Mine,
I am actually a "philosophy person"--used to be a philosophy professor before I was a
lawyer. Although I do not necessary share the vehemence of the rejection of (the very
different, as you remark) approaches of deconstruction or hermeneutics, I am fairly
suspicious of their value when applied in a cookie cutter manner to scientific
questions. The Sokal hoax shows what happens when scientifically illiterate
postmodernists try to talk about science. I don't know enough about hermeneutics
(Gadamer, Otto-Appel, that lot) to say whether scientific illiteracy is a defect of
that tendency, although it wouldn't surprise me if it was. (However, I will remark
that Heidegger, of all people, an important influence on both decontruction and
hermeneutics, wrote some excellent philosophy of science based in obviously solid
knowledge of early modern science.)
I would refrain from broad brush statements about "empiricism." What do you have in
mind when you say that empiricists "support the status quo by distorting the facts in
the name of science"? Empiricism in its broadest sense is quintessentially respect for
the facts as established by scientific research. This is not an approach that is for
or against the status quo. Now, logical empiricism, the philosophy expounded by
Carnap, Hempel, Reichenbach, Ayer, and so forth, has been pretty thoroughly
discredited in most of its details, and has not had any serious exponents for a
quarter century, even among those who consider themselves in some sense
empiricists--like me. The closest is perhaps Larry Sklar, although I wonder whether
Michael Dummett isn't really a logical empiricist. Still, he doesn't advertise that
he is one. G.A. Cohen, a leading (former?) analytical Marxist is pretty close to
logical empiricism in his philosophy of science.
It was, however, deeply respectful of facts, and, for what it was worth, thought to be
consitent with the left social democratic politics of those figures. Ayer, in fact,
was a pretty radical left Labourite. One of the key logical empiricists, Otto Neurath,
was a Marxist who made substantial contributions to the theory of the planned economy.
Contemporary empiricism tends to be of two main types, which are not necesasrily
inconsistent. One is neopragmatism of the sort represented by W.V. Quine (a
reactionary), Wilfred Sellars (a radical), and the new Hilary Putnam (a former
Marxist), as well as by Richard Rorty (a left liberal). The other is scientific
realism, represented, e.g., by the old Putnam and his students, Michael Devitt,
Richard Boyd, Richard Miller, Peter Railton--Marxists or former Marxists of some
stripe all, Quine and Sellars are also scientific realists. I consider myself both a
neopragmatist and a scientific realist. Railton was on my dissertation committee.
--jks
In a message dated Wed, 7 Jun 2000 2:23:56 PM Eastern Daylight Time,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
<<
>
>>References to hermeneutics and deconstruction don't convince me. I've
never
>>been into that kind of lit crit sh*t. I prefer logic, empirical
research,
>>and the philosophy of science (methodology).
If there would be a philosophy or literature person here, s(he) would
*really* be pissed, not only by the unprofessional use of language but
also by ignorance. I am not a big fun of hermeneutics and deconstruction
either, but I never make the mistake of considering those theorists
writing outside the realm of philosopy of science. Science, by its nature,
requires *some form* of hermeneutical understanding-- the question of what
is that we are studying? why and how? Many people who have written
about hermeneutics have also written about the philosophy of social
sciences: nature of understanding, nature of inquiry, different
methodologies, interpretation (don't we interpret facts in economics.
oh!), the status of the relationship between positive and social
sciences, etc, etc..okey I have not seen very many critical studies in
hermeneutics (mind you that hermeneutics and deconstruction are very
different things). I have not seen among *empricists* or pure logicists
either. Empricists are well known to be supportive of status quo by
distorting facts in the name of science. They present ideology as science.
I would not be too quick to accept empricist methodology at face value.
Regarding *critical* hermeneutics, one should have a look at Paul Ricour's
works, not Gadamer's. Paul R. tries to abridge the gap between Marxism and
understanding, and the role of marxist methodology in interpretation.
Why do economists constantly make the claim that what they are doing are
objective science given that it is not-- given that distribution of
resources is by definition a political act!
Mine Doyran
SUNY/Albany
>>
