In response to my argument that the reason why the Opec cartel
could collapse was  because the labour
cost of expanding production in the Gulf was substantially below the
elevated market price. If this had not been the case, cheating
would not have been possible.

Gil replies that:
<<<<
If by "labour cost of expanding production" Paul means "marginal cost 
of production as represented by socially necessary labor time", I see 
the preceding statements as twice insupportable.

First, the "because" clause begs a central question.  Recall from my 
previous post the point that Roemer has demonstrated that rent and 
uneven exchange can be coherently explained without reference to 
labour values.

Second, "market price exceeding labour cost" is neither necessary nor 
sufficient to support the implication of monopoly power (and by 
extension, the "possibility of cheating").  Concerning sufficiency:  
we know from Sraffian arguments (*without* having to buy into 
Sraffian economics as a paradigm, note) that market prices consistent 
with competitive ( and thus not collusive) behavior can yet exceed 
labor value (on this point also see the discussion of ground rent and 
interest below).

Concerning necessity:  Suppose the Sraffian price in an industry 
is less than the corresponding labor value.  There is no 
contradiction in suggesting that firms in that industry might collude 
to raise that price to a level equalling labor value.  The 
profit rate in that industry will then be higher than in 
other industries, but that's what monopoly power is all about.
No contradiction, so no necessity.


>>>>

1. I do not doubt that it may be possible to re-write Ricardo's theory of
   rent in terms of the phenomenal forms of value - prices - but has
   anything new been added to the theory in so doing. Does the non 
   value based theory predict different results from classical political
   economy?
   In this actual example, do you doubt that the amount of labour 
required
   to expand Gulf oil production was substantially less than the amount
   of labour commanded by the oil commodity that it produced?
   If your example was supposed to show the falsity of the labour theory
   of value this would have to be the case.

2. Deviations of prices from values on the basis of Sraffian 
transformatio
   are at the limit of what is statistically measurable, so much so that
   there existence as phenomena is questionable. The fundamental
   hypothesis of transformation theory in all its variants - that the 
rate
   of profit should be statistically independent of the organic 
composition -
   has yet to be demonstrated. For the British economy we have presented
   results ( Bergamo Centenary Conference on Capital III, 1995) which
   indicate that it is false.
   Does Gil have any empirical evidence to suggest that oil in 1974 was
   actually selling below its value, as his argument would imply?
   

I went on to say: "Thus the short term nature of the super rents is 
what would be  expected from the law of value."

Gil responds:
<<<<<

This does not follow.   Counterexamples: first,
a positive interest rate implies that the price of the money 
commodity in loan capital transactions exceeds its value. 

>>>>>
I do not accept this. Price and interest are dimensionally
incomparable. Price has dimension $ or Pounds etc, interest has
dimension seconds^-1. An interest rate is not therefore a
price of the money commodity.

He continues:
<<<<
 Positive 
ground rent implies that the market price of unimproved land exceeds 
its value, which is zero.  But positive interest rates and positive 
ground rents have been around a long, long time, suggesting there is 
absolutely nothing intrinsically "short run" about rents to 
relatively scarce and differentially owned tradeables (like land, 
like oil supplied by a cartel, like usury and merchant's capital). 
>>>>

It is unclear whether Gil is discussing absolute or differential
ground rent here. Let us assume that he is refering to differential.
Ricardian political economy did not attempt to explain rent as 
a price of a 'land commodity', it explained it as a second order 
effect arising from deviations in labour productivity on different
plots of ground. Thus the fact that the land is unimproved is of
no relevance to rent. Applied to oil, it would imply that a rent
by Opec would only be sustainable so long as the marginal oilfields
were ones with a much lower labour productivity. This was not the
case so the price fell.

There is no implication in the Ricardian theory that rents must
be short term, he was well aware that the British landowning class
had been living off them for centuries. What he was concerned to do
was to explain that their rise during the first decade of the 
19th century was due to the declining labour productivity in
agriculture. His aphorism that 'rents are high because corn is
dear' rather than 'corn is dear because rents are high', 
remains valid, and applicable to oil revenues.

If Gil believes that the DeBeers cartel for diamonds has
no foundation in the labour costs of producing diamonds, he
is at liberty to open a diamond factory and try to under-cut them.

Gil objects that the law of value has only been established
empirically, and that we do not know all the causal mechanisms
by which it operates. In large measure this is because it has
only become a topic of serious research in the last decade,
until which point, too many marxian economists had engaged in
scholastic model building detached from reality. The question
of how closely the correlation between values and prices holds
in less developed economies is interesting, and there is some
evidence from Valle to suggest that in the Mexican economy the
correlation is lower - largely due to the wide variations
in labour productivity between peasant and capitalist farming.

These are serious scientific research topics, unlike the 
abstract sort of model building that some people have imported
from bourgeois economics.







Reply via email to