> But then the claim doesn't mean very much. It just means you're not
> doing comparative world history--which begs definition, btw. But so
> what? How does that invalidate any of the claims that Brenner makes in
> Merchants and Revolution or the Turbulence essay?
I don't disagree with what Justin says. But in light of recent works
which put China (and possibly other Asian areas) closer in
economic development to the most advanced areas of Europe
(England, Netherlands) than to other areas of Europe (Italy, France,
Spain), I certainly think it would be "eurocentric" to continue with
the old marxist transition debate, as if the question was England vs
France vs eastern Europe, the way Brenner-Wood-Comninel
continue to do today. According to the H-World list, I am
eurocentric...or you can ask Yoshie.
The stuff you've
> been posting about Chinese agriculture (to the degree I've kept up)
> has been fascinating. But it doesn't explain the rise of New World
> Slavery, the triangle trade, the origins of modern finance, the
> transition from feudal to capitalist social relations in the Atlantic
> economies, etc. (Which doesn't mean it's not worthwhile, just that . .
> .)
>
> Eurocentrism, in that context, is basically a way to harness the
> political claims of wrong to an epistemology which, like all
> epistemologies, has its limits. If you want to argue on this
> level--which is basically name-calling--comparative world history is
> not non-Eurocentric--it's a more ambitious version of Eurocentrism,
> the way "globalization" is a more ambitious (and "friendly") version
> of imperialism.
>
> But that's a stupid argument. Spivak said somewhere that the problem
> is not Eurocentrism, but not being Eurocentric enough.
>
> Christian
>
> P.S. I second Justin's rec of _Hydra_.
>
