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Salam review

How do you spell apartheid? O-s-l-o 


By Edward W. Said 

Yasser Arafat's intention to declare a Palestinian state next May
could spell disaster, dividing the Palestinian people and crippling
their cause forever. In other words, just what the architects of Oslo
had in mind.

For several weeks, Yasser Arafat and members of the Palestinian
Authority have been saying loudly that on May 4, 1999 he will declare
a Palestinian state. This announcement first emerged as a threat to
Israel, and specifically to Benjamin Netanyahu, who has been delaying
agreement on a further redeployment of Israeli forces from Palestinian
territory. 

Israeli responses to the announcement have been uniformly hostile, and
very threatening. Do it, says Netanyahu
to Arafat, and our response will be severe. Neither the Palestinian
nor the Israeli side has been exactly specific, but this has not
deterred either from going on about a Palestinian state and an
unpleasant Israeli reaction. 

The Arabic press has been reporting that during his numerous visits to
both Arab and non-Arab countries,
Arafat has been seeking foreign support for a Palestinian state. By
now, the notion that a Palestinian state will be declared on May 4 by
Arafat has acquired a momentum, if not exactly a life, of its own. 

I say this with some irony because, at first glance, the notion of
declaring a state for a second time (November 1988 in Algiers was the
first) must strike the untutored spectator as inherently funny, since
in both instances, except for about 60 percent of Gaza, there is very
little land for this state. 

There is some Palestinian control - without sovereignty, a major
requirement for a state - on only 3 percent of the West Bank, and no
territorial continuity between the various spots of land that make up
what is now called Area A, the 3 percent under full Palestinian
control.  

One likely Israeli reaction might be to say that the Palestinian
entity has to be in Gaza, which is already cut off from the West Bank,
and more or less force Arafat to confine himself and, alas,
Palestinian national aspirations, to Gaza. This would be a severe
blow, no matter how much international support the declared state
would have at the time. 

In addition, the new state would make little sense demographically,
given that Palestinians in one area would be totally cut off from
their compatriots in other areas. 

Supporters of Arafat's idea of declaring a state in spite of the
concrete demographic and territorial problems say that the project
itself would have the positive effect of stirring the Palestinian
population into some sort of energy, thereby compensating for the
dismal failure of the Oslo accords on which Arafat and his
increasingly small circle of supporters, advisers, and hangers-on have
staked so much. 

There is a great deal of discouragement and lethargy in Palestine, and
also elsewhere in the Arab world. So much has been written and
proclaimed about the new era of peace, the benefits of peace, the
economy of peace, etc., that with five years of non-peace, people are
understandably disaffected, fed up with lies, fed up with Israeli
arrogance, fed up, above all, with their own sense of powerlessness
and failure. 

Master tactician and artist of survival though he is, Arafat, I
believe, still thinks that he can move things along with this idea of
his and, in so doing, either avert an explosion against his faltering
rule or divert attention away from it. 

There is always the danger that his plan may backfire but, again
characteristically, he probably thinks he can deal with that when and
if it happens. As for the institutions, machinery, governance of a
real state, none of these is really in place. 

It is true that the Palestinian Authority has many functions of a
state government - post office, birth certificates, security,
municipal affairs, education and health - but it is still far too
dependent on Israel to do as states should be able to do. Thus, for
instance, water is still under Israeli control, as is the use of land
and entrances and exits to the territories. 

Any pressure applied by Israel on any of these can cripple the state
and render it impotent. Surely no Palestinian government would want to
be put in so harrowing a position. 

The disadvantages of declaring a state seem to me to far outweigh the
advantages. Most important, a state
declared on the autonomous territories would definitively divide the
Palestinian population and its cause more or less forever. 

Residents of Jerusalem, now annexed by Israel, can play no part, nor
be, in the state. An equally undeserving fate awaits Palestinian
citizens of Israel, who would also be excluded, as would Palestinians
in the Diaspora, whose theoretical right of return would practically
be annulled. 

Far from uniting Palestinians, therefore, the declaration of a
Palestinian state would in fact divide them more than ever before,
rendering the notion of one Palestinian people more or less void. In
whose interest is such a result? 

Certainly not the Palestinians'. 

I have a strong suspicion that Arafat is using the declaration of a
state as a way of covering himself with what looks like a gain even as
he is about to accept the treacherous Israeli "offer" of 9 percent
plus 3 percent as a nature reserve under Israeli control. 

Arafat is a prisoner of both the Israelis and the United States. He
has no place to go, no corridor he can escape into, no excuse he can
rely on. I fear that, under pressure, he will concede and accept the
Israeli deal, using the declaration of a state as a way of
compensating (as well as trying to fool) his people. Watch him
carefully.  

Another disadvantage that seems just as significant is that the
Israeli idea of getting rid of the Palestinians by separation will be
achieved not by Israel but by the Palestinian leadership. This would
be the final triumph of the desire for the Palestinian people's
disappearance by dispossession, for which a century of Zionist
planning and belligerence has always plotted. 

The Zionists consider it to be the Land of Israel, reserved
exclusively for Jews. On the other hand, we should
remember that every idea of Palestinian self-determination since the
ascendancy of the present PLO has  embodied an idea of
non-discriminatory equality and sharing in Palestine. 

This was the notion of a secular democratic state and, later, the idea
of two states living side by side in
neighborly harmony. These ideas were never accepted by the Israeli
ruling majority, and Oslo, in my view, was a clever way for the Labor
Party to create a series of Bantustans in which the Palestinians would
be confined and dominated by Israel, at the same time hinting that a
quasi-state for Palestinians would come into being. 

To Israelis, Rabin and Peres spoke openly about separation, not as
providing Palestinians with the right to
self-determination but as a way of marginalizing and diminishing them,
leaving the land basically to the more
powerful Israelis. Separation in this perspective then becomes
synonymous with apartheid, not with liberation. To declare a
Palestinian state under such circumstances is essentially to accept
the idea of separation as apartheid, not equality, and certainly not
as self-determination. "Self-rule" is Netanyahu's euphemism for it. 

Moreover, those who would argue that, for Palestinians, such a
declared state would be the first step toward a
real state, with true self-determination, are actually deluding
themselves by thinking illogically. 

If by declaring that what, in effect, is a theoretical abridgment of
true statehood is the first step toward the realization of actual
statehood, then one might as well hope to extract sunlight from a
cucumber on the basis of the sun having entered the cucumber in the
first place. 

This is an example not of serious, but of magical thought, something
we have no need of now. 

No, this hullabaloo about May 4, 1999 is part of Arafat's tried and
true method for distracting us from the true difficulties we face as a
people. He used to do the same thing before every National Council
meeting, floating rumors about an upcoming date, then postponing, then
announcing a new date three or four times, until people would greet
the actual meeting itself with much delight and celebration. 

This time, however, the political drawbacks of his plan also obscure
the true imperative, which is first of all to unite Palestinians and,
above all, to provide us with a new political vision, program,
leadership. 

If the last few years have proved one thing, it is the bankruptcy of
the vision proclaimed by Oslo, and of the
leadership that engineered the whole wretched thing. It left huge
numbers of Palestinians unrepresented,
impoverished and forgotten; it allowed Israel to expropriate more land
in addition to consolidating its hold on Jerusalem, the Golan Heights,
and the West Bank and Gaza settlements; it validated the notion of
what can only be called petty Palestinian nationalism, which in
reality was little more than a few worn-out slogans and the survival
of the old PLO leadership. 

What is needed now is first of all a symbolic political event held
outside Israeli and Palestinian Authority
jurisdiction that will bring together all the relevant segments of the
Palestinian population, a truly national meeting or conference. From
such a meeting, new outlines for resistance and liberation would be
announced, coordinating not only the efforts of people in the occupied
territories, but also those Palestinians from Israel and the whole
Diaspora. 

It is the members of this larger group (in fact the majority of
Palestinians) that Arafat neither can nor is willing to try to
address, since they have been left out of the deal he made with Israel
and the United States, and whose hostage he now is. 

The only political vision worth holding on to is a secular bi-national
one that transcends the ludicrous limitations of a little Palestinian
state, declared for the second or third time, without much land or
credibility, as well as the limitations that have been so essential to
the Zionist form of apartheid imposed on us everywhere. 

I am not the only one to see our plight today as basically that of
human beings deprived of the right to full
citizenship. It is this that united us all as a people, whether in
Lebanon, Jerusalem, Nazareth, Amman, Damascus or Chicago. The present
Palestinian leadership has neither comprehended our dilemma nor,
obviously enough, furnished an answer to it. 

This is why we shouldn't be too excited by Arafat's rather juvenile
enthusiasm for the prospects of what might or might not take place on
May 4, 1999. 

The real task, I think, is to be planning a real alternative to the
nonsense at present being put about, that by declaring a state -
somehow - we will actually get one - somehow. Typically, this silly
slogan conceals the real difficulties in actually establishing a
state, difficulties that can only be overcome by real work, real
thought, the real unity and, above all, real representation of all (as
opposed to a part) of the Palestinian people. Not unilateral, empty,
repetitious slogans. 

It is an insult to the integrity of our people to keep on making up
such make-believe "realities" and trying to pass them off as political
substance. Arafat and his advisers should be ashamed of themselves for
such banal tricks. They should stand aside so that a more serious and
credible political process can replace their disastrous fumbling once
and for all. 



Edward Said, a professor of literature at Columbia University in New
York, has been a vocal critic of the Oslo
Accords and long-time champion of Palestinian rights. This article was
first published in the Cairo newspaper
Al-Ahram. October 11, 1998.



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