Summers, whose credibility has been irrevocably tarnished internationally by his inept
handling of the global financial crisis in the past two years, gave another admonishing
speech in Japan last Friday, February 26, 1999, warning Japan not to depend on a weak 
yen
to boost its economy, using worn-out slogans such as: "the
exchange rate cannot be a substitute for policy."

Its an amazing posture after Rubin/Summers turned down a Japanese/EU joint proposal 
for a
3 currency stabilization regime last month at the G7 meeting in Bonn.  Being a bit 
humbled
by his own dismal record of first diagnosing the Asian crisis as merely transient, then
IMF off-the-shelve conditionalities as the only cure, and finally non-intervention of 
free
financial markets as a inviolable guiding principle, Summers declared vaguely this time
the Krugman cure: "What I think is crucial is the recognition that the goal of price
stabily include the responsibility to avoid deflation."
He and Rubins declared only last month that while free markets are not perfect, all 
other
forms intervention alternatives are worse.  Now, he went to Japan and again asked the
Japanese to intervene in their economy with interventionist monetary policies.
Yukihiko Ikeda, a senior member of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, reported told 
the
press: "Mr. Summers says, do this, do that.  But we will continue with steps already in
the works."
Japanese officials are generally of the opinion that reflationary policies would 
further
weaken the yen, due to pressure on the value of the yen from any increased supply.  It 
may
lead to further currency devaluations in other parts of Asia.  The BOJ, Japan's central
bank, thinks Summers is offering snake oil cures in the
notion of fighting deflation with easing money supply.
Meanwhile, the prime minister of Malaysia is publicly urging Japan to dump its US 
Treasry
holding to show Asia's displeasure on US nationalistic globaliztion policies.


Henry C.K. Liu


"JAPAN AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY" DEPUTY TREASURY SECRETARY  LAWRENCE H. SUMMERS NATIONAL
PRESS CLUB TOKYO, JAPAN

Just a few months ago we faced what some called the most serious global financial 
crisis
in 50 years. Today I would like to discuss where we are in working through that crisis 
--
both in terms of sustaining global demand and in terms of building an
international financial system that can prevent and better contain future crises.

I. The Global Economic Situation

This has been quite a remarkable period in the global economy. Six months ago, in the 
wake
of the Russian financial crisis, signs of significant strain in United States and 
global
financial markets, and evident concerns about global growth -- the G7 warned that the
balance of risks in the global economy had shifted, and emphasized
their commitment to promote sustainable global growth. As Secretary Rubin and I 
discussed
with our G7 colleagues in Bonn last weekend, since then there has been some important
progress made. But very large challenges remain. Two stand out.

First, there is too little growth in the global economy. The risks around the world are
still very much tilted toward lack of growth, spare capacity, and slowdown -- rather 
than
toward economic overheating. Concerns are about excess supply not excess
demand. And in many places worries about rising prices have given way to concern about
falling prices.

Growth in Europe has weakened, and is expected to average at best 2 percent this year.
While prospects for Japan also look worse than they did a few months ago, with most
forecasters now expecting another year of negative growth in 1999, and IMF and private
forecasts projecting a decline in prices.

Second, there is too little balance in growth. Growth in the United States has been 
very
strong, but -- at 4 percent -- very likely above long run trend sustainable rates and 
is
giving rise to very substantial imbalances. Private sector forecasts are suggesting 
that
the United States current account deficit rose by more than $80 billion, to $235 
billion
in 1998, while Japan and Europe are expected to have had
current account surpluses of $95-115 billion. United States imports from emerging Asia,
for example, rose by close to $12 billion last year, as compared with a nearly $20 
billion
decline in Japanese imports from these countries.

The United States accounted for more than two-thirds of growth last year in the major
industrial economies and one third of global growth. On current forecasts it will 
account
for a similar share this year. With growth in the world increasingly dependent
on the United States, and growth in the United States increasingly dependent on the
American consumer, it is crucial -- both because of the slowdown directly and because 
of
the consequences of imbalanced growth -- that we see a strengthening of global growth 
as
an imperative for policy. And appropriate domestic policies aimed
at promoting sound and sustainable growth at home can also help lay the foundation for
more stability in exchange markets.

Full speech:
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/pr2983.htm





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