Bill Burgess writes: I don't see the distinction your are making re *nation-based* overproduction. I would argue the competitive austerity you described is imposed by capital as their 'solution' to growing overproduction. Is there a better way of understanding its root cause?<< If I remember Lenin accurately, he saw monopoly capitalism as developing within each advanced capitalist nation, causing overproduction there, encouraging competition amongst the nations. I was talking about a competition among nations _for whatever reason_ that is creating a tendency toward overproduction (inadequate aggregate demand) on a world scale. I guess the distinction is a bit academic. I don't think of the competitive austerity (CA) as "imposed by capital." That leans heavily toward conspiracy theory or functionalism; most importantly, capital may suffer greatly if CA causes world depression. The CA reflects a relatively complex history, centered on tendencies toward globalization, domination of production by creditors, decay of labor movements, etc. Maybe that can be summed up by "imposed by capital," but a lot is lost in that summary. I had written > The US war against Vietnam doesn't quite fit with Lenin's theory since it was part of the US war against a non-capitalist country (the USSR), while Lenin assumes the world is capitalist.< >> Lenin's characterization was of an epoch of (inter-related) imperialism, war and revolution, and so Vietnam fits fine. I don't think it is right to say the US war against Vietnam was aimed at the USSR.<< I think that the VN war was simultaneously a war against national liberation and the right to opt out of capitalism (as you say) _and_ "part of the US war against a non-capitalist country (the USSR)." So we basically agree. >>*If* the "main contradiction" was between capitalism and socialism I would agree Lenin's approach needs transplant surgury.<< I don't know about "main contradiction," but the cold war sure did dominate the world political economy from about 1946 until 1989. Things have changed a lot since then, suggesting that the end of the cold war had major effects. I suggested >> that imperialist economic competition is "fading", and that MNCs are de-nationalizing. But aren't the 'free' trade agreements we've been discussing a form of *intensified* competition, and which we all know are crammed with protectionist measures and could easily be erased tomorrow in favour of more explicit protectionism? << Intensified competition, yes, but between nation-states? US auto workers working for US-based companies, for example, used to compete with Japanese auto workers working for Japan-based companies. But now they compete with workers employed by foreign factories of US-based companies, while Japan-based companies hire US workers. Something has changed. The trade laws do include protectionist measures, but the long-term trend since WW II has been for these to go away. So far, there is no sign of that trend being reversed. (It's intensified with NAFTA and GATT.) It is true that protectionism could come back, but would US big business back that? now that that big business has so many operations around the world (and benefits from exports which might be hurt by retaliation), I doubt that they would favor revived protectionism. Without their backing, and with labor and small business weak, it's hard to imagine a sufficient political base for protectionism. >>Many argue any serious de-nationalization of firms is another 'globalization' myth, as state power (ultimately backed by military power) remains essential to protect both their general *and particular* world corporate interests. I still have yet to see convincing evidence for any notion of general de-nationalization of capital.<< I agree that the abolition of nation-states is a myth. In my 1994 article in RESEARCH IN POLITICAL ECONOMY, I wrote that "Despite the rise of global capitalism, nation-states still exist and have important economic functions, including the collection of taxes to pay interest on external debt, the maintenance of law and order, and efforts to attract international capital." However, that doesn't mean that capital is as tied down to the nation-state as it was in the past. Ultimately, the globalization of capital (which, BTW, is nothing new, but something that's been going on since capitalism's birth) will get beyond the ability of the various nation-states to stabilize the system. This will encourage the rise of a world state. But that hasn't happened yet and isn't guaranteed. It's also possible that a massive reaction against globalization might occur, as in the era between 1914 and 1945, though of course history never repeats itself. I >> also tied Lenin's notion of finance capital to German-style banking ... I have never understood why the difference between German and British banking matters much for his approach to imperialism. Can someone explain this?<< In German-style banking, the stock market plays a very small role; corporate stocks are instead owned by banks. >>On Russia: Sure, the collapse of the USSR has left the US virtually unchallenged militarily, but considering that the US just re-invented NATO as a noose around Russia's throat by admitting a handpicked three neighbours (and refusing others) I don't think it is right to downplay the ongoing danger of war.<< I interpret the expansion of NATO as part of Clinton's effort to sell more US arms. Ironically, it also undermines the effectiveness of NATO as an organization, by bringing in some relatively weak countries. I guess the point is to sell them arms but keep them from using them against Russia. BTW, you'll note that Yeltsin has come to terms with the expansion of NATO. Maybe that's why he was granted a seat at the G-7 meetings, becoming part of the 8. You should also note that the current regime is deeply in hock to the "West." It's plausible to see Yeltsin et al as compradors or junior partners. Maybe Russian politics will change (revolution?) and so will NATO/Russian relations. But I don't see that as guaranteed. in pen-l solidarity, Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] Econ. Dept., Loyola Marymount Univ. 7900 Loyola Blvd., Los Angeles, CA 90045-8410 USA 310/338-2948 (daytime, during workweek); FAX: 310/338-1950 "Segui il tuo corso, e lascia dir le genti." (Go your own way and let people talk.) -- K. Marx, paraphrasing Dante A.
