Journal of World-Systems Research
Volume 3, Number 3 (Fall 1997)
http://csf.colorado.edu/wsystems/jwsr.html
ISSN 1076-156X
Position in the World-System and National Emissions of
Greenhouse Gases*
by
Thomas J. Burns
Department of Sociology
University of Utah
Salt Lake City, Utah 84112
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Byron L. Davis
Department of Sociology
University of Utah
Edward L. Kick
Department of Sociology
University of Utah
Cite: Burns, Thomas J., Byron L. Davis, and Edward L. Kick. (1997).
"Position in the World-System and National Emissions of Greenhouse
Gases." Journal of World-Systems Research 3: 432 - ??.
*An earlier version of this paper was presented at the National Third
World Studies Conference, Omaha, Nebraska, October
1995.
© 1997 Thomas J. Burns, Byron L. Davis, and Edward L. Kick.
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INTRODUCTION
The "greenhouse effect" is the Earth's trapping of infrared radiation or
heat. Physical scientists have linked the greenhouse
effect to the emission of two primary sources, or "greenhouse
gases"––carbon dioxide and methane. While this in itself is a
naturally–occurring phenomenon, the amount of trapped heat has increased
substantially along with heightened human
production and consumption. In fact, the amount of heat trapped in the
earth's atmosphere through the greenhouse effect has
risen dramatically in the last thirty years, and has done so in rough
proportion to the loss of world carbon sinks (most notably
through deforestation) in that same period (Grimes and Roberts 1995;
Schneider 1989).
Despite the apparent importance of these dynamics, there is relatively
little social science theorization and cross–national
research on such global environmental issues. There is especially a
paucity of cross–national, quantitative research in sociology
that focuses on the social antecedents to environmental outcomes (for
exceptions, see Burns et al. 1994, 1995; Kick et al.
1996; Grimes and Roberts 1995). We find this condition surprising given
the substantial initial work of environmental
sociologists (Dunlap and Catton 1978, 1979; Buttel 1987) and the key
role social scientists might in principle play in
addressing such worldwide problems (Laska 1993). As a consequence, we
propose and assess a perspective on the global
and national social causes of one environmental dynamic, the greenhouse
effect.
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THE NATURE OF GREENHOUSE GASES
For present purposes it is sufficient to underscore just a few
essentials about the "greenhouse effect." It refers to the
atmospheric trapping of heat that, for the most part, emanates from
natural compounds (e.g., carbon dioxide, methane), but it
is vitally important to recognize that global social life has greatly
augmented the concentration of these and other gases.
Physical scientists theorize that if this human–generated trend
continues, global climatic changes will occur that have serious, if
not catastrophic, long–term effects (e.g. Schneider 1989; CDAC 1983).
These effects range from the destruction of
agriculture to mammoth flooding as a result of the melting of the polar
ice caps.
The most important human–produced greenhouse gas is carbon dioxide
(CO2), which is primarily a product of fossil fuel
usage. The United States is the largest global emitter of CO2, followed
by the former U.S.S.R., China, India, and Germany.
Net amounts of CO2 are also increased through human land use, especially
as it involves deforestation. Because forests are
the primary locus of CO2–oxygen exchange, their depletion reduces the
rate of natural CO2 uptake.
Large amounts of another greenhouse gas, methane (CH4), similarly result
from wet rice agriculture, livestock, uncontrolled
coal mine emissions, and petroleum and natural gas leakages (World
Resources Institute 1994:199–202, 361–272). China is
the world's leading emitter of methane, followed by India, the United
States, Brazil, and Bulgaria.
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It should be emphasized that the social dynamics leading to CO2, CH4 and
to environmental degradation generally, may
operate quite differently across structural positions in the
world–system (Olsen 1990; Burns et al. 1994, 1995; Kick et al.
1996; Grimes and Roberts 1993), and that these dynamics themselves
depend upon global processes (e.g. Kone 1993;
Thiele and Wiebelt 1993; Bunker 1984). It is to these latter theoretical
linkages that we now turn.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE WORLD-SYSTEM, NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT,
POPULATION, AND
GREENHOUSE GASES
World–system theorists provide a framework focusing on global processes
and their influences on national outcomes.
Wallerstein (1974:390 ff.), for instance, identifies a world economy
that for centuries has promulgated power and dependency
linkages among nations of the world. He argues that global
power–dependency relationships are reflected in an international
division of labor that encompasses core, semiperipheral and peripheral
countries. Core nations, including the major powers of
Western Europe, the United States, Canada, and Japan dominate global
production by virtue of their domestic and
international strength. For Wallerstein, this strength is primarily
economic in nature (for models acknowledging other
dimensions of international strength, see Snyder and Kick 1979; Kick et
al. 1995; Terlouw 1993).
In the short run at least, core countries thereby ensure their wealth,
economic expansion and technological advancement.
When coupled with relatively low population growth, these serve to
maintain a high standard of living for core nations,
reflected in their role as the primary consumer of the world's
resources, including its energy reserves (see Rosa et al. 1988;
also see Cook 1971).
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According to conventional world–system arguments, the countries in the
periphery of the world-system––the least–developed
nations in Africa and Asia (e.g., Bangladesh, Rwanda)––are relatively
weaker than the core and, to a lesser extent, the
semiperiphery (e.g., Chile, Libya). As a result they remain
underdeveloped, and experience the domestic conditions that
accompany a relatively low standard of living. As an illustration,
consider that the commodity exports of peripheral countries
often are highly concentrated, even more so than the semiperiphery's; as
such, these countries are comparably vulnerable on
international exchange networks (Kone 1993; Thiele and Wiebelt 1993).
These dynamics, when coupled with initial disadvantage due at least in
part to international geography, as well as to
political–military, cultural and technical dependency, have severely
limited national wealth and the economic growth potential
of the periphery. These disadvantages limit technical progress and in
turn foster virtually unchecked population growth, which
ensure the substantially rural and agrarian character of the periphery's
labor force (Elnagheeb and Bromley 1994).
Semiperipheral countries have characteristics of both the core and the
periphery (Terlouw 1993; Arrighi and Drangel
1986:12). Further, they mediate between the core and the periphery in
the world–system. The economically and politically
stronger nation–states of Africa, Latin America and Asia, for example,
exercise a not insignificant degree of control over
exchanges with the periphery, despite their own economic
political–military, cultural and technological dependence upon the
core. Relatedly, semiperipheral countries occupy an intermediate
position in terms of their per capita product, and are
technologically, economically, and militarily advantaged relative to the
periphery. Not unlike the periphery, the semiperiphery is
undergoing rapid population growth, but unlike the periphery,
semiperipheral populations typically are more highly urbanized
as they undergo rapid social change.
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Although the short–term a priori odds of any given nation experiencing
world–system mobility are slim, many countries in the
semiperiphery have a strong motive and related potential for upward
mobility in the system (Chase–Dunn 1990; Wallerstein
1979; Arrighi and Drangel 1986). A country maximizes its chances of
mobility by utilizing what advantages it does have
relative to others. For example, a semiperipheral country is likely to
emphasize its revenue–generating capability relative to the
periphery, but its cost–advantage relative to the core (Arrighi and
Drangel 1986:27). Partly as a result of this process, some of
the countries in the semiperiphery have become more industrialized than
some of those in the core (Arrighi and Drangel 1986).
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Stern et al. (1992) point out that demands for energy have peaked in
some core countries. This can be attributed, in part, to
the movement of heavy industry out of the core and to the semiperiphery.
Thus, a high standard of living, mass consumption,
and mammoth energy usage still characterize the core (Arrighi and
Drangel 1992), while industrialization increasingly typifies
the semiperiphery.
The semiperipheral countries most likely to acquire and maintain heavy
industry are those with the strongest network ties to
other countries who could potentially serve as markets for the goods
produced––most notably the mass consumption societies
of the core. A similar logic applies to agricultural production and
export––a disproportionate share of agricultural production
which is connected to international markets, occurs in the stronger (by
which we primarily mean more tightly networked)
nations of the semiperiphery.
While the long–term outcome may not be successful, semiperipheral
nations attempt to use their relative advantages in hopes
of attaining world–system mobility. But as Terlouw (1993) contends: "a
semiperipheral state who wants to improve its position
in the world–system must first of all strengthen its state apparatus"
(p.96).
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A strong semiperipheral state apparatus depends in the modern world
economy on heightened industrial or agricultural
production which, regrettably, frequently bypasses the health and
environmental safeguards that commonly attend such
production in core countries. Further, it was those countries that were
core–like in some respects (e.g. political), but not in
others (e.g. economic), which were most likely to undergo crises. During
such crises, environmental concerns are most likely
to take a back seat to more immediate ones. Crises thus are likely to
contain the potential for ecological catastrophe, and the
loci of many such crises are likely to be in the semiperiphery1.
In making such arguments, we acknowledge that despite its theoretical
utility, the semiperiphery as a theoretical and empirical
construct is the least well–defined of the three major sectors of the
world–system. Depending upon the definition used, as
much as two–thirds of the world's population resides in a semiperipheral
country. As Terlouw (1993) points out: "The vast
majority of states have been classified at least once as semiperipheral,
but no state is always allocated to the
semiperiphery...[t]he diversity of states which are thus classified as
semiperipheral is striking" (pp. 88–89).
Distinctions can be drawn within the "semiperiphery" category. While by
definition, semiperipheral states are stronger
economically, politically or militarily than peripheral states, the
omnibus "semiperiphery" categorization masks important
differences in the transnational power and dependency linkages of
lesser–developed countries in Western and Eastern Europe
(e.g., Finland, Bulgaria), relative to third–world countries (e.g.,
Egypt, Columbia).
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A number of theorists have pointed to distinctions within the
semiperiphery, based on either internal characteristics (e.g.
Arrighi and Drangel 1986), or international characteristics (e.g. Nemeth
and Smith 1985; Smith and White 1992; Snyder and
Kick 1979; Kick 1987).
In this paper, we distinguish between stronger states and weaker states
in the semiperiphery. This strength can be seen
primarily in terms of global network ties, but typically is reflected
domestically as well. In line with earlier work (Snyder and
Kick 1979; Kick 1987), we adopt a categorization in which we label the
stronger parts of the semiperiphery as "semicore,"
and for the weaker states (in the semiperiphery) we maintain the term
"semiperiphery" (see Appendix I). In so doing, we
acknowledge salient differences between the periphery and semiperiphery
in global power and dependency networks, as well
as corresponding variations in their respective standards of living.
Terlouw (1993) posits two primary aspects of power in the semiperiphery
(economic and political). In what Terlouw terms
the "ideal typical semiperiphery" (p. 92), the economic and political
dimensions correspond closely to one another. It is these
cases typically that fall into what we term the "semiperiphery" in this
paper. However, there are a number of cases in which the
political strength and economic strength of a country do not match. In
cases in which one aspect (e.g. the economy) is largely
semiperipheral in character, but the other (e.g. the polity) is
significantly stronger than would otherwise be the case in a
semiperipheral country, we classify as the "semicore". Since it is not
truly part of the core, because of a relatively weak
position in either the economy or the polity, we do not combine the
semicore with the core. Rather, we treat it as an
analytically distinct part of the world–system.
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Some elaboration on characteristics of the "semicore" (e.g., Brazil,
Norway) category is, of course, required. Semicore
nations occupy an intermediate position in the world-system between the
core and the periphery. Unlike the weaker
semiperiphery, however, the semicore has some characteristic that
approaches the core, such as in the political–military,
economic, cultural or technological realm. This position is supported by
the semicore's national characteristics and their
position of power over the semiperiphery and periphery. The semicore
cannot compete with the core uniformly, however.
As a result of their world–system position, semicore countries rank
between the core and the weaker semiperiphery (which in
turn ranks ahead of the periphery) in their levels of per capita
product. The semicore has been rapidly industrializing, under
conditions of relatively level population growth and technological
advancement. Further, the semicore is urbanizing as its
population becomes more highly educated than populations in the weaker
semiperiphery and periphery (c.f. London 1987). In
a related vein, the labor forces of semicore nations are increasingly
employed in the manufacturing and service occupations
that attend rapid industrialization.
These overall characteristics of core, semicore, semiperipheral and
peripheral nations influence the magnitude and nature of
environmental degradation that they are likely to experience. Because of
the institutional and technological differences among
countries comprising the respective sectors, the proximate causes of
such degradation are likely to differ by sector as well (for
an expansion of this theme in terms of social causes of deforestation,
see Burns et al. 1994).
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Because of their respective positions in the world-system, core
countries are the wealthiest economies in the world; this
permits ever greater expansion of their economic institutions,
technology, and industry. Such technological prowess permits the
core to set production and consumption strategies that aggravate (or, at
least potentially, alleviate) production of industrial
CO2. Also, when coupled with their abundant natural resources, core
countries' technological and economic advantages
afford them a far greater physical ability to degrade the environment––a
fact reflected in, inter alia, greenhouse gas emissions.
Additionally, the indirect effects of core power on greenhouse gas
emissions as by, for example, other environmental
degradation such as deforestation, can hardly be overemphasized. The
core has a far greater ability, because of its
technological and infrastructural advantages, to deforest (and to
reforest) than the non–core (Burns et al. 1994; Kick et al.
1996), and thereby to magnify or limit CO2 emissions resulting from
land–use decisions.
Peripheral countries continue to experience low wealth levels and
relative economic constriction. Relative to the core, they
sustain enormous population growth––growth which often results in
further intrusion into hinterland areas (Kaoneka and
Solberg 1994), with population pressures that spur other types of
environmental degradation (Anderson 1990; Niang 1990),
including the very land–use changes that generate CO2 and methane
concentrations.
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Even the weaker semiperipheral nations have profiles that differ
significantly from the periphery. This is largely a function of
international networks of which they are a part, but is reflected in
their internal characteristics as well. While such weak
semiperipheral countries would have a difficult time competing with the
stronger semicore countries, they are in an advantaged
position relative to truly peripheral countries. Semiperipheral
Guatemala, for example, has a per capita GNP that is four times
higher than the peripheral country, Zambia. This is largely attributable
to the fact that even the poorer countries of Central
America are more integrated into world networks than are truly
peripheral countries.
The semiperiphery, due ultimately to its world networks position, has
its own characteristic and proximal causes of
environmental degradation. While increases in population, especially in
urban areas, precipitate encroachment into forested
regions (Burns et al. 1994; Miller et al. 1991), and their eventual
development into industrial usage, more typically this
encroachment results in land being used for agriculture. In
semiperipheral countries especially, this agriculture is commonly
geared to cattle and other kinds of livestock production for export to
core countries (DeWalt 1983).
If the semiperiphery has unique characteristics that are reflected in
its impact on the environment, so too does the semicore. It
is precisely in the semicore that the least isomorphism between economic
and political strength has occurred, at least in recent
years. Many, if not most, of the semicore countries have had major
upheavals in the last decade. This relative lack of
isomorphism between political and economic power would, ceteris paribus,
imply some relatively major advantage and
disadvantage disparities between themselves and other countries––the
core on one side, and the weaker semiperiphery on the
other.
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The industrialized countries of the semicore are potentially upwardly
mobile in the world system (c.f. Chase–Dunn 1990; So
1990; Wallerstein 1979). As a result, they are in many respects
undergoing more rapid change than either periphery or core
nations and, to an extent, even more than the semiperiphery. Their
greater comparative wealth relative to the semiperiphery
and, to an even greater extent, the periphery, leads to economic
expansion and concomitantly high levels of energy production
and industrial activity, and hence to CO2 production.
It is in the semicore that much of the potential for air pollution and
for the greenhouse effect are most clearly evidenced. As is
true for the non–core, population growth in general leads to
encroachment into rural or wilderness areas, which encourages
environmental degradation (such as high levels of CO2 and CH4
production) in the semicore. When coupled with the
opportunity for deforestation, which stems from their high level of
technological power (relative to the semiperiphery and
periphery), there is a comparably higher deforestation potential for
semicore countries. This is exacerbated by the fact that
reforestation is relatively unknown in the semicore, as compared with
the core. In the process, there is the loss of carbon
sinks, and the accompanying vital capacity for CO2–oxygen exchanges.
In sum, the economic institutions and demographic dynamics of nations
vary by world–system position. These processes
further interact in influencing both the national level of greenhouse
gas emissions and the processes by which those emissions
are likely to occur. Industrial CO2 is disproportionately produced by
core and semicore countries, due to their patterns of
consumption, which in turn are related to their economic institutions.
Demographic dynamics and land use in the semicore, and
to a lesser degree the semiperiphery, exacerbate methane production.
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We use this overarching framework to inform our ensuing analyses. A
schematic diagram, detailing concepts and their linkages
in our conceptual framework, is presented in Figures 1 and 2.
METHODOLOGY
Sample
Data were available and are analyzed for 105 countries. The countries
selected represent a wide range of variation on each of
the crucial independent and dependent variables indicating the
constructs discussed above. (See Appendix I). Our data are
taken from the World Resources Institute (1994) data set.
Analytical Technique
Central tendency and variance statistics were generated, as were
zero–order correlations among the variables in our model.
They are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations
Variable Mean Std Deviation
CO2 152357.784 550802.352
METHE 2009.510 5944.562
GNP 109497.510 422313.953
CATTLE 10228.164 25993.038
ENRC 1766771.196 7110718.082
FRST -2133.305 7751.555
POP 37083.785 119813.238
CORE .105 .308
SCORE .162 .370
SPERIF .457 .501
PERIF .276 .449
Correlations
CO2 METHE GNP CATTLE ENRC FRST POP CORE
CO2 1.000 .743 .873 .517 .972 -.274 .558 .375
METHE .743 1.000 .456 .799 .609 -.336 .925 .126
GNP .873 .456 1.000 .386 .937 -.156 .222 .562
CATTLE .517 .799 .386 1.000 .460 -.401 .677 .091
ENRC .972 .609 .937 .460 1.000 -.215 .369 .435
FRST -.274 -.336 -.156 -.401 -.215 1.000 -.276 .179
POP .558 .925 .222 .677 .369 -.276 1.000 .052
CORE .375 .126 .562 .091 .435 .179 .052 1.000
SCORE .081 .158 -.042 .094 .035 -.226 .144 -.150
SPERIF -.139 -.056 -.175 -.014 -.157 .006 -.014 -.314
PERIF -.169 -.154 -.156 -.124 -.152 .057 -.138 -.211
SCORE SPERIF PERIF
CO2 .081 -.139 -.169
METHE .158 -.056 -.154
GNP -.042 -.175 -.156
CATTLE .094 -.014 -.124
ENRC .035 -.157 -.152
FRST -.226 .006 .057
POP .144 -.014 -.138
CORE -.150 -.314 -.211
SCORE 1.000 -.403 -.272
SPERIF -.403 1.000 -.567
PERIF -.272 -.567 1.000
Legend: CO2 = Carbon Dioxide Emissions (Ave 1988-91);
Methe = Methane Emissions (1991); GNP = Gross National Product
(Ave 1975-85); Cattle = Number of Cattle (Ave 1983-87);
ENRC = Energy Consumption (Ave 1975-85); FRST = Change in
Forestation (1991-1960); POP = Population (Ave 1975-85);
CORE, SCORE, SPERIF, PERIF = world-system Position Dummy
Variables.
We use ordinary least–squares regression to test key facets of the
theoretical framework we propose.
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Outcome Variables
We use two dependent variables. The data are for circa 1990 and reflect
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from industrial
sources and methane (CH4) emissions. In concert with our focus on the
worldwide nature of the problem of the greenhouse
effect, and the cumulative and shared effect of greenhouse gas
emissions, both variables are reported in total output of
emissions produced (as opposed to, for example, per capita output).
Predictor Variables
We employ four mediating variables that serve as indicators for the
causal processes detailed above. They include: the national
institutionalization of economic development (measured by gross national
product, averaged over 1975–1985); energy
consumption (averaged over 1975–1985); total cattle population, as an
indicator of agricultural activity (averaged over
1983–1987); and the amount of forested area (in 1991, relative to 1960).
As an exogenous variable, we include average population over the period
1975–1985. The other exogenous variables in our
regression estimations reflect nations' respective positions in the
modern world-system measured circa the early 1970s. Their
respective effects are assessed using "dummy variable" analysis, which
permits examination of the relative effects of each
structural position indicator compared with the other three.
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Operationalizing the World–System
The literature is rife with conflicting operationalizations of the
world–system, and the most problematic sector is the "elusive"
semiperiphery (Terlouw 1993). As Arrighi and Drangel point out,
Wallerstein's (1979) list of semiperipheral states collectively
account for about two–thirds of the world's population.
We acknowledge the problems inherent in treating the semiperiphery as a
monolithic bloc. Previous research based on a
multiple–network theoretic model (Kick 1987; also see Kick et al. 1995),
indicates a relatively more central (in multiple
network theoretic terms) and less central part of the semiperiphery,
which we label as the "semicore" and "semiperiphery,"
respectively.
Admittedly, our taxonomy is somewhat arbitrary––an alternative might be
"stronger semiperiphery" and "weaker
semiperiphery," respectively. Nemeth and Smith (1985), for example,
derive four positions in the world–system––a core, a
periphery, and a two–tiered semiperiphery, which they label as "strong
semiperiphery" and "weak semiperiphery." In testing
the predictive validity of their scheme, Nemeth and Smith typically find
"monotonic" relationships between their outcomes (e.g.
average annual growth in GNP per capita, and child mortality), such that
the core is in the most favorable position, the
periphery in the least favorable, and the semiperipheries rest in
between. A problem with the Nemeth and Smith (1985)
scheme is the absence of communist–bloc countries, many of which are in
either the semicore or the semi–periphery. That
notwithstanding, Nemeth and Smith make a key distinction between a
strong and weak semiperiphery in which, on balance,
the strong semiperiphery has characteristics that in some ways resemble
those of the core. The 'weak semiperiphery,' while
significantly stronger than the periphery, is in a disadvantaged
position relative to the 'strong semiperiphery' in terms of
international trade networks.
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Kick (1987) acknowledges multiple networks of global power and
dependence. Dominance in one network area may be
used to generate dominance in another; for example, political and
military networks enforce core control and foster its global
economic gain and cultural hegemony (for further discussion, see Mann
1986). Yet Nemeth and Smith (1985) criticize work
such as Kick's (1987), which derives a world–system classification on a
multitude of networks in addition to economic ones.
For example, they criticize Snyder and Kick (1979) for deriving blocs
seemingly based on geographic similarity. As Fain et al.
(1995) demonstrate, however, geography itself is a strong predictor,
along with economic, political and military
considerations, of world–system position.
Nemeth and Smith (1985), and work stemming from it (e.g. Smith and White
1992), is biased in the way that much
world–system work is––namely that it largely ignores factors other than
those directly associated with economics. While this
may be defensible in a study ignoring the communist–bloc countries, it
would be problematic in one including them.
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We argue here and elsewhere (e.g. Kick et al. 1995), that the
world–system cannot be reduced to economic processes only,
even if the world economy can be. As an illustration, it is precisely in
the transitional semicore that there is the least
isomorphism between economics and politics. The semicore resembles the
semiperiphery (e.g. economically), but has some
characteristics in common with the core in other dimensions, such as
politically. Yet the very inconsistency between the
economic and political dimensions makes the semi–core vulnerable to
crisis. In some cases, the crisis takes the form of
revolution (as in '[W]hy did 1991 happen?'). The important point for
present purposes is that this inconsistency can result in
environmental crisis as well.
Given the aforementioned considerations, the country categorizations we
use are shown in Appendix I and are reproduced
from Kick (1987). In concert with our theorization, we consider four,
rather than three world–system positions. Thus, we
dummy code for four world–system positions, with the omitted category
(for model identification purposes) being the core.
RESULTS
Before analyzing the relatively more complex regression results, we
first consider the simple zero–order correlations among
variables in our model, which are given in Table 1. We then turn
attention to regression results, which are summarized in
Figures 1 and 2. The coefficients reported generally conform with the
modified world–system framework detailed above.
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In examining the zero–order correlations, it is apparent that the core
is most closely associated with CO2 production, followed
by the semicore, semiperiphery, and periphery, respectively. As
expected, CO2 production is very highly associated with
energy consumption, as it is with structural position in the
world–system.
Methane production is not so monotonically associated with world–system
position. The semicore has higher methane
production than does even the core, which in turn has higher methane
production than the semiperiphery. The periphery
produces the least methane.
While in many respects the semicore resembles the semiperiphery, in
other key respects it does not. Thus, while energy
consumption and the related CO2 emissions are more or less linearly
related to world–system position (thus obviating any
need to distinguish between strong and weak semiperiphery), methane is
not linearly related to world–system position (at least
in terms of zero–order relationships). In this regard, the strong
semiperiphery (semicore) much more closely resembles the
core than it does the (weaker) semiperiphery, and in fact is more
closely associated with methane production than is even the
core itself.
The zero–order correlations in themselves tell an important story.
Additionally, in examining the figures relating world–system
position to carbon dioxide and methane production, a number of possible
indirect effects are worthy of note.
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Effects of world–system position on methane emissions can be understood,
in part, through consideration of the mediating
effects of cattle production. We attribute this to methane production,
at least in part, to the gradual movement of agribusiness
(e.g., cattle ranching for beef, much of which eventually is exported to
core countries) from the core to the semiperiphery––but
more specifically the more strongly networked portions of the
semiperiphery (which we herein characterize as the semicore).
World–system impacts on economic strength (in this case, GNP) are
precisely in line with the expectation that the world
hierarchy perpetuates the core's wealth advantages over the non–core.
Further, there are expected costs to noncore status
that become progressively more pronounced in the semicore (SCORE),
semiperiphery (SPERIF), and periphery (PERIF),
respectively2.
Forestation is affected as well by world–system position. In perusing
the zero–order correlations in Table 1, it is apparent that
the greatest deforestation is in the semicore. The favorable (positive)
sign associated with the impact of core position
represents the core's natural forest endowments and reforestation
programs, as discussed earlier. Semicore and, to a lesser
extent, semiperipheral, nations are able to employ their technology for
deforestation of their abundant forests without
concerted replacement efforts, and to do so with a higher level of
efficiency than the less developed economies of the
periphery. To be sure, however, semicore deforestation reflects both
domestic consumption and core involvement (e.g.,
through international timber trade) in local deforestation processes.
[Page 451]
Journal of World-Systems Research
Although its effects are dampened in the fully controlled regression
model (beta = –.02), the zero–order correlations show a
moderate (negative) correlation (–.27) between forest growth and CO2
production. For methane production as well, there is
a moderate negative correlation (–.34) with forest growth.
In the periphery and elsewhere, population is a global and generic force
that heightens the world's deforestation potential. The
roles of population, economic expansion, and to an extent deforestation,
are additionally crucial for CO2 and CH4 emissions
and their attendant greenhouse effects. As reflected in the population
size and economic expansion (GNP) coefficients, human
consumption and production directly contribute to carbon dioxide
emissions. As anticipated, economic expansion (GNP)
indirectly contributes to increasing levels of industrial CO2. Put
another way, ever expanding economies consume and
produce energy that directly heightens CO2 and hastens the greenhouse
effect.
Similarly, population pressures exacerbate methane production directly
and indirectly. Population pressures directly elevate
national methane levels, while population heightens cattle stocks as
well, which in turn generate even greater methane
emissions.
[Page 452]
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A reliance upon livestock for farming, when coupled with the swelling of
populations, escalates national and global methane
emissions. These dynamics are characteristic primarily of the semicore.
In contrast, the relatively higher standard of living that
is characteristic of the core culminates in mounting carbon dioxide
emissions. We further note the untested possibility that as
post–industrial societies retain their high consumption levels but
import energy and goods (e.g. meat, wood) produced in other
world sectors, the net effect will likely reduce production–related
emissions in the core, while increasing them for the
producers (e.g., the semicore and semiperiphery).
CONCLUSIONS
In examining the social concomitants of greenhouse gas emissions, we
find that CO2 production is most closely associated
with the core position in the world–system, and that methane production
is most closely associated with the semicore position.
We believe both of these associations can be best understood in a
world–system framework.
While certainly there are strong overlaps between economic networks and
those in other dimensions (such as political and
military), they are by no means isomorphic. Terlouw (1993), for example,
examines six different types of networks, and
generates two primary dimensions of relative strength in the
world–system: economic and political. He acknowledges, in
addition to the ideal typical semiperiphery (which has characteristics
of both the core and the periphery in roughly equal
measure), a "political semiperiphery" and an "economic semiperiphery"
(p. 92). The important point for our work is that these
different types of semiperipheries are likely to differ in a number of
outcomes, such as environmental impact.
[Page 453]
Journal of World-Systems Research
Arrighi and Drangel (1986) theorize that economic strength is not
necessarily parlayed into political strength, because "'wealth'
can be accumulated more easily than 'power'" (pp. 23–24). The converse,
however, can sometimes be true. Terlouw argues
that a primary characteristic of a semiperipheral nation that is
attempting to move up in the world system is "intense state
intervention in the economy [which] is needed to stimulate national
production" (p. 96). Thus, the combination in question
would appear to be a strong state, which can simultaneously use its
power to apply modern technology on a scale that
potentially could compete with the core, while not having the kind of
environmental regulations which, if found at all, are found
primarily in the core. The combination thus has the potential of
ecological catastrophe.
Those stronger semiperipheral countries which we characterize as the
semicore, to the extent they are potentially mobile, are
likely to use what economic strength they have in order to
industrialize, in combination with political strength to push their
advantages. This can have devastating consequences for the environment
because these countries are under great competitive
pressure and are unlikely to devote many resources to environmental
protection.
[Page 454]
Journal of World-Systems Research
As has been pointed out elsewhere, a significant portion of
semiperipheral nations are potentially upwardly or downwardly
mobile in the world–system. While much of the semiperiphery forms a
potentially stable intermediary in the world–system
between the core and the periphery (Wallerstein 1974), the semicore
poses at least a potential challenge to the hegemony of
the core. In hopes of moving up in the hierarchy, it makes a number of
sacrifices, such as using any available natural resources
(both domestic and those it is able to use its political and military
linkages to import). Having failed to achieve stability as a
core power, it is less likely than the core to enact measures more
typical of societies with a surplus, such as enacting the kinds
of environmental protections found in the core.
The relationship between world–system position and at least some
environmental outcomes is not monotonic in the way that
other (e.g. economic) outcomes are. Other preliminary work indicates
that the most severe degradation is occurring in the
intermediate positions (Burns et al. 1994; Roberts and Grimes 1992).
>From what we are able to tell here, the greatest
deforestation appears to be occurring in the semicore, as does the
greatest methane production. Subsuming the semicore into
the semiperiphery for analysis purposes attributes the problem to the
semiperiphery, albeit in a somewhat dampened form. In
fact, the semicore and the semiperiphery appear to have profoundly
different profiles in terms of at least some outcomes.
Other outcomes (e.g. CO2) do appear to follow world-system position
virtually monotonically, largely because of standard of
living sorts of factors, most notably energy consumption.
[Page 455]
Journal of World-Systems Research
The important point here, is that while certain aspects of environmental
impact appear to be linearly related to level in the
world–system, others do not. Energy consumption, for example, is
greatest in the core and least in the periphery, with
intermediate positions in the world–system associated with intermediate
levels of energy consumption. Other relationships are
not linear. Further, it may well be that by examining other
environmental phenomena (e.g. toxic waste imports), the periphery
could show up more prominently.
This is not to imply a lack of efficacy of a world–system analytic
framework. On the contrary, world–system dynamics (e.g.
concentration of wealth and power in the core), are likely to manifest
themselves in a number of ways, which may include
environmental outcomes that are most severe somewhere other than the
core.
These are some of the worldwide causes of global warming, but relatively
little social science theorizing and research
addresses such environmental issues. We have constructed a preliminary
theoretical framework and analytical examination to
move toward addressing this need.
[Page 456]
Journal of World-Systems Research
The findings from this study point to interdependencies among global
social structures and environmental outcomes. Aside
from the specific causal mechanisms detailed above, we think it critical
to emphasize that, like so many domestic processes,
greenhouse gas emissions are products of indigenous forces which are
themselves conditioned by the operation of a global
system of power and dependency.
Policy implications spring directly from this understanding. The most
generic implication is that efforts to limit global
greenhouse gas production will not be successful if they are conducted
on an ad hoc, nation–by–nation basis. The formation
and activities of global agencies will prove relatively ineffectual if
the socio–environmental interdependencies of the world
operate to counter such interventions. Consider that worldwide efforts
to curtail the CO2 and CH4 levels of non–core
countries will prove to be impotent to the degree they manifestly
challenge other key national agendas in the Third World, such
as economic development. These national agendas and the institutional
processes from which they stem are influenced in no
small way by global forces.
In concluding, we emphasize the preliminary nature of this work. Many
rigorous studies have been done on the greenhouse
effect from the standpoints of the respective physical and life
sciences. While these serve an important function in
understanding the proximal physical mechanisms of the greenhouse effect,
we point out that social arrangements are at least as
important, and have a profound effect on such proximate physical
mechanisms. Those social arrangements have international
implications.
[Page 457]
Journal of World-Systems Research
We hope that our study will encourage further work in increasingly
precise specification of the social processes involved in
environmental degradation, as manifested in greenhouse gas emissions,
pollution and resource depletion. Such research has
profound implications for policy– makers, and not only on the local and
national levels. While policy is promulgated most
forcefully at the nation–state level, many environmental problems (and
very notably the greenhouse effect) do not conform to
nation–state boundaries. Thus, we urge continuing intergovernmental
dialogue, as well as much more social scientific research,
on environmental problems.
[Page 458]
Journal of World-Systems Research
APPENDIX I
LISTING BY STRUCTURAL POSITION OF 105 COUNTRIES
(taken from Kick, 1987)
CORE: Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States
SEMICORE: Australia, Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia
(former), Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel,
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Yugoslavia (former)
SEMIPERIPHERY: Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Dominican Rep., Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador,
Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq,
Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Rep., Kuwait,
Liberia, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saudi
Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Rep., Thailand,
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay,
Venezuela, Zaire
PERIPHERY: Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African
Rep., Chad, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia,
Gabon, Gambia, Laos People's Dem Rep., Madagascar, Malawi, Mali,
Mauritania, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
[Page 459]
Journal of World-Systems Research
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Endnotes:
1. When political and economic strength do not match, there is a
heightened potential for crisis. Bergesen (1992) uses a world-system
framework, and theorizes that states are least stable in the
semiperiphery (p. 143). He ties this to worldwide Kondratieff cycles, in
which it is
commonly the case that while economies are expanding, political
structures typically are contracting, and vice-versa (also see Bergesen
1983).
He attributes the collapse of many of the communist countries to this
lack of stability, which was exacerbated in the 1980s by a Kondratieff
B-phase, and the associated economic contraction and political
overextension.
2. We readily acknowledge that a fully specified model of this type
undoubtedly would also incorporate a range of other demonstrated
predictors of national wealth (e.g., investments, prior wealth,
savings). Unfortunately the inclusion of the range of wealth predictors
causes
estimation problems, including severe multicollinearity. An array of
quantitative evidence from a variety of empirical studies (e.g. Davis et
al.
1995) shows that the position effects we report are sustained even when
the influences of such causal forces are explicitly estimated. Indeed,
the dummy-variables we use in some ways stand as proxies for these
forces.
[Page 466]
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v. 1/6/97
--
Mine Aysen Doyran
PhD Student
Department of Political Science
SUNY at Albany
Nelson A. Rockefeller College
135 Western Ave.; Milne 102
Albany, NY 12222
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