"Russia: What Happens After the Elections?"

        Since I have reported on the two previous conferences of this nature, I
think I can detect changes in the consensus of ex-Sovietologists over the past
several years.  This year's conference on May 22, 1996, represented a
continuation of the erosion of support for the Yeltsin regime. The general
consensus seemed to be that "it doesn't matter" who is finally elected.
        The former Ambassador, Jack Matlock, had just returned from a week in
Moscow. Although he was now less inclined  to say that "it doesn't matter "
than before, he admitted that he spoke to no communists or supporters of
Zyuganov. Most Russians haven't made up their minds yet as to which is the
"lesser evil" and may not do it until they hit the voting booth. 
        Alexander Tsipko, a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center, admitted that
Zyuganov was the more moral of the two leading candidates, Matlock claimed that
the most moral candidate doesn't always win elections in the West. Zyuganov has
little power in either Moscow or St. Petersburg, but has much support in the
countryside.
        Yeltsin is bucking the trend in other former socialist countries, which
have in general changed their immediate post-socialist government back to
former communists. It may be possible to fudge 3-4 percent of the vote, but the
margin of difference may be larger than this.
        Russian politics is still pretty much conducted by "individuals" rather
than parties. The Communist Party is thus rat her unique and will durvive even
if Zyuganov is defeated. It is also unique in that the word "communist" is
still employed although it has been abandoned elsewhere in the former socialist
countries. There had been some discussion about changing the name, but
apparently 70-plus years of Communism is too much to abandon: industrialization
and world-class status plus the victory over fascism is too much to forget.
        There was a Women's Party, but it failed to receive over 5 percent of
the votes in the most recent election for the Duma, so it seems to have
disappeared.  At least, Grace Dennan Wasrnecke, who is a frequent consultant to
Russian-American ventures, especially in a small town of Volkhov where women's
enterprises are being encouraged, could throw no light on how women would vote.
Yeltsin's decree to phase out the draft by the year 2000 was an obvious attempt
to appeal to women. Warnecke thought that older women would tend to vote for
Zyuganov and younger ones for Yeltsin.
        Several participants thought that there might be several "show trials"
if Zyuganov won, but that "salami tactics" would be a more likely strategy to
get back to a "mixed economy" with more central planning, including some price
controls.
        Yeltsin supporters are predicting a fall in the value of the ruble from
its roughly 5,000: l ratio to between 10,000 and 15,000: l in the event of a
Zyuganov victory. In my view, tigher exchange controls and a fixed rat e of
exchange closer to the ruble's purchasing power parity (less than 5,000) is
more likely.
        Marshall Schulman, former director of the Harriman, was an active
participant. His main worry about a Zyuganov victory would be its effect on
U.S. politics in an election year. With Richard Perle writing Dole position
papers, the uestion of "Who lost Russia" might rear its ugly head.
        Generally speaking, there doesn't seem to be much difference between
the foreign policy of Zyuganov and Yeltsin since both are nationalists.
Primakov would likely continue as Foreign Minister in either case. Lynn Turgeon
[EMAIL PROTECTED]


Ypraio

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