quantified existentially ("something"). The *logical*
meaning of a concept then corresponds to all the Beta graphs embedded in
the blank sheet with lines joined to its name.
CSP: The *meaning* of any graph-instance is the meaning of the composite of
all the propositions which that graph-instance would under all
circumstances empower the interpreter to scribe, over and above what he
would have been authorized to scribe, if he had not been authorized,
directly or indirectly, to scribe the graph of that instance. (R
280:92[35], c. 1905)
However, Peirce eventually gives up on using EG to prove his pragmatism and
instead makes his case primarily on the basis of his broader semeiotic (R
318, CP 5.464-496, EP 2:398-433, 1907). In speculative grammar, concepts
and their names are classified as "*Symbols*, which represent their objects
... because dispositions or factitious habits of their interpreters insure
their being so understood" (EP 2:461, 1909). "A Symbol incorporates a
habit, and is indispensable to the application of any *intellectual* habit, *at
least*"(CP 4.531, 1906). Accordingly, the *ultimate* meaning of a concept
cannot consist in other concepts, propositions, or arguments because these
all have logical meanings of their own. Instead, it must be a habit, which
can only be *described* by a conditional proposition.
CSP: The concept which is a logical interpretant is only imperfectly so. It
somewhat partakes of the nature of a verbal definition, and is as inferior
to the habit, and much in the same way, as a verbal definition is inferior
to the real definition. ... Consequently, the most perfect account of a
concept that words can convey will consist in a description of the habit
which that concept is calculated to produce. But how otherwise can a habit
be described than by a description of the kind of action to which it gives
rise, with the specification of the conditions and of the motive? (CP
5.491, EP 2:418, 1907)
This comports with what I consider to be Peirce's clearest variant of his
original maxim of pragmatism. "Consider what effects that might conceivably
have practical bearings you conceive the object of your conception to have:
then the general mental habit that consists in the production of these
effects is the whole meaning of your concept" (R 318:177[22], 1907). As he
later explains, a "general mental habit" is expressed by a *subjunctive*
implication.
CSP: A conditional proposition,--say "if A, then B" is equivalent to saying
that "*Any *state of things in which A should be true, *would *(within
limits) *be *a state of things in which B is true." It is therefore
essentially an assertion of a *general *nature, the statement of a "
*would-be*." ... [I]f it conveys any meaning, i.e. if it is calculated to
produce any state of mind, in a person who trusts in it, it must be that it
establishes a *habit* in that mind, using the word "habit" in the original
sense, as meaning only that the person or the thing that has the habit, *would
*behave (or usually behave) in a certain way *whenever *a certain occasion
should arise. (RL 477:9-10, 1913 Oct 14)
The sheet in EG represents existence, but concepts "essentially carry some
implication concerning the general behavior either of some conscious being
or of some inanimate object, and so convey more ... than any existential
fact, namely, the *'would-acts*' of habitual behavior; and no agglomeration
of actual happenings can ever completely fill up the meaning of a 'would
be'" (CP 5.467, EP 2:401-402, 1907). The inability of EG to represent such
*general* states of things is presumably why Peirce shifts to a different
strategy for proving his pragmatism. Might SG be more suitable for that
purpose since the sheet represents the entire continuum of reality,
including conditional necessity?
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
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