At 03:53 PM 12/31/97 -0800, Jim Devine wrote:
>I think that the whole issue of whether or not we need vanguards boils down
>to how those vanguards act.
>
>Early on (1905?), old Leon T. launched a critique of Lenin for being
>"substitutionist." (See, e.g., Deutscher, THE PROPHET ARMED.) The critique
>was very abstract (and self-described Trotskyists have ignored it), but it's
>relevant. The problem of a vanguard arises when it starts substituting
>itself for the class it's supposed to lead. Rather than combining teaching
>workers with learning from them, a substitutionist organization tries to ram
>its "correct" line or program down workers' throats. It claims to speak in
>the name of the workers -- or even worse, claims to act in the name of the
>workers -- without being held responsible to that class. If such an
>organization takes state power, the "dictatorship of the proletariat" can
>become the dictatorship in the name of the proletariat or (worse) the
>dictatorship over the proletariat. In such a situation, the central
>committee is likely to substitute itself for the party rank and file, while
>eventually the Leader subsitutes him or herself for the central committee.
>
>Note that an organization doesn't have to be "Leninist" or communist to be
>substitutionist. A social democratic party typically substitutes the
>parliamentary representatives and the party bureaucracy for the rank and
>file. The careers of the leaders dominate the wishes of the members. I am
>sure that a lot of pen-l people have been members of organizations where the
>"national office" staff end up dominating the organization.
etc.
Jim makes a valid point that can be carried even further - every
organisation 'representing' some larger constituency will inevitably, sooner
or later, become 'substitutionist.' This is so, beacuse contrary to
official statements and pronouncements, organizational behavior is driven,
for the most part, by the situationist logic rather than abstract missions
and goals. In other words, most of the decisions made by an organization's
officers reflect the immediate experience and circumstances of the officers
themselves -- but then those decisions are 'rationalised' or ex-post fact
justified in terms of the official goals and missions (cf. the neo-Weberian
school in organizational theory aka "the garbage can theory of organizations").
For example, a university department may hire candidate X because every
other candidate is opposed by some of the departmental factions, or the
dean, or the university president, etc. Of course, that opposition is a
good reason for opting for X, because every other candidacy is likely to be
derailed by the opposition. Yet, the official justification is that X had
"the best qualifications for the job."
Of course, when the organisation's goals are even more open-ended and
defined even more ambiguously - as in the case of political parties or
governments -- there are many competing views how to proceed, and all those
views purport to be in the best interests of the constituents. Clearly, the
internal power struggles will drive all or most of the decisions - and all
of it in the name of the constituents' "best interest."
To summarize: human behavior is driven by immediate experience rather than
abstract principles, and the immediate experience of organization's officers
is shaped by other organization's officers, rather than the organization's
constituents. As long as it is so, the organization's behavior (decisions
made by its officers) will be shaped by internal politics, and only ex post
facto justified in terms of the organization's official mission.
The only way out of this situation is such an organizational design that
requires the organization's officers routinely interact with constituents in
such as way that the officers' experience is shaped primarily by interaction
with constituents rather than other officers.
cheers,
wojtek sokolowski
institute for policy studies
johns hopkins university
baltimore, md 21218
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
voice: (410) 516-4056
fax: (410) 516-8233
