In a message dated 6/23/00 11:18:37 PM Eastern Daylight Time, JKSCHW writes: < << Justin writes: >I agree. It's part of my criticism of Cohen in that he cannot make this >distinction, although he does insist in another part of his account on the >distinction between relations of production that are functional for and >those that fewtter or are dysfunctional for the forces of production. Jim says: if he can't make the distinction, all he's got is a functional explanation, which lands him smack dab in the middle of the functionalist camp. You do not seem to be interested in trying to understand why an intelligent radical might find Cohen valuable. I am mystified by your hostility. With all due respect, I find his contribution a great deal more considerable than yours, much less mine. However, I will try again. Cohen if of course aware that there are dysfunctional phenomena. In fact, it is cehntral to his theory of social change that that the relations of production come to fetter, in some sense, the forces of production. He has careful an interesting extended treatments of fettering. At that level, he makes the distinction. However, if you look at what his account of functional explanatuion is, he cannot distinguish between a functional and a dysfunctional explanation. That is, his theory of what makes functional explanations explanatory does not allow the distinction. But you confuse levels. You seem to think that if he cannot make the distinction at the metalevel, he cannot make it at the object level. That is a fallacy. >you might think that there are many social phenomena that have >neither a functional nor a dysfunctional explanation. Functionalism I take >to be doctrine that everything is functional. No, the star functionalist, Talcott Parsons, saw some phenomena as nonfunctional. . . . Parsons never allowed for dysfunctional phenomena >> OK, I defer to you here. I could never read enough Parsons to know. But the point is, Cohen allows for and insists on dysfunctional phenomena in his basic theory. He agrees neither with my exteeme functionalist nor with Parsons. --jks >>
In a message dated 6/23/00 10:40:39 PM Eastern Daylight Time, JKSCHW writes: << Justin writes: >I agree. It's part of my criticism of Cohen in that he cannot make this >distinction, although he does insist in another part of his account on the >distinction between relations of production that are functional for and >those that fewtter or are dysfunctional for the forces of production. Jim says: if he can't make the distinction, all he's got is a functional explanation, which lands him smack dab in the middle of the functionalist camp. You do not seem to be interested in trying to understand why an intelligent radical might find Cohen valuable. Ia m mystified by your hostility. With all due respect, I find his contribution more considerable than yours, much less mine. However, I will try again. Cohen if of course aware that there are dysfunctional phenomena. In fact, it is cehntral to his theory of social change that that the relations of production come to fetter, in some sense, the forces of production. He has careful an interesting extended treatments of fettering. At that level, he makes the distinction. However, if you look at what his account of functional explanatuion is, he cannot distinguish between a functional and a dysfunctional explanation. That is, his theory of what makes functional explanations explanatory does not allow the distinction. But you confuse levels. You seem to think that if he cannot make the distinction at the metalevel, he cannot make it at the object level. That is a fallacy. >you might think that there are many social phenomena that have >neither a functional nor a dysfunctional explanation. Functionalism I take >to be doctrine that everything is functional. No, the star functionalist, Talcott Parsons, saw some phenomena as nonfunctional. . . . Parsons never allowed for dysfunctional phenomena >> OK, I defer to you here. I could never read enough Parsons to know. But the point is, Cohen allows for and insists on dysfunctional phenomena in his basic theory. He agrees neither with my exteeme functionalist nor with Parsons. --jks
