------- Forwarded Message Follows ------- Date sent: Mon, 19 Apr 1999 17:47:44 -0700 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] From: Sid Shniad <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: Understanding the War in Kosovo in the Fourth Week From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Sun, 18 Apr 1999 23:51:00 -0500 (CDT) To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Weekly Analysis -- April 19, 1999 ______________________________________ Stratfor's FREE Kosovo Crisis Center - http://www.stratfor.com/kosovo/crisis/ The most comprehensive coverage of the Kosovo Crisis anywhere on the Internet ______________________________________ STRATFOR's Global Intelligence Update April 19, 1999 Weekly Analysis: Understanding the War in Kosovo in the Fourth Week Summary: The war in Kosovo grew out of fundamental miscalculations in Washington, particularly concerning the effect Russian support had on Milosevic's thinking. So long as Milosevic feels he has Russian support, he will act with confidence. If Russia wavers, Milosevic will have to deal. With the air war stalemated and talks of ground attack a pipe dream, diplomacy remains NATO's best option. That option depends on Russian cooperation. However, Russian cooperation will cost a great deal of money. That brings us to the IMF, the Germans, and former Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, who is Russia's new negotiator on Serbia, a leading economic reformer and a good friend of the West. Analysis: On March 24, 1999, NATO aircraft began to bomb Yugoslavia. We are in the fourth week of the campaign, which now appears to be a stalemate. NATO is unable to force Belgrade to capitulate to its demands using the force currently available. Yugoslavia is unable to inflict sufficient casualties on the attackers to dissuade NATO from continuing the campaign nor has it been able to drive a wedge into NATO from which a peace party might emerge that is prepared to negotiate a conclusion to the conflict on terms favorable to Serbia. As in most wars, the rhetoric on both sides is filled with purple prose, horrible accusations and much confusion. Given that the current stalemate cannot be maintained indefinitely, we are, almost by definition, at a turning point. While the stalemate can, theoretically, go on indefinitely, neither side has it in its interest to permit this to happen. NATO's unity is fragile at best, particularly if the conflict fails to resolve itself. Yugoslavia is losing valuable economic assets that it would rather not lose. Since neither side appears ready to capitulate and neither side wants the current stalemate to continue, it is useful to consider, leaving rhetoric aside, how we got here and where all this is likely to go. It is clear to us that the war began in a fundamental miscalculation by NATO planners and particularly by the civilian leadership of the United States: Madeleine Albright, Sandy Berger, Richard Holbrooke and the President. They made a decision to impose the Rambouillet Accords on both sides in Kosovo. It was simply assumed that, given the threat of bombardment, Slobodan Milosevic would have no choice but to capitulate and accept the accords. By all accounts, Richard Holbrooke, architect of the Dayton Accords and the person most familiar with Milosevic was the author of this reading of Milosevic. Holbrooke had good historical precedent for his read of Milosevic. After all, when Serbs in Bosnia were bombed in 1995, Milosevic capitulated and signed the Dayton Accords. Holbrooke's reasoning was that history would repeat itself. The evidence that Washington expected capitulation was in its complete lack of preparation for an extended conflict. At the time the air campaign began, NATO had about 400 military aircraft available for the campaign, with less than 200 hundred for bombing missions. Even with the availability of cruise missiles, no serious military observer, including apparently senior U.S. military officials, believed this to have been anywhere near the amount required to inflict serious damage. Indeed, most observers doubted that an air campaign by itself could possibly succeed without a ground campaign. Thus, Washington and NATO were either wholly irresponsible in launching the campaign with insufficient forces, or had good reason to believe that Milosevic would rapidly capitulate. Since Albright, Berger, Holbrooke and the President are neither fools, nor irresponsible, we can only conclude that they were guilty of faulty judgment about how the Serbs would respond. There are three reasons for the difference in Milosevic's behavior in 1999 and 1995. First, Kosovo is strategically and psychologically critical to the Serbs. The demands of the Rambouillet Accords were crafted in such a way that the Serbs were convinced that NATO occupation would mean the loss of Serb sovereignty over Kosovo. Thus, where NATO was calculating that Milosevic could not survive politically if he brought a bombing campaign on Serbia, Milosevic was making the exact opposite calculation: that he could not survive if he accepted NATO's demands. In fact, Milosevic's view was that a bombing campaign over Kosovo would increase his domestic political power, by positioning him as a champion of Serbian national unity, thereby limiting the ability of his opposition to oppose him. The second reason had to do with the shift in Russia's position. In 1995, Russia was deep into its love affair with the West. That meant that Serbia was politically isolated, without hope of support or resupply. Milosevic saw the world very differently in 1999. He had observed the U.S. bombing of Iraq in December 1998 and Russia's reaction to it. He concluded that not only was he no longer isolated, but that the internal dynamics of NATO were such that they would limit the intensity and duration of the campaign. Milosevic expected a vigorous Russian reaction to war. It was also his expectation that NATO's fear of a return to the Cold War would create a peace faction inside of NATO. He was confident that Greece would not join in the campaign, and he had great hopes for Germany, France, and Italy. It was Milosevic's view that the Germans would be terrified of a breakdown in good relations with Russia; that France would play its normal game of being a good NATO member while simultaneously hoping to weaken the Anglo-Americans; and that the Italian government was so weak that it would not give NATO carte blanche for the use of its air bases, particularly after the cable car incident. Thus, Milosevic felt that the geopolitical and diplomatic situation had shifted in his favor, and that the NATO operation would be limited in time and intensity. Finally, Milosevic was acutely aware that, although the U.S. and Britain had been conducting an air campaign in Iraq since mid- December, the constraints on U.S. and British air forces were such that they were extremely reluctant to enter into two simultaneous air campaigns whose intensity was not fully under their control. Milosevic was convinced that the small number of aircraft allocated to the anti-Serb campaign represented resource limitations on the United States. In a sense, both sides miscalculated. The United States assumed that Milsosevic would capitulate when he realized that the United States would actually bomb Serbia. Milosevic assumed that the Russians would be a more limiting factor on NATO behavior and that American concern for the Iraqi theater would deter them as well. But of the two, the American miscalculation was the greatest. NATO has not yet split as Milosevic hoped, but a split in the coming weeks, as discussions of a ground campaign intensify, is not only possible, but even likely. Moreover, while the U.S. has transferred air assets into the Serbian theater at an increasing rate, the transfer has been slow in coming, precisely because it strips air reserves from the United States and forces the redeployment of scarce aircraft from the Iraqi theater. There is no doubt in our mind that Washington's misunderstanding of Belgrade's thinking was much more profound than Belgrade's misreading of its opponents. Thus, Milosevic is quite content to absorb the current level of air attacks. He has established what is for him an acceptable reality on the ground in Kosovo. He has cemented his political supremacy in Belgrade, helped along by Clinton's extraordinary error in identifying the removal of Milosevic as a war goal and thereby wedding the idea of Serbian national interest and Milosevic's personal survival together in the Serbian mind. Milosevic is quite content with the situation as it stands. He is so content that he has, for the time being, rejected the German proposals for a compromise on Rambouillet including non- NATO police forces. He sees no need for a compromise right now. Milosevic is waiting for NATO to make a move and, in his view, they don't have many moves to make. NATO has three options: * Intensified Air War: This is the option it is officially pursuing. The available air power is being raised to over 1,000 aircraft, although it is not clear when all aircraft will be in theater. There are three weaknesses with the strategy. First, air campaigns, no matter how intense, simply have not historically succeeded in forcing capitulation. An air campaign can be effective in wearing down a military force but to take advantage of it requires a ground option. Moreover, wearing down a military force in Serbia's terrain and with Serbia's climate will take substantially more aircraft than are currently contemplated. Second, building a sufficient attack force of aircraft against Serbia will require stripping forces from Iraq and elsewhere. As a result, the United States will find itself wide-open for attack in other areas. Finally, and most important, NATO is committing the fundamental error of air power as a weapon of psychological warfare: gradualism. Rather than overwhelming the enemy with sudden, terrible power, NATO is permitting the Serbs to adjust themselves psychologically to increasing levels of violence. An air war by itself will not cause Milosevic to capitulate, let alone resign. The increased commitment to the air war compounds the original error and the expectation that it will result in capitulation is sheer wishful thinking. * Ground attack option: This is a complex matter about which we have prepared a fuller study "Analysis of NATO's Ground Invasion Options" at http://www.stratfor.com/crisis/kosovo/. We will simply summarize our findings here. First, the only doable option from Albania alone is an attack on the Pagarusa Valley. Not only is this a complex and costly operation, but it achieves little. Second, an invasion of Kosovo proper is impossible from Albania alone because the roads will not sustain the necessary supplies to the size force required. At the very least, an invasion must also come from Macedonia, but Macedonia has refused to permit this. It must also be supported from Greek ports, which the Greeks have refused to allow NATO to use. A general invasion of Yugoslavia would require the cooperation of both Hungary and Romania as well as permission from Austria or Slovakia for transshipment of men, equipment and supplies. A build up of military assets for such an operation will take many months and the result could be a quagmire like Vietnam if the Serbs retreat into their national redoubt, which they plan to do. We simply do not see a credible ground attack option available for logistical and diplomatic reasons before the end of the summer. The only option, the Pagarusa invasion, is so trivial in its effect on Belgrade as not to be worth mounting. * Diplomatic option: Germany and Russia appear to be working in tandem in bringing about some sort of proposal. The United States has adopted the role of "bad cop" to Germany and Russia's "good cop." Milosevic is not particularly impressed. There is a key here, however: Russia. If Milosevic becomes convinced that Russia has abandoned him, he may become much more flexible. It is, of course, very hard, for the Russians to abandon the Serbs for internal political reasons. However, it is interesting to note that Viktor Chernomyrdin, former reform Prime Minister has been appointed to manage Russian diplomacy on Serbia. Why Yeltsin would want to frighten Milosevic by appointing a liberal who is well liked by the West is an interesting question? A press report out of Moscow, saying that they expect to start receiving IMF money in a few months may be part of the answer. The Russians may be for sale. If so, NATO had better go shopping. Neither the air campaign, nor a ground attack, nor Clinton or Albright's ferocious rhetoric worries Milosevic. The loss of Russia as an ally does worry him. Now, for political reasons, it is not clear that the Russians can completely abandon the Serbs. However, the mere hint of Russian softness could cause Milosevic to become more flexible in his terms. But Russia needs to be motivated to turn soft, and the color of motivation remains green. If we were cynical, we would be tempted to say that Russia encouraged Milosevic in order to put Russia in a strong position vis-à-vis Germany and other nations able to extend credit. However, since we are not cynical, we will be simply startled at the sudden opportunity the West has to work closely with the Russians in solving their financial problems. Washington's nonsense about overthrowing Milosevic, bombing him into submission and invading Serbia is of little consequence. At the center of this crisis now is Russia, and the price it will charge for placing Milosevic back into isolation. Milosevic undertook his adventure in part because of the Russia factor. As Russia softens, Milosevic has to weaken. Therefore, the question for this week is how Milosevic reads Moscow? If he is getting concerned about Russia's commitment to Serbia, then German peace proposals might suddenly get a warmer reception. If not, the war goes on. ___________________________________________________ To receive free daily Global Intelligence Updates, sign up on the web at: http://www.stratfor.com/services/giu/subscribe.asp or send your name, organization, position, mailing address, phone number, and e-mail address to [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___________________________________________________ STRATFOR, Inc. 504 Lavaca, Suite 1100 Austin, TX 78701 Phone: 512-583-5000 Fax: 512-583-5025 Internet: http://www.stratfor.com/ Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[PEN-L:5585] (Fwd) Understanding the War in Kosovo in the Fourth Week
ts99u-1.cc.umanitoba.ca [130.179.154.224] Tue, 20 Apr 1999 01:03:49 -0500