Why does this make me laugh?

It's from that commercial working paper abstracting service that most
PEN-Lers seem to hate. Note there's a fee for this paper. Though a few of
these are now distributed from web sites, an increasing number of working
papers now come with a fee. No doubt this service has encouraged charging
for WPs. MIT's fees start at $12.

>     "The Democratic Political Economy of Progressive Income
>      Taxation"
>
>      BY: JOHN E. ROEMER
>            University of California, Davis
>
>          Paper ID: UC Davis Working Paper #97-11
>          Date:     March 1997
>
>          Contact:  Donna Wills Raymond
>          E-Mail:   MAILTO:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>          Postal:   Department of Economics, University of
>                    California, Davis, CA 95616-8578
>          Phone:    (916) 752-9240
>          Fax:      (916) 752-9382
>          ERN Ref:  PUBLIC:WPS97-154
>
>     HARD COPY PAPER REQUESTS: Papers are $3.00 in the U.S. and
>     Canada, $4.00 outside of the U.S. Checks must be payable to
>     "Regents of the University of California" and drawn on
>     U.S. banks. We do not invoice, accept purchase orders, or
>     cash. Requests must be accompanied by payment and mailed
>     to Donna Wills Raymond at the Department of Economics,
>     University of California, Davis, CA 95616.
>
>
>     Why do both left and right political parties almost always
>     propose progressive income taxation schemes in political
>     competition? Analysis of this problem has been hindered by
>     the two-dimensionality of the issue space. To give parties a
>     choice over a domain which contains both progressive and
>     regressive policies requires an issue space that is at least
>     two-dimensional. Nash equilibrium between two parties with
>     (complete) preferences over two-dimensional policies fails to
>     exist. I introduce a new equilibrium concept for political
>     games, based on inner-party struggle. A party consists of
>     three factions--reformists, militants, and opportunists: each
>     faction has a complete preference order on policy space, but
>     together they can only agree on a partial order. Inner-party
>     unity equilibrium is defined as Nash equilibrium between two
>     parties, each of which maximizes with respect to its quasi-
>     order. Such equilibria exist in the two-dimensional model,
>     and in them both parties propose progressive income taxation.
>
>     JEL Classification: D72, H20

Doug

--

Doug Henwood
Left Business Observer
250 W 85 St
New York NY 10024-3217 USA
+1-212-874-4020 voice  +1-212-874-3137 fax
email: <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
web: <http://www.panix.com/~dhenwood/LBO_home.html>




Reply via email to