I'll try to keep this short and sweet (dropping the stuff that generates
more heat than light). At the end of the following, it's very clear that
Ajit and I have been talking past each other, discussing completely
different questions. Bored readers should now hit the delete button -- but
only after the first point, concerning the definition of "arbitrary."
Ajit writes: >Since when we have started to settle philosophical debates by
dictionaries? As a matter of fact, I, on your asking, gave you what I meant
my arbitrary, so your statement starting with "Thus..." really makes no
sense.<
No-one was trying to settle any philosophical debate using a dictionary.
Absent a clear definition of what you meant by "arbitrary," the only
alternative I could think of was to seek the _generally accepted meaning of
terms_ in order to understand what is being discussed. In that case, the
dictionary fills the bill.
Now, it is quite common for academics to use words in ways that differ from
common usage. This is quite appropriate in most situations -- if they
_explicitly_ define their alternative meanings.
If you were to define the word as meaning "involving elements of
subjectivity or ideology," then your proposition that all statements of
truth are arbitrary would be generally acceptable and we could end this
discussion. If you had clearly defined what you meant by "arbitrary" from
the start, neither Doug nor Paul nor I would have reacted the way we did to
your categorical assertion.
I had written: >>I assume that reality exists independent of my perception
of it, even if I perceive it incorrectly and incompletely.<<
Ajit says: > ... Your criterion of truth is YOUR assumption, the assumption
you say must be made by any one who wants to make sense, i.e. say something
that is not babbling. Don't you think that if you are going to propose a
universal criterion for making sense, then it should be something more than
your "assumption"?<
I misunderstood something that Ajit said and so there's no point in
repeating the discussion. In the above, he is right: I am arguing that my
assumption should be made by all who are interested in separating myth from
reality, in studying the world. Especially if the point of studying the
world in order to help change it.
I had written >>This is only an unprovable _assumption_, since you might be
a product of my fevered imagination.<< and that >>I never said that I could
_prove_ it.<<
Ajit writes: >You said it was ONLY an unprovable assumption, since I might
be a product of your fevered imagination. Let's suppose I'm not a product
of your fevered imagination or let's suppose I'm dead and no longer exist.
Now, could you prove your assumption on this supposition?<
The word "assumption" implies a proposition that is posited rather than
proved. Isn't that what your dictionary says?
>>The difference between an assumption and a tenet of faith, IMHO, is that
the former is a necessary evil while the latter is something one glories in
as part of some religion. I reject the latter.<<
>What "necessary evil" or "tenet of faith" has got to do with establishing
the truth of 'objective truth'?<
Since one of my premises _from the start_ was that I don't _know_ the
"objective truth," I have never been trying to "establish the truth" of it.
Rather, the "necessary evil" assumption is simply that such a truth exists,
or (more accurately) that the world outside me exists independent of my
perception of it. This kind of premise seems needed for rational thought,
though I will not try to "prove" such an assertion.
>>BTW, how can you "hold" to the "tenet" of "reason" if it is arbitrary, as
you asserted before?<<
> Don't you think that the rules of chess are arbitrary? ... But we all can
play [it] because we accept those arbitrary rules. When I play chess, I
don't accept the rules because I think they are the objective truths. Do you?<
Maybe the rules of chess were "arbitrary" (as the dictionary defines it)
when the game first developed, when people created chess. But now the rules
of chess have taken on the form of an objective (outside our heads) fact,
are written down in books in very clear detail, and are generally accepted
by a large number of people. They are no longer arbitrary, though a
relatively small amount of arbitrariness creeps into the _interpretation_
of those rules (so that judges are needed at big-league chess matches).
Anyway, the analogy between playing a game and studying the world is very
incomplete. That is, they are not only similar but differ in many ways. As
far as I know, the game of chess never killed anyone, while one of the main
objects of my study (capitalism) has done so repeatedly.
Ajit continues: >This question of your is indicative of the fact that you
really don't know what is at issue here...<
**Here's the nub!** In this kind of discussion, the basic rule is that "it
takes two to tango." Maybe I don't know what _you_ think is at issue here,
but that simply means that you don't know what _I_ think is at issue.
Unless there's some sort of objective truth about "what's at issue" (which
I doubt in this case), what's happening is that we're talking past each other.
For the life of me, I didn't think the issues concerned games such as
chess. Rather, the issue was about the methods of social science.
You asserted that all statements of truth (of the sort that social science
or philosophy deals with) are arbitrary. Absent a definition from you, this
basically means that social science and philosophy absurd. My point was and
is that this is a self- contradictory perspective.
I wrote: >>But it's [the assumption that the world exists outside of our
consciousness of it] an assumption which we have to make if we want
anything to make sense.<<
>How many times we have already come across this assertion of yours?<
In this discussion thread, this assertion has shown up only once before the
current message. BTW, just because something is repeated doesn't mean it's
wrong or "arbitrary." (Of course, repetition doesn't make anything "true"
either.)
> Do you have any argument to defend this assertion?<
Yes, but I've got better things to do with my time. Anyway, why do you care
about hearing an "argument," since it would be arbitrary?
>... Why does 'objective truth' hide "behind" empirical appearances? Is it
the nature of 'truth' to be shy? Why can't it just stand out in open?<
Last time I checked, humans were fallible (though of course I can only
speak for myself, not for you). I for one make all sorts of mistakes, like
misintepreting Ajit's prose despite its crystal clarity. Also, our concepts
-- which we use to gain an understanding of the world in which we live --
can never be reduced to pure logic. Anthropologists, for example, have
discovered that different cultures define the boundary lines between
different colors differently; we can only imagine how more complex concepts
are distorted by the cultural context. Further, it is very hard to gain
enough information about any empirical topic to get a complete picture of
it. I could go on, but I'm sure that Ajit has heard this all before.
I had written: >>Given that assumption, a greater _approach_ to the truth
would involve having a subjective picture of that reality that fits the
objective reality more accurately and completely.<<
Ajit had responded: >But, according to yourself, since you do not know the
'objective reality', how would you know that your "subjective picture" of
that unknown "reality" fits that reality better or worse?<
I answered: >>I already answered that question. It involves the usual
toolkit of serious social scientists that Ajit already knows. ...<<
Ajit now responds: >What kind of cop out is this? A philosophical question
is settled by this mesterious took kit of "serious" social scientist?
Particularly when the question or the problem is not of social science in
particular to begin with.<
What, then, is the question?
>>As I said, there is no absolute truth that we can know. We can only
approach it, attain relative truth. <<
>... If you cannot know the absolute truth, then how do you know you are
approaching it? You could be going in absolutely wrong direction. So how do
you know?<
>>Good question. But I never said it was _easy_; it involves work. In fact,
as I said before, it's quite possible to get closer to the truth according
to one criterion (e.g., logical consistency) while going further on
according to another (e.g., consistency with empirical data). Given the
complication of serious issues in social science, it's much easier to tell
when you're moving away from understanding what's really going on than to
tell when you're moving toward it. (That's why it's always easier to
criticize than to actually contribute something to our understanding.)<<
>Good question, sure! But unfortunately pretty bad answer. Or basically no
answer.<
What is your argument for these assertions?
>>I follow Popper a little, but not all the way.<<
>That's your basic problem. You follow itse bitse bits of a thousand
philosophers and create your mumbo-zumbo philosophy par excellance.<
By what _criteria_ is this my problem? what's your argument? It is better
to be a slavish follower of _one_ philosopher rather than trying to learn
from several in search of a synthesis (as I do)? What philosopher do you
recommend I become a slavish follower of, if indeed this is what you
prescribe? (Until I get an answer, I think I'll stick with critical reason.)
>>The possibility of falsification is crucial<<
>Crucial for what?<
For gaining an understanding of the world rather than getting caught up in
a self-referential vicious circle (or the sort that cult members get into).
For understanding the world in order to change it for the better.
>>any vision of the empirical world that can't be falsified should be seen
as an assumption, the number of which should be minimized.<<
>What this got to do with establishing the truth of 'objective truth'?<
I was NEVER trying to establish the "truth of 'objective truth'" (whatever
that means). You will note (and sorry for the repetition) that above and in
previous messages I _assumed_ that the objective truth _exists_ even though
we don't know it, despite the unavoidable epistemological uncertainty.
>>We should either make our propositions explicit as assumptions or try to
test them (by dealing with new questions, different cases, etc.) If a
proposition doesn't fit perceived reality, that suggests that something is
wrong. If a theory is logically inconsistent, something is wrong. If the
perceptions of external reality and the logical theory don't mesh very well
(e.g., involves the forcing of data to fit the theory) then it's
methodologically suspect. If the theory doesn't work in practice (as a
guide to policy or political action) something is wrong.<<
>I thought you were going to establish the existence of 'objective truth'
and establish the fact that without 'objective truth' any communication
would be meaningless. What this pedestrian account of economic theory and
econometrics has got to do with our question. ... <
I never said that "without 'objective truth' any communication would be
meaningless." I think the problem here is that you break my messages down
into a lot of little pieces and then attack each one rather than trying to
understand the big picture. Unfortunately, this is a major flaw with most
e-mail debates & discussions.
BTW, I thought that only hard-core natives of Los Angeles were so wedded to
their cars that they used "pedestrian" in a pejorative way! Getting away
from such humor, I think that instead of eschewing the "pedestrian," we
should seek to unify it (i.e., the practical) with the high-flying
abstractions of philosophy. (Similarly, we shouldn't actively eschew the
abstract...)
I had written >>... I for one embrace agnosticism (as opposed to religion
....) In fact, I think agnosticism -- skepticism -- is the only _scientific_
attitude.<<
Ajit had responded: > Which you have shown an incredible lack of, as a
matter of fact. You have shown absolutely no skepticism about your own
BELIEF in truth, eventhough you keep saying that you can never know it.<
I responded: >>In earlier missives and above, I explicitly noted that it
was _an assumption_ rather than a "belief." Evelyn Woods has failed you.<<
Ajit now responds: >But the logic has failed you. Your assumption that
'objective truth' exists is nothing but your belief that it exists.<
I don't know how you can tell what is in my mind beyond what I say. What is
your basis for this assertion of "truth"? Are you a mind-reader? Can you
teach me this skill?
I had written >> We _don't_ know the objective truth. All we really have is
"working hypotheses" which can be rejected when better working hypotheses
come along. But the fact that there may be better working hypotheses
indicates the importance of _relative truth_ and of truth criteria in the
first place.<<
Ajit had responded: > You seem to be talking Karl Popper here. Popper had a
theory of verisimilitude, on the basis of which he thought theories could
be ranked. But ... [he] had to accept that his theory of verisimilitude was
inconsistent with his theory of hypothesis and refutation. So Popper, who
you are trying time and time again to bring in for help, would not be much
of help here. <
BTW, I don't know where Ajit gets the idea that I invoke Popper "time and
time again."
I said>> I agree with Popper on one thing: I think that appeal to authority
is a BS way of arguing. I really don't care about what he said, even if
what I say is similar in some ways (because it is dissimilar in others).
.... What I said should stand on its own (de)merits. That Pooper made a
mistake with X does not imply that I am wrong with Y. (And it seems not
worth anyone's time to have Ajit prove the identity of X and Y.)<<
>And it simply does not stand. To say that one theory is closer than the
other to 'objective truth' you need a scale to measure them. Did you make a
scale? No. You thought Popper had probably done it. Sure he tried but
failed. Now, it's your turn.<
I don't know _where_ you get these ideas about what I thought. I never said
that Popper had created a scale for measuring the relative truth of
different propositions. I never said that _I_ had created such a scale. In
fact, I said more than once (sorry about the repetition) that relative
truth was _multi-dimensional_ (so that one can approach truth according to
one criterion but move away from it according to another). In fact, see above.
If forced to choose _one_ criterion, I would use that of practice (see Paul
Z's missive), but luckily I am not forced to choose.
>>Ajit, why is Popper's inconsistency relevant anyway? After all, according
to you, all truth is arbitrary. So why not go with inconsistency? Just do
it!<<
>I just explained the relevancy of Popper above. When did I say "go with
inconsistency"? <
You never did: I asked a question -- given your seeming premise that all
truth is arbitrary -- "why not go with inconsistency?" If assertions of
truth are so bad, why not embrace falsity?
>I'm basically asking for consistency all the time. My claim is that your
claim to 'objective truth' [a claim I never made] is inconsistent within
its own logic of critical thinking. Not only that you haven't been able to
refute my claim [which is what?] but you have made a much greater claim
that without 'objective truth' every utterance becomes meaningless. And you
have made a total mess of your own claim.<
I would rely on more than Ajit's "argument" that I've made a "total mess."
Perhaps an objective observer could arbitrate? Of course not, since Ajit
would presumably see such arbitration as arbitrary!
One thing is sure: I never said that "every utterance becomes meaningless
with 'objective truth." There are lots of meaningful utterances where truth
criteria are irrelevant (such as "Hello! how are you?")
Ajit concludes: >The more and more I think about it, the more and more this
claim that 'everything would be meaningless without the criterion of
'objective truth' or thought becomes impossible without it' sounds absurd.<
I wonder where I stated this proposition. I also wonder what's wrong with
absurdity according to your criteria, Ajit?
>What Jim is asserting boils down to the statement that all forms of human
communication accept [i.e., except] empirical science are meaningless.<
Since I wasn't talking about communication, the stuff about art (Gorky,
etc.) is irrelevant. (I don't know anyone who sees "truth" as an important
way to judge art.) I was talking about studying the world. I do not see
social science as being in the same league as the game of chess or art, no
matter how honorable or useful all of those kinds of communication are.
> Jim's criterion would render most of the philosophical discourses
meaningless as well. To get back to where the whole thing started from,
Kant's discourse on morality should be declared meaningless babbling
according to Jim Devine's criterion. The categorical imparative or the
moral imarative of Kant does not rest on any 'objective truth' out
there...<
I was also not talking about normative analysis like Kant's discussion that
Ajit cites.
I'm not the expert on Kant that Ajit is, but if Kant makes no reference to
the morality held by actual human beings and simply develops his
"imperatives" via logic inside his own skull, then it seems a very
incomplete and thus not very helpful discussion (a bit like Arrow-Debreu
general equilibrium). Even then, the reference to objective truth exists in
such an analysis because of the reliance on logic. Logic is not something
that is simply and purely subjective ("arbitrary"?); like mathematics, our
"systems of logic" reflect (but is not the same as) some kind of logic that
exists in the universe.
in pen-l solidarity,
Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://clawww.lmu.edu/1997F/ECON/jdevine.html
Econ. Dept., Loyola Marymount Univ.
7900 Loyola Blvd., Los Angeles, CA 90045-8410 USA
310/338-2948 (daytime, during workweek); FAX: 310/338-1950
"As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not
certain; as far as they are certain, they really do not refer to
reality." -- Albert Einstein.
