Barkley blames the tendency for top management to take over from
worker-managers on the interference by the League of Yugo Communists, etc.
That's plausible, but since the co-ops are not owned by the worker-managers
alone, but by the state, isn't that kind of interference almost inevitable.
Even if that interference didn't arise from government or political
parties, might not it come from other sources, e.g., bankers? We do have to
take seriously Louis' point that a worker-managed cooperative in a
non-worker-managed global economy will be subject to all sorts of pressures
that might undermine the co-op's internal democracy. 

Also, we have to take seriously the point that co-ops may not have the
incentive to expand employment, so that unemployment persists or the use of
non-member temps is encouraged (perhaps as in the quote about Mondragon).
This is an old point, from Ben Ward and Evsey Domar, among others: the
co-op has a tendency to be exclusive, having an almost fraternity-like
attitude toward outsiders. (This might encourage sexism, racism, and more
crucially for Yugo, antagonism toward other ethnic groups.) 

If I remember correctly, in a previous discussion of this issue, Paul
Phillips quoted either Jan Vanek or Branko Horvath to indicate that _in
practice_ the employment growth-limiting effects of worker co-operatives
does not happen and that the co-ops do not have the incentive that Ward,
Domar, et al suggest. I think that this is most likely true, though I am
far from being an expert on this issue. (Is it possible that the effects of
the tendency to not expand membership was hidden by the large migration of
Yugo workers to N. Europe?)

However, my question (which gets back to the issue of the first paragraph)
is: could it be that the non-exclusionary policies of real-world Yugo
co-ops be simply the result of the institutional constraints imposed on
them? (Maybe the imposition of these constraints was instituted partly by
encouraging top-managerial rule?)

So we need to discuss more than simply the co-ops of Slovenia or Mondragon
and discuss the institutional environment in which they exist. This brings
us back to the key issue of how central planning (or at least central
policies) and decentralized co-ops can work together to inch toward
socialist ideals...

boy, that's a lot of stuff on our plate. 




in pen-l solidarity,

Jim Devine   [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Econ. Dept., Loyola Marymount Univ.
7900 Loyola Blvd., Los Angeles, CA 90045-8410 USA
310/338-2948 (daytime, during workweek); FAX: 310/338-1950
"As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not
certain; as far as they are certain, they really do not refer to
reality." -- Albert Einstein. 



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