-----Original Message----- From: J. Barkley Rosser, Jr. <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date: Thursday, April 22, 1999 3:03 PM Subject: Re: Jane's Defense Weekly on Balkans >Greg, > Interesting post, but a few caveats: > 1) The claim that Albania sits astride the two >major routes linking "Europe and the East" is >nonsense. Hey, the Danube does not run through >Albania! Maybe for the old Venetian Republic, >and maybe for modern Italy, but Europe? Nah. > 2) Bassett like others seems to think that partition >is a viable solution. There are people in Washington >mumbling about establishing an enclave for the Albanian >refugees inside Kosmet. Maybe. But there is no obvious >line of partition. Kosmet is not neatly divided into zones >where one group is predominant and then another. It is >too muddled up. And the zone that would be the obvious >Albanian enclave would be in the south. But that is where >most of the Serbian religious and historical monuments >are that form the basis of the chauvinistic "heart of Serbia" >argument that drives the worst of the fanatics in Belgrade. > 3) With respect to the latter I would note that the >historic "heart of Bulgaria" is in what is now Macedonia. >The attitude of the Bulgarians is a sharp contrast with that >of the Serbians, despite that vague plottings by the Bulgarians. > 4) BTW, Bulgaria is officially backing NATO and even >begging to join, although it may be that popular opinion in >Bulgaria is much more pro-Serb. >Barkley Rosser >-----Original Message----- >From: Greg Nowell <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >To: lbo talk <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >Date: Wednesday, April 21, 1999 7:20 PM >Subject: Jane's Defense Weekly on Balkans > > >> http://defence.janes.com/ >>BALKAN ENDGAME? >> >> >>Following devastating >>airstrikes in Yugoslavia, >>what are the options for an >>acceptable settlement on >>the ground? Richard >>Bassett examines the >>prospects for the future >>and the lessons of the past >> >> >>In the wake of NATO's attack on Yugoslavia the Balkans >>ends the century >>much as it began; an expression of great power rivalry >>and a source of >>potentially destabilising conflict. >> >>As at least one military historian of note, John >>Keegan, has written, the >>problems of Bosnia, Macedonia and indeed Kosovo would >>be wearily >>familiar to any official of the Austro-Hungarian empire >>posted to Sarajevo in >>1908. The inevitable competing spheres of influence led >>the great >>19th-century German Chancellor, Bismarck, to observe: >>"The Balkans are not >>worth the bones of a Pomeranian Grenadier." >> >>If history is one of the inescapable millstones of the >>Balkans, geography is >>another. Albania today still lies across two of the >>most important routes that >>link Europe with the East. >> >>Its appearance on the global stage, in 1912 at the >>Ambassador's conference, >>when it was described as the "child of Austria, with >>Italy acting as midwife" >>was an attempt to balance the pretensions of Russia's >>main protegé in the >>region, Serbia, and limit its access to the >>Mediterranean. >> >>Today, there is still anxiety on the part of the >>western powers, notably the >>USA, over Serbian and, by extension, Russian influence >>over the eastern >>Mediterranean. At the same time, those in Europe >>(judging by recent >>comments from the French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, >>they include France) >>who, like Russia, are fretful of the "naked expansion >>of US power" in the >>aftermath of the Cold War, are equally keen to ensure >>that the Balkans does >>not become a US sphere of influence. >> >>Former West German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, >>underlined his belief that >>this was just a new twist to the old game when he said >>in a recent interview: >>"Only the Americans would be naive enough to imagine >>that there could be a >>lasting peace in the Balkans". >> >>If, after the airstrikes, Milosevic backs down and a >>multi-national force is >>deployed then that force may not be an entirely NATO >>entity. >> >>Seen in the context of any future envisaged troop >>deployment in Kosovo, it is >>clear that Serbia could only sign up to a deployment >>which reflected an >>agreement between the powers (in this case the USA, on >>the one hand, and >>Russia and Moscow's supporters on the other). >> >>Such an agreement has proved extremely difficult to >>reach, not least because >>of exaggerated demands on both sides which have had to >>be reined in by >>some very tough negotiation between US Secretary of >>State, Madelaine >>Albright and Russian prime minister and former KGB >>spymaster, Yevgeny >>Primakov. >> >>But all the powers know that only when faced with a >>credible united front can >>Milosevic be persuaded to back down. Eventually the >>advantages of having >>the West disarm the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) may >>become apparent >>to the Serbs and the stationing of Russian troops will >>ensure the protection of >>their fellow Slav citizens in Kosovo. >> >>One of the most sensitive issues is the exact >>positioning of the Russian >>contingent as this will inevitably be the de facto line >>of partition in the >>province. In the eyes of the KLA, the British and the >>French, traditional allies >>of the Serbs in two world wars, can also be relied on >>to defend the Serbs, >>though London and Paris would, with reason, deny this. >> >>As the French and UK forces would come under a NATO >>commander, the >>KLA believes that US influence which is largely >>pro-Albanian would manage >>to prevent a too tough approach being taken towards the >>Albanians. >> >>However, recent suggestions to shift the political >>control structure of the >>deployment from NATO to the Organisation for Security >>and Co-operation in >>Europe (OSCE) would of course neutralise US influence >>and be an ominous >>development for the Albanians. >> >>It is, however, quite feasible to see a de facto >>splintering of Kosovo into >>separate zones not dissimilar to those which divided >>Berlin, Vienna and >>Trieste and its hinterland after 1945, though >>presumably with more cordial >>relations between the various participating forces than >>during the Cold War. >>However, given the different interests of the >>participants and the fact that a >>NATO and Russian force would be sitting cheek by jowl >>under separate >>commands, it can be assumed that a great deal of time >>and energy will be >>devoted to working out the correct protocols to govern >>this interface of highly >>sensitive, and in practice divergent, commands. >> >>However, even if in Kosovo there is an eventual >>resolution of the >>spheres-of-influence problem, the Albanian question, as >>is frequently >>mentioned, also spills into Macedonia and(less >>frequently mentioned) >>Montenegro. >> >>Macedonia has an ethnic population of Albanians which >>comprises 23% of >>the country's entire population. Fears that it would >>try to break away from the >>republic have been behind the generally cordial ties >>between Skopje and >>Belgrade. >> >>Despite denials by the ethnic Albanian leaders, there >>is no doubt that, situated >>as they are close to the Albanian frontier, the >>temptations of a future tie-up >>with a Greater Albania remain high on the agenda. >> >>Even without the Albanian issue, Macedonia has long >>been a controversial hot >>spot where Greek, Bulgarian and Serbian interests >>collide. Greece has long >>contested the right of the Macedonians to use the name >>of Macedonia, saying >>that it implied a territorial claim over Greek >>territory. Moreover, Greek >>politicians until relatively recently attempted to >>undermine the new state at >>international forums and in discussions involving new >>trade links. >> >>However, more recently under Russian, US and European >>pressure the >>Athens government has adopted a more supportive line, >>though this is of little >>comfort to the ethnic Albanian minority. >> >>Bulgaria which has long maintained that Macedonian is >>only a Bulgarian >>dialect, has also become more supportive of the >>government in Skopje, >>though this is partly a result of the government, >>dominated by the newly >>elected VMRO party, enjoying traditional ties with >>Bulgaria. >> >>Before the Second World War, Bulgaria financed with >>Italy the VMRO party >>which was then dedicated to destroying the newly >>created Yugoslav state and >>was implicated in the assassination of King Alexander >>of Yugoslavia in >>Marseilles in 1934. >> >>The news earlier this month that Bulgaria is to donate >>150 main battle tanks, >>including 115 T-55As, and nearly 150 artillery pieces >>caused some concern in >>western embassies. The concern was particularly acute >>over the arms import >>as the Bulgarian donation came on the heels of the >>supply by Germany of >>BTR-70 armoured personnel carriers. With all Macedonian >>army leave >>cancelled and the deployment of two brigades on the >>Albanian/Kosovo >>frontier, analysts fear that the arsenal now being >>created in this small country is >>a tinderbox awaiting ignition. >> >>More ominously, the build-up of weapons, with the tacit >>agreement of >>Belgrade suggests that the future of Macedonia may have >>already been >>decided by its neighbours. >> >>The emergence of Bulgaria as a regional player is also >>viewed with some >>disquiet in the region - traditionally Bulgaria and >>Serbia have a long history of >>emnity, though some analysts point to the old Comintern >>idea of a >>Serbian-Bulgarian federation possibly being revived. >>Such a development, >>however, has been described as two stranded swimmers >>linking hands across >>a sea of Macedonian troubles. >> >>Certainly the agreement on 22 February by the Bulgarian >>and Macedonian >>governments to "put an end to the artificial problems >>between our two >>countries" suggests that events are moving rapidly >>towards some form of >>anti-Albanian front and that a military "solution" may >>be imminent. >> >>The language of the February agreement is adamant in >>its reconciliation of the >>Bulgarian-Macedonian differences claiming that neither >>government will allow >>its territory to be used by groups hostile to the >>other. In diplomatic jargon this >>is a clear warning to Albanian groups smuggling weapons >>into or, indeed, out >>of Macedonia. >> >>It remains to be seen whether this agreement stabilises >>Macedonia. The clear >>anti-Albanian implications of the agreement may drive >>the ethnic minority in >>Macedonia to desperate measures. Moreover, in the >>long-term, Bulgarian >>-Serbian-Greek rivalry over Macedonia is inevitable and >>partition may be >>unavoidable also here. >> >>Montenegro also has a sizeable Albanian community >>though only forming 8% >>of the population. Moreover, in contrast to the >>Albanians in Macedonia and >>Kosovo, these Albanians are predominantly Catholic >>rather than Muslim. >> >>However, Montenegro is at perhaps one of the most >>strategic points in the >>Adriatic. Already at the beginning of this century, the >>Imperial Austrian Navy >>saw the importance of the great bay of Kotor, which >>until the Second World >>War was one of the most naturally defensible harbours >>in the Adriatic. >> >>Even today, the harbour is the major naval installation >>of the Yugoslav navy >>and is Serbia's vital access to the Adriatic. The >>harbour is guarded by the >>Prevlaka peninsular (see map) which has been the bone >>of contention >>between Serbia and Croatia since hostilities ended >>between those two >>countries four years ago. Croatia is adamant that it >>cannot cede control of the >>peninsular without endangering its own security >>interests although for the same >>reason, Serbia is determined to ensure that the >>peninsular is controlled by >>Belgrade. Otherwise the entire Serbian fleet and its >>facilities can be deployed >>only subject to Croatian veto. Unsurprisingly, these >>facilities were a priority >>target for NATO attack. >> >>Partly for this reason, Serbia last year initiated a >>plan to move against >>Montenegro's democratically elected anti-Belgrade >>government. The plan met >>with considerable resistance among the upper ranks of >>the Yugoslav army, >>many of whose officers are Montenegrin and provoked the >>resignation of the >>Serbian Chief of the General staff, General Perisic. >> >>A move against Montenegro is still likely, however, for >>the strategic reasons >>outlined above especially if western funds, >>particularly from Germany, >>continue to pour into Montenegro in an attempt to >>detach the leadership there >>from Milosevic's control. As well as German attention, >>Montenegro remains a >>traditional focus for Russian activity. Before 1914, >>the Russians established >>the biggest of the legations in the Montenegrin >>capital. >> >>During the Cold War, a small but significant remnant of >>this legacy remained in >>the shape of the small Soviet merchantman spy-vessel >>which remained at >>anchor in the bay of Kotor, despite Tito's break with >>the Comintern in 1948. >>It was a token presence but one which underlined the >>Churchill-Stalin deal >>that Yugoslavia should be divided 50-50. >> >>For the West that meant a Yugoslavia that was not part >>of the Warsaw Pact. >>For the Soviets that meant despite the formal break no >>offensive activity or >>alliance with NATO. For both sides there were small >>intelligence favours of >>which the Kotor merchantman was one. >> >>Russia's views on events in Montenegro are likely to be >>consonant with those >>of Serbia and therefore hostile to any moves that >>appear to detach the country >>from the Serbian orbit. >> >>Thus as the century ends, the problems of the region >>remain bound up with >>the ambitions and aspirations of the global powers as >>well as the hopes of >>different ethnic groups. It is therefore perhaps >>illuminating to examine in some >>detail the solutions those powers sought to impose on >>the region in those >>times. >> >>Before the First World War, diplomacy was secret though >>in practice there >>were no secrets between ambassadors and those involved >>in foreign affairs. >>An exception, perhaps, occurred during the First World >>War with the >>controversial Treaty of London which lured Italy into >>breaking its alliance with >>Austria and Germany in order to gain territory at >>Vienna's expense. >> >>Fortunately for students of diplomacy in the Balkans, >>the treaty was published >>when the Bolsheviks came to power in Russia in 1917. >> >>In addition to the clauses relevant to Italy's northern >>territorial acquisitions, >>there were several which underlined the status of the >>Adriatic Đ the region >>which is now so hotly contested. >> >>Italy was given important rights over the direction of >>Albania's foreign policy. >>Albania itself remained partitioned between Serbia, >>Greece and Italy which >>had rights over the port of Vlore (Valona), the key to >>the Straits of Otranto. >> >>The rump Albania was designated a Muslim state to be >>governed from Tirana, >>a concession few European states would tolerate today >>in a period of >>increasing religious polarisation and anti-islamic >>feeling. Above all, however, >>the signatories to the treaty, which included Russia >>and France, all agreed to >>work together to prevent the Balkans becoming an area >>of dispute between >>them. In the attempted agreements hammered out between >>NATO and >>Russia the spirit of this Treaty can still be seen, >>however different the territorial >>lines drawn on the map today. Although the USA is a new >>player in this game, >>there are reasons to think that it does wish to work >>through consensus though >>it may not understand as vividly as the Europeans the >>potential dangers of an >>uncontrolled conflict originating in the Balkans. >>NATO's surprise guarantee of >>Albania's territorial integrity last week is >>incompatible with the Treaty of >>London's intentions. >> >>In any event the USA's room for manoeuvre has been >>dramatically cut down >>by the coalition of European and Russian forces which >>are traditionally >>pro-Serbian. It remains to be seen what the USA can do >>for the Albanians >>despite all the talk of this being a "single-polar >>world". >> >>For its part, the UK, for which the Balkans has always >>been a traditional area >>of expertise, remains committed to establishing a >>lasting solution for the >>region. Although it no longer stands at England's >>imperial jugular, the region >>remains critical to the Mediterranean and the long-term >>interests of Europe. >>As far as London is concerned, it is synonymous with >>the 500-year-old game >>of erecting a balance of power. >> >>The interests of the third partner, Russia, however, >>remain perhaps the most >>constant -preservation of some presence, albeit a token >>one, along the >>Adriatic and the prevention of the peninsular being >>dominated by any one >>power. Here the activities of the USA are a cause for >>serious alarm in Russian >>strategic counsels. >> >>The precarious internal situation in Russia also >>militates against the >>confidence-building measures the West feels are >>essential to any joint solution >>of the Balkans crisis. The obvious policy disputes >>between Russian President >>Boris Yeltsin and Primakov may be just questions of >>degree but they continue >>to overshadow the ability to come to agreements at the >>highest level which >>can be seen as having a chance of sticking. >> >>Yet without such an agreement there is every indication >>that the Balkans will >>continue to smoulder and that the flames of ethnic >>cleansing will continue to >>blaze for several years to come. >> >>Richard Bassett, JDW's Business Editor, is a former >>Central Europe >>correspondent for the Times of London >> >>-- >>Gregory P. Nowell >>Associate Professor >>Department of Political Science, Milne 100 >>State University of New York >>135 Western Ave. >>Albany, New York 12222 >> >>Fax 518-442-5298 >> >> >> > >
