Gary f, Jon A.S., List, [I have changed the Subject to reflect a difference in emphasis.]
Thank you, Gary, for your excellent primer on phaneroscopic practice. https://gnusystems.ca/TS/pheno.htm There has surely been too little discussion of that practice -- not to mention *far* too little practice! -- one which I tend to think of as quasi-necessary for the fullest and deepest comprehension and most fruitful possible application of Peirce's categories as they concern, especially, the cenoscopic sciences including, and perhaps especially, logic as semeiotic and metaphysics. It simply makes good sense, I think, to ground any such work relating to the categories in phaneroscopic practice. You wrote: Gf: When the subject of Peirce’s “categories” arises, the discourse always seems to jump directly into theoretical issues and applications. I certainly agree with you that there's been a tendency to leap to theory with scant attention given to its phaneroscopic grounding in practice, and this is perhaps most clearly and frequently the case as regards applying the categories to logic as semeiotic. That is, I believe, in part the result of Peirce himself having done so much work there relating to the categories that for some it may appear that all -- or, at least, most all -- of the categorial work in semeiotics has already been accomplished! Yet Peirce repeatedly urged others to duplicate the intellectual experiments he had made, not "taking [his] word for it" but re-discovering for oneself what he'd uncovered. Attempting to recreate such experiences and experiments would seem to be especially valuable for anyone engaging in phenomenology or employing the categories in other sciences. Looking at the Peircean literature as a whole, it seems to me that insufficient attention has been given not only to the practice you outlined and which Andre de Tienne terms *phaneroscopy* to distinguish it from the *iconoscopy* he posits in his paper, "Iconoscopy Between Phaneroscopy and Semeiotic" https://www.erudit.org/en/journals/rssi/2013-v33-n1-2-3-rssi02379/1035282ar/ (it would appear that you do not make such a distinction in your handbook), while it seems to me that insufficient attention has been given to Peirce's science of phenomenology *as a whole*. Yet, the neglect of phaneroscopic practice in particular is no doubt one of the principal reasons why it hasn't yet been developed very far even, and especially, given that in his *classification of sciences* it is positioned as *firs**t *cenoscopic science (with normative science, including logic as semeiotic, metaphysics, and the special sciences following). As a consequence of that neglect it seems to me to remain yet a *possible* science, that is in the sense of it's far from being a fully developed one. While Peirce was certainly deeply interested in phenomenology and applied his categories to many sciences, he principally saw himself as a logician. Perhaps, in part because of that, not only was phenomenology undeveloped by him *qua* science, but so were his theoretical ethics and theoretical esthetics. In any case, one can predict, I think, that no significant progress can be expected in the science as such until a sufficient number of scholars take it up in earnest commencing with phaneroscopic practice and, then, considering the essential role of prescission in moving it beyond that essential practice, thus, to the development of the theory and, ultimately, to the fuller development of the science itself. I have in the past discussed on the List two other possible branches of phenomenology which might follow phaneroscopy, the one posited by de Tienne, *iconoscopy*, and a third, *Peircean category theory*, by me. These have been put forward on the assumption that as soon as we prescind any categorial appearances from the phaneron, or extract a triad of categorial elements and begin to identify and assign names to these triads and their categorial constituents (or to otherwise discuss them), that we've passed beyond pure phaneroscopy and are moving toward theory. Jon quoted Peirce on the the practice of phaneroscopy as "the faculty of seeing what stares one in the face, just as it presents itself, unreplaced by an interpretation, unsophisticated by any allowance for this or that supposed modifying circumstance: (CP 5.42, EP 2.147) and the categories as non-conceptual: "Perhaps it is not right to call these categories conceptions; they are so intangible that they are rather tones or tints upon conceptions'' (CP 1.353, 1885). That is most surely the case for pure practice. But one requires, I think, 'interpretation' (of the data) and an abundance of related 'concepts' in developing a science. So, it is my sincere belief that if a Peircean science of phenomenology is to be developed that it will surely be necessary to go beyond practice (*phaneroscopy*) to the prescinding, identifying and naming of, first, categorial appearances of 1ns, 2ns, 3ns (de Tienne's *iconoscopy*) and, *then*, identifying and analyzing various triads of categories (as well as the six paths, or trichotomic vectors, which the categories may follow) which present themselves to the phenomenological practitioner (*trichotomic*, or Peircean c*ategory theory*) See: *Outline of trikonic: Diagrammatic Trichotomic *for a brief introduction: https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/aboutcsp/richmond/trikonic.htm ). Some have argued that this development of phenomenology as an independent science isn't really possible and/or necessary, or that the development of iconoscopic and, especially, trichotomic theory is outside the province of phenomenology itself, that it ought to be the work of, say, semiotics. Needless to say, I am not one of these. Rather, I believe such activities as just mentioned ought to be developed *within* the science of phenomenology properly understood as essentially a *theoretical* science, albeit it a 'strange' one having an initial non-theoretical phaneroscopic practice *necessarily* preceding the theory. It is important, I believe, to remember that in his classification that *all* of Peirce's sciences of discovery, including phenomenology, are considered 'theoretical' in nature. This, more than perhaps anything else, suggests to me that *phenomenological theory *needs to be developed alongside *phaneroscopic practice.* In my view, the practice is *not* yet the theory; but that the theory cannot be well established and developed without the practice; and that the theory ought *immediately* follow the practice within the *science of phenomenology* itself.. These three great divisions, Idioscopy, Cenoscopy, and Mathematics, together constitute the aggregate of those sciences which are sometimes called Theoretical Sciences. . . . (1906 [c.] | L [R] | MS [R] 601:24-25 in *Commens *DIctionary). You allude to this, I think, in commenting that you "agree with Jon Alan [Schmidt] that this practice, and especially the act of *prescission*, is the experiential basis of whatever we can say about Peirce’s 'categories' or the 'formal elements of the phaneron'." In my own experience 'doing' phenomenology, prescission, by its very nature a kind of abstraction, points to this theoretical character and for the need of further development within the science of phenomenology itself. My own experience has been that such theoretical constructs follow quickly -- sometimes almost instantaneously, sometimes after some reflection -- upon some actual period of pure practice, but that those theoretical insights ought to be distinguished from the practice as such. This is to say that while the phenomenologist commences with, shall we say, *pure* phaneroscopic appearance, he quickly begins to identify descriptive 'characters' within the phaneron including, of course especially monadic, dyadic, and triadic characters, and at a later stage further identifying specific trichotomies as well (I have found this latter activity to be fraught with difficulties and dangers of possible misrepresentation). As earlier mentioned, I would also include research into the six vectors and their interrelations as a part of this third branch, viz., Peircean category theory. All of this work can, and indeed in my view must, be done at least primarily with a *logica* *utens *which, in my view, has its own 'natural' modes of abstracting, prescinding, etc. Leaping into phenomenological theory from the standpoint of logic as semeiotic -- or, worse, as a task of it -- seems to me to be just the sort of "jump[ing] directly into theoretical issues and applications" which you warn against, Gary. [A brief, albeit relevant, aside: One might imagine that in his original phaneroscopic explorations that Peirce *first* found quality, reaction, and representation to present themselves in the phaneron and *then* abstracted these primitive characters as kinds of 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns rather than the reverse. He seems to hedge a bit on this, however, at one point suggesting that he first 'discovered' the categories in phenomenology and thus had reason to expect to find them in mathematics; at another he suggests that the *valencies of the simplest mathematics* guided him toward the categories in phenomenology.] Jon quoted Vincent Colapietro: "It may be the case that not only the categories themselves are tones and tints of conceptions (rather than fully realizable modes of conceptuality) but also especially effective means for identifying the most subtle tones, tints, and textures of phenomena themselves" and commented. JAS: ". . . I now believe that it [is] the right approach in general for exploring 'theoretical issues and applications; of Peirce's categories." I can't say that I see it exactly this way since, for example, the categories as they are employed in Peirce's semeiotic, notably in its first branch, semeiotic grammar, seem to me less "subtle tones, tints, and textures of phenomena themselves" (although they sometimes can be that as well) than, especially in combination, something more like 'organizing principles'. I would point not only to Peirce's several diagrams of sign relations -- and especially to his triangular diagram of the 10 classes of signs (not to mention the many valental diagrams), but he made it clear that his last classification of sciences (sometimes referred to as the 'perennial' classification') was itself organized around the categories in the trichotomic sense. In such organizational structures one recalls that Peirce termed his categories 'cenopythagorian' which brings to mind the valental and even mathematical (monadic, dyadic, triadic) characters of them apart from the "tones, tints, and textures" which, again, are explicitly those of the "phenomena themselves," finding, perhaps, their 'tonal' locus in phenomenology far more than anywhere else among the sciences of discovery. There is, of course, more to be said regarding the possibility of Peircean phenomenology becoming a fully developed theoretical science (again, albeit of a peculiar nature). So I hope that interested scholars, drawing on the work such scholars such as you, Jon Alan Schmidt, Andre de Tienne, Marc Champagne, Vincent Colapietro, and Richard Atkins (who, however, takes a essentially semeiotic approach), will indeed develop it further including its expansion to include not only phaneroscopy, but also iconoscopy and trikonic (or something like them). If I were a young Peircean scholar with an aptitude for phenomenological observation, and looking for an area of research relatively untouched, I would think that Peirce's phenomenology might be well worth exploring in some depth. In any event I would imagine that we'd all agree that the very first work ought to be explorations within phaneroscopic practice. Yet in the sciences following phenomenology, I believe that the principles established in the theoretical part of that science can eventually be given free reign to express themselves however they may. Best, Gary R “Let everything happen to you Beauty and terror Just keep going No feeling is final” ― Rainer Maria Rilke *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Fri, Mar 12, 2021 at 11:03 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > When the subject of Peirce’s “categories” arises, the discourse always > seems to jump directly into theoretical issues and applications. Even in > published studies there seems to be little discussion of the *practice* > of phenomenology or phaneroscopy (or phenoscopy, the term Peirce introduced > in the *Century Dictionary*). But I agree with Jon Alan that this > practice, and especially the practice of *prescission*, is the > experiential basis of whatever we can say about Peirce’s “categories” or > “formal elements of the phaneron.” > > I have accordingly tried to draft a short introductory-level ‘manual’ for > this practice: https://gnusystems.ca/TS/pheno.htm. (This is now > incorporated as the “Presign” into *Turning Signs > <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/index.html>*, as its introduction to Thirdness > leads into some basics of semiotics.) Of course it’s possible that someone > else has done something like this, perhaps done it better, somewhere on the > Net, and if anyone knows of such a text I’d appreciate notification of it. > Meanwhile I’d welcome any discussion of my attempt on the list, with a view > to improving or expanding it. > > Gary f. > > } I want to ask the meaning of spring's coming, but even the plum blossoms > do not know. [Dogen] { > > https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time > > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to > [email protected] with no subject, and with the sole line "UNSubscribe > PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >
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