> > Firstly, most of us opposed the bombing because it could not, in itself, possibly realise the professed ends in whose name it was conducted. People were gonna get killed, maimed, dispossessed and dislocated for no reason that had anything to do with NATO's crocodile tears and apple pie bleatings.> Sure you did, but the practical effect of a bombing halt is to hand the entire country to Milo, complete with a death warrant for Kosova. > Secondly, whatever solutions (and not all of us professed a clue as to what might have solved the problems as at 22 March) were available at the outset, are now mostly beyond reach (eg. Serbian anti-Milosovic dynamics, the Serbian parliamentary compromise of 23 April, Rugova's gradualist strategy etc), and the scope of possible positive changes has been severely limited by NATO's vicious nonsense. > Right. But some people are prone to revisiting what should have been done three weeks ago, instead of the choices in view right now. > Thirdly, bombing and impoverishing people is a great way to exacerbate identities like those of the bloody nationalists. No-one's bombing and impoverishing Murdoch, and he hasn't a nationalist bone in his body, whereas a lot of people living around his farm here in southern NSW have long been doing it very tough and have just voted a self-identified 'national-socialist' Hansonite into the state upper house. A sad trend in the west these days is that as capital gets more internationalist, the proletariat and petit-bourgeoisie are becoming defensively and belligerently nationalist. You gotta multiply that by some significant factor to allow for the life experience of a Serb or an Albanian. Both are likely to come out of this with shining eyes to match their emaciated features. > All the more reason for the independence of Kosova from Serbia. > Lastly, to come up with a 'solution' now is to respond to a whole new priority - that of stopping the slaughter and destruction wrought by NATO bombs, Serb responses, and those of the almost wholly newly constituted KLA. Serbs and Albanaian Kosovars alike are gonna be paying a big price for it, but not to pay that price is now to pay an altogether bigger one. > I'm not sure what you're saying here. > In short, very few of us opposed the principle of Kosovar 'autonomy'/'independence' (although I, for one - & mebbe Rugova for two - > That is not obvious to me. I recall very little expressed support for Kosova from those opposed to Nato. There has been more about Nato's nefarious plans to stoke nationalism and splinter the Balkans, as if the region wasn't a patchwork already. > didn't have a clue how it might come about in any meaningful way - in the short term at least). We merely opposed - and still oppose - 'strategic bombing. Because it kills and impoverishes the innocent and PRECISELY BECAUSE IT COULD NOT HELP, IN ANY WAY, ADVANCE THE CAUSE OF ANY OF YUGOSLAVIA'S PEOPLES. > A difference that crops up here is your equation or parity between the 'cause' of Serbians and Kosovans. They are not equivalent. The Serbian regime is the aggressor and oppressor. Serbian independence is not in question. Kosova is the aggrieved party. A bombing halt to me signals a halt to any commitment to put pressure on Milo, though the bombing itself has not been successful in this regard thus far. Thus the real significance of simple anti-bombing politics is anti-Kosovan. > As an afterthought, would it be a bit paranoid of me to inquire into the timing of the NATO strike? I mean, if Serbia's parliament did do something very like what Serbia did in 1914 (ie accept pretty well everything the imposed Rambo-eh document demanded with only the proviso that the occupying troops not be under NATO control) on the 23rd of March, might we discern in NATO's immediate resort to bombing (the following morning) evidence that what was sought was a pretext and not the sudden appearance of waht might have been a solution? > The fact that the event could have been a pretext does not mean an amended Rambouillet agreement would have been a solution (except to the SErbs' current travails). > The conditions under which this integration must now take place (esp. the position from which Yugoslavia would be dealing) have been much altered by the bombing - because the bombing has destroyed so much of Yugoslavia's productive capacity - the WB/IMF can now have their wicked way with a desperate pile of ashes and skinny people (who are even now becoming refugees themselves - again withouit a skerrick of western sympathy and aid). > I don't see any economic logic for the IMF in having the industrial capacity of Yugoslavia destroyed. The Yugo working class is more productive with capital, not without it. Profits and income to rentiers are more likely with capital. Destroying it makes no sense from an economic standpoint. The notion that this act solves any worldwide problem of excess capacity (too many Yugo's?) is ludicrous. > Pointing at inconsistency was not the whole anti-bombing argument - and it was not the theme of that critique by any means. It was merely presented in evidence as reason to suspect something other than NATO's PR bleatings was at the root of the adventure. I think it's pretty compelling evidence meself. > It's evidence of bad faith by Nato, for anyone who needed it. I didn't. In fact, following my counter-intuitive theme echoed by the loony Luttwak, it's evidence of a desire to preserve the Serbian mandate over Kosovo. Evidence of a desire to liberate Kosovo would be an invasion. > Wars in deserts, against bemused conscripts, ain't wars in mountains against a people fighting for its very existence as they see it. And Milosovic is not just a man, he's also a representative of a way of seeing. We have made more Serbian nationalists in a month than Milo's machinations produced in a decade. We won't have heard the last of this if and when we do put Milo in his box ... > You ignore my point about the dubious affection for war by capital presently, but as for Milo, this could be taken as yet more evidence of a disinclination by Nato to invade, hence a very limited scope of concern for Kosova. > I just don't understand you on this, Max! You say a fix was in - one that did not have the Albanian Kosovar aspirations at its core at all - and yet you ridicule those who opposed the bombing on precisely these grounds! > As I mentioned above, my perception of anti-bombing is not that it was motivated by or associated with support for Kosova. There were tales (originating in Western intelligence services and commercial media outlets) of the KLA as terrorist drug runners and Kosovar nationalism as of a piece with an international Albanian mafia. There was Kissingeresque hand-wringing about national sovereignty and the danger of instability from nationalist secession movements. There were aspersions on Kosovar Muslims as backward, patriarchal, and anti-socialist. There was and is continual effort to discount reports of Serb atrocities (by condemning all conceivable sources for such reports). There is the parable of an international imperialist crusade against a phantom Russian working-class regaining power. There was opposition to Nato establishing any kind of larger role in the world. Somehow or other the mining complex was supposed to be important to capitalists. Much was made of the inconsistency and hyporcrisy of Nato, Clinton, etc. vis-a-vis other national struggles. When the tribulations of Kosova were raised, people said stuff like, what about East Timor? As if the latter situation somehow invalidated the former. Very little support for Kosova. > >If they try to invade and take over Serbia proper, the Nato Imperialist Crusade thesis is upheld. > > This doesn't follow at all, Maz - and you bloody know it. Imperialist crusades ain't what they used to be. The WB/IMF is the gunboat/garrison of the late twentieth century. Sometimes, a little traditional capital destruction is initially required to get 'em in there, that's all. If they go in mob-handed, it'll be because their bungling has put NATO's hegemony on the line. An organisation would be fighting for its own survival, as organisations do. I can only hope the stakes inherent in such a daft gamble are apparent to our head-butchers. > This makes no sense to me. Yugo capital destruction is a non-issue in the international economic scheme of things. The WB/IMF has been in the saddle all along. What other options does Serbia or anybody else have? What evidence is there that Serbia wanted any other option? Nato's organizational legitimacy is clearly a factor, but I suspect those on all sides would see larger motives in the background. Simplifying matters, I pose the disagreement as Nato's Imperialist Crusade versus EU Periphery Pacification. The former implies a great escalation of current hostilities, the latter a cooling off. I think the chances of the latter are much greater, tho not 100%. Cheers, MBS
