First let me note that Marty L.-H. is right that more of the troubled tigers were running current account deficits than just South Korea, especially Thailand, the alleged epicenter of the crash. But if current account deficits are what determine currency fundamentals, then the US is a sitting duck with its long-entrenched and now rapidly expanding current account deficits. I can hardly wait for Michel Camdessus to take a helicopter from the IMF building over to the US Treasury to tell the US what to do with its fiscal policy. Also, despite having high current account deficits in many cases, most of these nations have had actual budget surpluses or low deficits, have had relatively low rates of inflation, high rates of savings, and very high rates of real GDP growth and productivity growth. Of course these were exactly the kinds of elements that led all kinds of commentators to drool at the mouth over these econmies, many of these same commentators now huffing and puffing about how these countries need fiscal austerity and other parts of the IMF package that was developed for hyperinflationary/budget deficit Latin America. Duh... As regards currency fundamentals, since I brought this up, there is no universally agreed upon model of currency fundamentals. There are several competing models, some of them differing on their time horizons. The traditional long-run model is purchasing power parity which ignores capital movements and sees everything determined by trade. Productivity and inflation drive this model. By that model most East Asian currencies are now severely undervalued. However this model generally explains little in the short-run, latest estimates showing about a 15% per year convergence toward PPP. Shorter term models bring in capital movements, but even there there are differences between stock models and flow models. The latter generally involve interest parity conditions. Thus, higher interest rates should raise the value of currencies and we frequently see this. That's how Hong Kong is "defending" its currency. But on a wealth/asset model higher interest rates damage present values of assets and may hurt a currency. This may have happened to the US dollar several years ago when the Fed raised US interest rates with the dollar falling as a result. Foreigners feared further interest rate increases and declines in asset values in the US and fled the dollar as a result. Thus, I was sticking my neck out in saying the East Asian currencies are undervalued. But they certainly are on PPP grounds (determined by productivity and price levels). And old models by Dornbusch and others show that with fixed prices and wages a shock in the foreign currency market usually leads to an overshoot. This looks like one. The devaluations have gone too far. How long it will take for them to go back is another question. Barkley Rosser -- Rosser Jr, John Barkley [EMAIL PROTECTED]
currency fundamentals
Rosser Jr, John Barkley Mon, 19 Jan 1998 17:00:39 -0500 (Eastern Standard Time)
- Re: currency fundamentals Rosser Jr, John Barkley
- Re: currency fundamentals Doug Henwood
- Re: currency fundamentals Rosser Jr, John Barkley
- Re: currency fundamentals Jay Hecht
- Re: currency fundamentals Rosser Jr, John Barkley
- Re: currency fundamentals Jay Hecht
- Re: currency fundamentals Rosser Jr, John Barkley