I don't know if this helps to requested info on regulation theory..
Mine
>Although I have not read it, the paper abstracted below seems very
>interesting. I plan to obtain it soon. Some of you may also find it
>interesting.
>Cheers,
>McKeever
>"The Political Economy of Protectionism and Industrial Policy"
BY: HADI SALEHI ESFAHANI
University of Illinois
MUNIR MAHMUD
Pennsylvania State University
Dept. of Economics
Document: Available from the SSRN Electronic Paper Collection:
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=150730
Paper ID: Working Paper No. 98-0111
Date: June 1998
Contact: HADI SALEHI ESFAHANI
Email: Mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Postal: University of Illinois
210DKH
1206 South Sixth Street
Urbana, IL 61801 USA
Phone: (217)333-2681
Fax: (217)333-1398
Co-Auth: MUNIR MAHMUD
Email: Mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Postal: Pennsylvania State University
Dept. of Economics
609 Kern Building
University Park, PA 16802-3306 USA
Paper Requests:
Contact Illinois Research and Reference Center, 128 Library,
1408 West Gregory Drive, Urbana IL 61801 USA. Fax:(217)244-0398;
Phone:(217)333-1958. Basic fee is $10.
http://www.library.uiuc.edu/library/irrc/default.htm
ABSTRACT:
This paper develops a model of trade and industrial policy where
the politicians in charge of the government can direct the rents
generated by their policies toward their political or economic
objectives through different channels: lobbying, taxation,
regulation, and tariff and quota allocation. Different
mechanisms are distinguished by their point of rent extraction
and differences in resource waste for each dollar of transfer.
In conjunction with industrial policy, specific asset formation
is also endogenized. We show that many characteristics of the
model's equilibria transcend specific channels of rent
extraction that prevail. The parameters that represent the
effectiveness of rent transfer through various channels play a
mediating role. The results show that the relationships between
these parameters and policy outcomes may be different from those
based on single-channel models. We show that under reasonable
conditions, a variety of parameter changes induce a positive
relationship between the restrictiveness of policies toward
domestic and foreign competition. This helps explain a number of
important empirical regularities such as the positive
association of protection with import penetration and
output-capital ratio. The model also offers a guide for
empirical research on the role of lobbying and other rent
extraction mechanisms in policy-making.
JEL Classification: F13, L52
_
