I really wish I could be as optimistic about the ruptural, not to speak of revolutionary, possibilities offered by the current crisis in Russia or put as much faith in the KPRF as does Mark Jones. When the power of the working class (i.e. the political organisations based in, led by and directly representing the workers) has been obliterated by direct (as was the case in the post-Turin Italy or post-Night of the Long Knives Germany) or indirect (as was/is the case in the Soviet/post-Soviet labour-management relations; I exclude the state as such, for it has not played a role in subjugating labour other than through reneging its base - the enterprise directors and industrial nomenclatura - and only with them the workers) force, the logical consequence is reactionary despotism. This produces two further scenarios: I). Judging from the disorganised Russian state, this reaction will not come in an centralised authoritarian 'package'. Mark is right to point out that neither Lebed nor Luzhkov could be the catalyst of such change, because they are currently politically bankrupt and, ultimately, ineffectual in the face of the crisis of current proportions. The reaction, if it does come, is most likely to take the shape of recomposition of paternalistically based fiefdoms or corporate-criminal clan structures so pervasive in Russia. We might just see a turnaround to pre-Ivan the Terrible (circa 1550) decentralisation (or, as it is, de-federation). II). If this reaction comes in a centralised manner, it can only be so through the agency of the Communist Party of Russian Federation. For, currently being among the most popular political forces, the KPRF can achieve something of the sort unlike anyone else. But, there is one problem, which renders the possible third scenario: III). Tthe KPRF has had a rotten record of basically being in the pocket of the Yeltsin regime. For all the collisions between the dissolution-threatened (opposition dominated) Duma and the impeachment-threatened Yeltsin, the latter holds a commanding force over the latter (through the pocket book and the security of being a paid - albeit a cynical - politician). The seeming rhetorical prowess of the Duma has been little more than a political mechanism for getting more concessions out of Yeltsin, in a manner described by some (Vadim Borisov, 1994) as 'oral sex'. Every time some seemingly important issue has been brought to the Duma in the past and - as the presidential law stipulates - being threatened with dissolution upon rejecting the motion after the third vote, the Duma never actually stood its ground. This is simply a mechanism of political bargaining. In the (Soviet) past it was done at informal Party gatherings, today its done out in the open, where 'democracy' can be said to be in action. Well, it certainly is in action, if, of course, democracy can be narrowed down to such crudity. There were recently reports that this time the Communists mean business and will not bend to Yeltsin, but latest developments might prove otherwise. (On this point, see attached article below.) However, at this conjuncture such haggling might prove disastrous for the workers. For, in the absence of real working class political organisations (which would not kow-tow to Yeltsin's waving of the cheque-book), the power will most likely pass into the hands of Chernomyrdin, with the latter being in any case powerless to deliver Russia out of chaos. To be sure, his reign might give a boost to the Russian economy in the short term through the increase in the production of commodities, (hopefully) followed by the payment of wages to the workers and by the centralisation of finances. Yet without a fundamental revolutionisation of production methods and, consequently, the very social relations of production, (something, we must note, Chernomyrdin is not in favour of due to his affiliation with the industrial nomenklatura which is bent on averting competition from the West, even if it means operating in a _sui generis_ (supply) shortage economy which benefits principally merchant capital) there is little hope the recovery can be successful in the medium to long term. Hopefully the current vacuum on the Marxist political front can provide a powerful lesson of the lost opportunity to the country's workers, while Chernomyrdin's possible victory and the almost certain ensuing crisis, give them the necessary time to develop such strategies. But first, of course, the workers will need to develop the independent (adversarial and representing members' interests) union structures that would see the development of something resembling workers political struggle in the traditional sense of the word. Before this is a reality, we can talk all we want about the (careerism presented in the garb of the) politics of defence of the 'common man' (note: not even 'workers') currently displayed by the KPRF and hope (in some voluntarism fashion) that may be this time round Stalinism will be more humane than in the past. Stalinism is not an empty political programme but is an ideology appropriate to the material requirements of the Stalinist economic regime which, lest we forget, is nothing to cheer about. In sol, Greg. P.S. I shall send the article dealing with the current kow-towing of the Communists to Yeltsin in the next post. Louis Proyect wrote: > James Farmelant wrote: > > Mark Jones wrote........... > ..... > ..... > ..... > Mark > -- > http://www.geocities.com/~comparty > > Louis Proyect > > (http://www.panix.com/~lnp3/marxism.html) -- Gregory Schwartz Department of Political Science York University 4700 Keele St. Toronto, Ontario M3J 1P3 Canada Tel: (416) 736-5265 Fax: (416) 736-5686 Web: http://www.yorku.ca/dept/polisci
