The following is a dialogue between myself and Geoff Schneider which may be of interest. It's pretty abstract and long. Feel free to erase without any tinge of guilt. (It's my last message until August 20.) He wrote: >>What you described as essentialism comes very close to what I consider to be a 'practical' version of Wolfnick methodology.<< I wonder if their theory and practice are in sync (and I happen to think it's good to have them in sync if one can). I said >"Essentialism" for me simply means having a theory which points to the most important factors (not necessarily a single factor) determining the changes in the phenomenon under study, looking for the _essence_ of what in heck is going on rather than simply describing it.< >>Isn't this what we all do?! [yup] I think the point W&R are trying to make is that neoclassical economics and certain Marxists are OVERLY essentialist: they posit that certain relationships are immutable. In a social science I would question whether one can ever establish immutable relationships (which makes your choice of the immutable laws of physics inapplicable).<< If W&R are criticizing people for being overly essentialist, I'd agree with them in many cases (it depends on the case), though some analyses aren't essentialist enough but simply talk about a large number of different factors. But "relative essentialism" makes their theory much mushier. I agree with the point about physics. But there are some immutable laws even in economics, such as that production requires people, tools or machines, and raw materials. (more specifically, see section 1 of ch. 7 of CAPITAL, vol I) Okay, economics itself isn't immutable, since it didn't apply before sentient creatures appeared on earth (assuming that they have done so), but that's immutable enough. BTW, I like how Marx goes from the immutable in section 1 to the specifically social in section 2 of that chapter. BTW, I like Terry McD's distinction between different types of causes (which goes back to Aristotle, BTW). That is definitely better than my somewhat vague distinction in terms of levels of importance. >I don't see how looking for the most important factors can hinder understanding. It's _integral to_ understanding; it's what meant by "understanding" (as opposed to merely describing). On the other hand, to simply say that everything depends on everything else doesn't give us much understanding at all. At most, it's a starting point for a more essentialist effort.< >>Again, you get no argument from me on this: this is what all scientists do. In this realm I use W&R as a caution against ever believing you have captured everything. But practically speaking, I think even W&R approach social science in this way.<< Again, is there a conflict between W&R's theory & their practice? >I would have summarized your [Blair's] criticism of O'Connor as simply tht he left something important out of his analysis. That's a very old style of criticism, akin to Marx's view that certain theories (e.g., Ricardo's) though scientific and having something valid to say, were "one-sided," incomplete visions of the nature of capitalism.< >>This is exactly what overdeterminism is all about: when you reduce a relationship to its essence you almost always leave something important out. That doesn't prevent you from finding the most important factors!<< Of course you have to leave something out: abstration is part of social and physical science. Otherwise you can't say anything. But as I said, the necessity of abstraction also means that we have to avoid dogmatism. >Actually, if the R/M theory is consistent, there is no essence to it. The R/M vision is a totality in which all of the parts overdetermine all of the other parts and to deign to summarize it as saying some parts (e.g., overdetermination) are more important than others would be to slander it. There is no way to summarize it; all that we can do is broadcast the whole thing over -- i.e., all of the books and articles -- over pen-l. (Summaries wouldn't do, since that would be essentialist.) And even that still wouldn't be enough, since the other authors of the school and their oral tradition (not to mention body language) are just as much part of the totality of R/M thought as are the published texts. On top of that, the vision keeps on changing, so by the time tht all of this had been broadcast on pen-l, it would be obsolete. Even if some parts are more important than others at one point in time, this configuration would change over time, so an accurate description can easily turn into a slur. < >>I suppose you could arrive at this view if you took overdeterminism to extremes [as I was, deliberately and in the end, as a satire]. But in practically applying overdeterminist ideas, doesn't the absurdity which you describe above actually contains things which one should keep in mind when studying a community of scholars? Summarizing a discipline serves a purpose, but to truly understand it you would want to know the people participating, the oral tradition, etc. But as is obvious from my attempt to summarize W&R, I have no such worries about essences and the like, because I simply think that attributing relative weights to various explanatory factors is an inevitable part of social science.<< which is what I was saying. (BTW, I'm not interested in knowing everything about W&R's community of scholars. I'd like to know the essence of thier work -- or the "top ten ideas.") >It's very important to separate (a) the epistemological vision that we can never really _know_ absolute truth from (b) the ontological vision that there _is no_ absolute truth, no objective reality, independent of our perception. Realists such as myself reject (b) but accept (a). I believe, though I am sure that someone will correct me, that Wolf & Resnick confuse (a) and (b). It's that confusion that (as far as I can tell) prevents them from saying much -- unless they are inconsistent with their own method. < >>Your first point is exactly right, and you have hit upon the major philosophical distinction between realists and relativists. But Wolff and REsnick do not confuse the two, they are avowed proponents of relativism, so not only do they believe we can never know absolute truth, they believe that we cannot separate objective reality from our perceptions of reality. Which is why they pay particular attention to all the other processes which influence society besides class processes.<< the last is not unique: Albert & Hahnel put a big emphasis on other social processes besides class (i.e., gender, race, etc.) without embracing overdeterminationism. >>Again, as a practical matter, I think relativism is probably correct but to me this is not a useful distinction. Beyond acknowledging the influences on our psyche, I still want to have a conversation about what constitutes reality, or what people 'think' constitutes reality, and it doesn't really matter to me which one we're talking about. All I get out of relativism (a la Rorty and W&R) is a caution not to disregard certain influences on our thought processes and other idiosyncratic biases.<< then we agree. I also think that a realist like Bhaskar would agree. >But we have to recognize that this knowledge is _of something real_, something that exists independent of our perception.< >>Why does it matter if it IS real or if we THINK it is real? Something could be absolutely real to a realist, and a relativist could believe something was real given the influences on her/his psyche, and they could both have an interesting discussion.<< we think it is real and there is no way of "proving" that it is (and philosophers have stopped asking questions like "is reality real or not?" because they're fruitless). However, to make any kind of progress (in fact, to live in the world), we have to _assume_ that it's real. Else one gets into nihilism or confusion. >The fact that we don't know for sure is not a reason not to look, not to try to find the "essence" that lies under the appearances, our perceptions. < >>Here I think you miss the point -- W&R are definitely 'looking' for answers, but what they are unwilling to attribute any relationship to an immutable essence. I still think what you do and what they do are very close together, given that your idea of essence stated above.<< Essences need not be immutable. It depends on what one means by "essence." Marx saw the self-expansion of capital as being the "essence" of capitalism (though I don't know if he used that word). But it's quite mutable (i.e., capitalism can be abolished). And the details of capitalism can change: the appearance this "essence" has on the surface of society depends on a lot of other factors, such as how much of other kinds of modes of production persist in our social formation, how well the working class is organized, the role of patriarchy and systems of racial dominance, etc. I think that one difference between my social science and that of W&R concerns levels of abstraction. I think that at the low level of abstraction of the realm of appearances, the overdeterminist perspective is absolutely right. Empirical reality is definitely the result of a large number of different processes that interact and affect each other. However, some are more important than others, specifically over the long run. In our society, the laws of motion of capitalism are determinant "in the last instance," to coin a phrase. ;-) Now I don't think that these laws of motion are totally deterministic, but they do determine the options available. E.g., see the early part of my article in the 1994 issue of RESEARCH IN POLITICAL ECONOMY on the origins of the Great Depression: even though crises are inevitable, the actual form of the crisis is not predetermined. >This adds an additional point ("essentialist" is not the same thing as "static"), that perceived reality is always changing or that actual reality is always changing. Both are true, as far as I know. (In fact, as a working hypothesis, I'd say that part of the essence of reality is that it, and our perceptions of it, are always changing.)< >>As I understand it, W&R define "essentialist" as basically static, implying that certain relationships always hold. So a theory which is based in history and posits relationships based on particular historical relations and processes is not essentialist since it doesnt say that those relationships are the same for all time.<< well, then why do W&R denounce so many Marxist theories (which are cognizant of historical contingency) as "essentialist" and see that as a fatal blow to those theories? BTW, I get the feeling that though W&R talk a lot about processes, their theory does not use a historical conception of time. I can't prove that off hand, since I don't have my copy of their KNOWLEDGE & CLASS here. >But there are also some things -- some aspects of reality -- that don't change (as far as we know), such as the phenomenon of overdetermination in society or the laws of physics (at least within a relevant time frame). Reality combines constancy and change, as do our perceptions.< >>Here I think you would get disagreement from them, at least in regard to social science.<< But don't they see overdetermination as a constant aspect (may I call it an "essence") of society's history? in pen-l solidarity, Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] <74267,[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Econ. Dept., Loyola Marymount Univ. 7900 Loyola Blvd., Los Angeles, CA 90045-8410 USA 310/338-2948 (daytime, during workweek); FAX: 310/338-1950 "It takes a busload of faith to get by." -- Lou Reed. Geoffrey Schneider Assistant Professor of Economics Bucknell University Lewisburg, PA 17837 Phone: (717) 524-3446 Fax: (717) 524-3451 [EMAIL PROTECTED]