Mike, List: MB: I would ask you to spend a couple of minutes thinking about where you would place your own studies and analysis of existential graphs (EGs) within Peirce's Classification (use the 1903 'perennial' one).
I already answered that question on-List a few days ago ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-03/msg00070.html <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-03/msg00070.html)-->)--"EG obviously falls within logic, which Peirce generalizes as semeiotic. It is a diagrammatic system of signs for representing propositions (speculative grammar) and their valid transformations within deductive arguments (critic), and for a time Peirce believes that he can even use it in a proof of his pragmatism (methodeutic)." MB: Second, as for my own placement, my book [1, Part II] places the study of KR under speculative grammar, as I explain in Chapter 7 I guess that I can see a sense in which the *study *of KR itself could fall under logic as semeiotic. I was indeed thinking more of the resulting classification schemes (like KBpedia) that actually organize knowledge in a certain way. I will take a look at the explanation in your book. MB: Parker coined this term [practionary] to capture Peirce's discomfort (1902, NEM 4.30) with his "imperfect" earlier expression of the pragmatic maxim ... Unfortunately, there are widespread misunderstandings about Peirce's maxim, but I hope to help clear up at least some of them in a forthcoming paper in *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*. Inspired by Robert Marty's "76 Definitions of the Sign by C. S. Pierce" ( https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/rsources/76defs/76defs.htm), I present and discuss 13 variants of the maxim itself along with 47 restatements and elaborations, all from Peirce's writings after William James began popularizing pragmatism in 1898. While certainly not exhaustive, definitive, or authoritative, I believe that my list is sufficiently representative for discerning what Peirce had in mind as the pragmatistic meaning of a concept. For one thing, as far as I know, he *never *refers to "the pragmatic maxim." Instead, he calls it "the pragmatist maxim" (NEM 4:162, 1903) or "the pragmaticist maxim" (CP 5.426, EP 2:340, 1905) only once each, and "the maxim of pragmatism" or "the maxim of pragmaticism" otherwise. In fact, Peirce rarely uses "pragmatic" as an adjective for "of or pertaining to pragmat(ic)ism," consistently preferring "pragmat(ic)ist" or "pragmat(ic)istic." In light of the vernacular implications of "pragmatic" in contemporary discourse, scholars would do well to follow his example and ethics of terminology (CP 2.219-226, EP 2:263-266, 1903) by adopting one of these distinctly philosophical alternatives. In any case, for Peirce the maxim applies *only *to an "intellectual concept," which is one "upon the structure of which arguments concerning objective fact may hinge" (CP 5.467, EP 2:401, 1907), such as hard vs. soft but not red vs. blue. Its *ultimate *meaning is properly expressed as conditional propositions about the deliberate, self-controlled conduct of its interpreters, not the law-governed behavior of its object. In other words, it consists of "conceived conditional resolutions ... with their hypothetical antecedents" (CP 5.453, EP 2:354, 1905); and rather than being *descriptive *as a "theoretical judgment ... in the indicative mood," the consequent in each case is *prescriptive *as a "practical maxim ... in the imperative mood" (CP 5.18, EP 2:134-135, 1903). MB: Lastly, I appreciate your contextual expressions of the categories under Peirce's classification, but I do not view your expressions as uniformly applicable across the branches as do you. My apologies, I apparently gave the wrong impression. Those were simply meant to be *examples *of how the categories apply differently in each science. I did not intend to suggest that they are the *only *such trichotomies within each one that I mentioned. Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Mar 14, 2021 at 1:37 PM Mike Bergman <[email protected]> wrote: > Hi Jon, List, > > Happy Pi Day! > > Before addressing your question, Jon, I would ask you to spend a couple of > minutes thinking about where you would place your own studies and analysis > of existential graphs (EGs) within Peirce's Classification (use the 1903 > 'perennial' one). . . . > > OK. So, the first thing I would say is that the study of knowledge > representation (KR), in my view, subsumes the study of EGs. So the first > answer is to place KR as the parent of where you placed EG. An EG is a > specialized notation and rules for expressing logical relationships in a > symbolic language, which is (should be) one character of any formal KR > system. > > Second, as for my own placement, my book [1, Part II] places the study of > KR under speculative grammar, as I explain in Chapter 7. The book itself is > called a '*practionary*' (in Kelly Parker's coinage [2, p 182], which he > kindly allowed me to borrow), which is "all the practical effects a thing > could have in experience, and thus furnish the reader with a better > conception of the object.” Parker coined this term to capture Peirce's > discomfort (1902, NEM 4.30) with his "imperfect" earlier expression of the > pragmatic maxim “Consider what effects, which might conceivably have > practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conceptions to have. > Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the > object” (1878, CP 5.402). Parker saw the usefulness of laying out all of > the practical effects a thing may have (a 'practionary'), but that a > “third-grade of clearness of apprehension" also required personal > "hands-on" experience. A practionary is thus an approach under methodeutic. > It is not surprising that the study of KR is closely aligned to formal > semiotic (or what Peirce also called 'categorics'). > > I can see a bit of your logic in suggesting KR to be placed under the > 'Science of Review' but I think that applicable more to the assembly or > collection of extant KR systems or KR artifacts (if at all) than to the > study of them as a science. (Thus, KBpedia as a KR instantiation could be > placed there.) Beverly Kent [3, p 81] notes Peirce disdained this approach > as the "exudation" or "fossilized remains" of science as a "systematized or > organized body of knowledge". My understanding of Peirce's classification > of the sciences, obviously much informed by Kent, is that principles and > methods are the heart of the matter, not a static organization or > systematization. Still, as Peirce developed and Kent then documents, he > undertook at least 20 different classifications over the period of 1866 to > 1903 with many more minor ones. There are many perspectives to be brought > to bear on the questions of classification. > > Lastly, I appreciate your contextual expressions of the categories under > Peirce's classification, but I do not view your expressions as uniformly > applicable across the branches as do you. In formal semiotic itself, there > are at least three universal category interpretations each under > speculative grammar, critic, and methodeutic [1, Table 6-2]. There is > something universal about the categories, but that resides in their 'final > cause' as well as specific instantiations in different contexts. > > BTW, I have been slowly releasing the chapters [4] of my book in free > preprint versions, to be completed in the next month or so. Much more on > all of these topics is discussed there. I will complete that release over > the next few weeks, but I am happy to enable list members to obtain them > now either for the full book [1] or by individual chapters [4]. If the > specific chapter link is not yet active, simply substitute the relevant > number in the URL to get it now. > > Best, Mike > [1] Bergman, Michael K. 2018. *A Knowledge Representation Practionary: > Guidelines Based on Charles Sanders Peirce*. Cham: Springer International > Publishing. See author's version at > https://www.mkbergman.com/pubs/akrp/a-kr-practionary.pdf (page numbers > for this version) > [2] Parker, Kelly A. 1998. *The Continuity of Peirce’s Thought*. > Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press. > [3] Kent, Beverley E. 1987. *Charles S. Peirce: Logic and the > Classification of the Sciences*. Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University > Press. > [4] https://www.mkbergman.com/a-knowledge-representation-practionary/ > > -- > __________________________________________ > > Michael K. Bergman > Cognonto Corporation > 319.621.5225skype:michaelkbergmanhttp://cognonto.comhttp://mkbergman.comhttp://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman > __________________________________________ > >
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