> Date sent: Wed, 20 May 1998 15:25:34 +1000 > From: Ajit Sinha <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Subject: [PEN-L:129] In Defense of History > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Send reply to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > >In Defense of History: A Critical Review > Ajit Sinha > In Defense of History Marxism and the Postmodern Agenda (eds.) Ellen > Meiksins Wood& John Bellamy Foster. Monthly Review Press. New York. Pages: 204 > > > First of all we are told that: > postmodernists-either deliberately or out of simple confusion and > intellectual sloppiness-have a habit of conflating the forms of knowledge > with its objects: it is as if they are saying not only that, for instance, > the science of physics is a historical construct, which has varied over > time and in different social contexts, but the laws of nature themselves > are 'socially constructed' and historically variable. (p. 5, emphasis added). > > As I understand it, all postmodernism is saying is that any discription of > nature-objective or otherwise-is always within language (see Rorty, 1989), > and is part of a particular language game, to use a Wittgenstienian term. But this seems to imply we are somehow the play-things of language games. Each language game is as valid as the other. I would rather say we modern humans are self-conscious, therefore only those language games consistent with our self-consciousness are valid - that is, only those language games capable of internal self- criticism. > Professor Wood has not argued that the postmodernist position is false. She > only uses the rhetorical devise of 'obviousness' when she simply insists > that there is an objective nature independent of language with a law of its > own to boot. This particular strategy of using the so-called objective law > of nature as a refutation of the postmodernist critique of the notion of > 'objective truth' compromises her position on another front when she wants > to uphold the idea that human beings "make history". If the objective world > is governed by the 'law of nature', then human beings and human actions > must also be governed by the same law of nature, since human beings are > part of the same 'objective nature' according to the materialist > philosophy. Thus human beings cannot have 'free will', and therefore, > cannot "make history". Right. Ellen Wood is known as a gifted marxist, but I myself have always been troubled by the almost purely rhetorical nature of her polemics; it is as if she is preaching to the converted. The same I find in Gunder Frank's recently posted review of David Landes's book: it is mainly a polemic against eurocentrism (mind you there are some substantial points). > Interestingly enough, Professor Wood's defense of 'totalizing knowledge' on > the basis of capitalism being a 'totalizing system' compromises her > fundamental thesis that the 'reason' and values of Enlightenment should be > kept separate and independent from capitalism. But if capitalism is a > 'totalizing system', then on what ground one could keep the dominant form > of reasoning and the value system that prevails in this society independent > of its inherent logic? Yes, the problem is Wood's totalizing ideology, but, as Adorno once said, no matter how total a theory strives to be, it will always leave a "remainder" - antinomies which disrupt any presumption of achieved totality. > Fortunately, Terry Eagleton in the very next essay brings a change in the > tone and gives postmodernism its due. [...] Nevertheless, he finds postmodernism to be politically paralyzing and > disabling. The reason for this is that postmodernism not only cuts the > ground from under the feet of its opponents but it also refuses to provide > itself with a ground to stand on as well. This seems to be a fair > criticism. But postmodernism may take it as a compliment. If postmodernism > is an attempt to open up a 'new world'-a new way of talking and > thinking-then this old idea of having a firm ground beneath your feet may > not be relevant or important to it. Professor Eagleton, however, finds such > tendencies of postmodernism to be inherently contradictory, and an outcome > of a serious political defeat-probably the failure of May 68. Only one I know who has done some serious work in formulating a "ground" for our times is Habermas. > The next article is by David McNally on Language. Professor McNally claims > that postmodernism's "reification" of language, as exemplified by Derrida's > famous statement that 'there is nothing outside of text' or Foucault's > emphasis on "discourse", is essentially an idealist philosophy. Against > such idealism, he proposes a Marxist materialist thesis of language. He > proposes two theses: one is the thesis of language as a tool, and the other > is the thesis of language as reflection of experiences. > > In his first thesis Professor McNally argues that human beings need to > produce in order to survive and production requires cooperation among human > beings. The need for cooperation makes communication an essential aspect of > human life. Thus language as a tool for communication becomes an essential > element of human life: > A defining feature of human life is social labor, the way in which we > organize the interconnected productive activities of individuals in order > to reproduce ourselves materially. Just as human work presupposes > consciousness, so it requires communication among individuals, a capacity > to share and exchange ideas in order to coordinate social labor. And > language is the medium of such communication, .... (p. 28, emphasis added). > > In my opinion, the whole sequential reasoning on which this thesis is > built-i.e., first hunger is felt, to solve this original problem we need to > produce, which leads us to cooperate with each other (develop some kind of > division of labor), which in turn leads us to develop a language to > facilitate cooperation-is nothing but a fairy tale. In all the societies > hitherto known human beings have found themselves born in a given structure > of production as well as language. The sequential story that privileges > material production over language is based on the ahistorical idea that > hunger is the original cause that gives rise to society. Where is the > historical evidence for this? Another point is that human cooperation necessarily involves norms otherwise it is strictly instinctual. > Next comes an interesting interview with Aijaz Ahmad (this interview was > conducted by Slovenian journalists Erika Repovz and Nikolai Jeffs and is > edited for this volume by Ellen Wood). In this interview Ahmad talks about > varied issues such as nationalism, fascism, diversity, universality, etc. > Though Professor Ahmad supports anti-imperialist nationalism-he thinks such > nationalism is essential for a colonized society to reach socialism-he is > quite skeptical of nationalism in general and sees a threat of fascism in > it whenever nationalism turns into a quest for "purified and homogeneous > nations." Thus Ahmad is extremely in favor of diversity and heterogeneity. > At the same time, however, he champions the idea of universality. He argues > that particular rights or right to be different can only be defended and > fought for within the ideology of universal right. This is an interesting > idea but needs to be developed further. For example, how does one reconcile > universality and diversity when the right to be different comes in conflict > with the ideology of universality? Moreover, as Professor Ahmad himself > agrees, capitalism is a highly universalizing culture. The universalization > or the 'McDonalization' of the world is at the expense of diversity. How > does one fight such universalizing tendencies on the basis of an ideology > of universality? The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (of the UN) includes, by definition, individual rights. > Yet Nanda herself admits that no observation is 'innocent'. The fact that > observations and theories are interconnected and internally related to each > other, the fact that no observation is 'innocent' means that the idea of an > 'objective nature' is simply a fundamental belief of 'Western science'. It > is not a proposition that could be proved or an hypothesis that could be > established by science itself. This fundamental belief must be simply > accepted by the scientist and must be kept beyond the realm of criticism. > The culture of criticism comes to an end here. We had this debate here before. Empiricism cannot justify itself by itself; it has to appeal to some extra-empirical criteria to do so. Habermas says that verification is valid only in a pragmatic sense: we humans, or a community of scientists, have decided that the method of the natural siences is "valid" because it serves certain pragmatic interests. And for Habermas that interest is *technical* mastery of nature. By that criteria what the natural sciences say is true. No reason to fall back into mysticism. > Next comes a paper by the co-editor John Bellamy Foster on 'Marx and the > Environment'. In this paper, Foster argues against the popular view that > Marx adopted a productivist view of history that subordinates environment > or nature to the logic of material production. He argues, on the contrary, > that both Marx and Engels were quite aware of man's dependence on nature > and the conflict between production and environment. Thus they argued for > "sustainable development" and not development per se. This paper is a > positive contribution and opens Marxism up to the contemporary debate on > environment. This notwithstanding, I think Professor Foster would agree > that the idea of "sustainable development" is essentially rooted in man's > control over nature-it is only about better planning. Such an idea has > become part of world bourgeois ideology, and does not have revolutionary > potential in the contemporary environmental movement. There is no evidence whatsoever that Marx and Engels were ecologically-minded; to expect them to be is anachronistic. > In the end, I would like to make a small point. In his lecture on Marx, > Derrida (1994) remarked that justice is a notion that cannot be > deconstructed. I think it is a very significant point, which could prove to > be strategic in bringing a convergence between Marxist and the > postmodernist moral discourse.The idea of justice is not necessarily an > Enlightenment idea. Both Western and Eastern socities have had this idea > for a long time. Marx's moral critique of capitalism is also rooted in the > idea of justice rather than the idea of universalism or freedom (see Geras, > 1992). We need to contemplate on the question of justice and just society. Yea but you need to tell us what Derrida (or you) mean by justice. ricardo > > REFERENCES > > Derrida, J. 1994. Spectres of Marx: the state of the debt, the work of > mourning, and the New International. New York: Routledge. > > Geras, N. 1992. 'Bringing Marx to Justice: An addendum and Rejoinder.' New > Left Review 195. > > Habermas, J. 1987. The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. Cambridge, > Massachusetts: The MIT Press. > > Luxemburg, R. 1963. The Accumulation of Capital. London: Routledge and > Kegan Paul. > > Rorty, R. 1989. Contingency, irony, and solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge > University press. > > Wallerstein, I. 1983. Historical Capitalism. London: Verso. > > >
