THE VANCOUVER SUN SATURDAY MAY 29, 1999
A Soldier's View:
WHY NATO CONSENSUS IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY
By Lewis Mackenzie
OTTAWA — On Thursday a relatively long column of mine ap-
peared on the practicality of NATO launching a ground invasion of
Kosovo before the snow flies in the surrounding mountains in
October or November. The theme of the piece was "Sorry folks, it's
too late for this year!"
My argument mentioned the fact that gaining consensus from
the 19 NATO heads of state on such a contentious issue would
border on the impossible, not to mention the logistical nightmare
presented by the scale of any multinational operation on such
inhospitable territory.
Shortly after the article was published I received a particularly
enlightening communication from a former U.S. diplomat who has
been at the centre of decision making and consensus building during
NATO's involvement in support of the UN peacekeeping mission in
Bosnia and subsequently with the NATO-led operation that
followed. He was kind enough to agree with my analysis of the
challenge facing any ground assault prior to winter but took
exception with my deduction that consensus building with 19
NATO members inevitably ended up approving the "lowest
common denominator."
The gentleman made a compelling argument that unambiguous
political decisions from NATO required three things:
O U.S. leadership seeking to achieve a clear goal.
O U.S. willingness to share risks with other allies.
O The support of at least one other major ally.
Applying these three criteria, NATO is in serious trouble during
this critical phase of its war with Yugoslavia.
The initial goal of the NATO operation as stated by U.S. Sec-
retary of State Madeleine Albright was to change Slobodan
Milosevic's mind and stop his heavy-handed treatment of the
Kosovo Albanians. Shortly thereafter the goal was expanded to
include the implementation of all the conditions laid down in the
Rambouillet Agreement, including withdrawal of Serbian security
forces from Kosovo, the insertion of a NATO-led peace
implementation force, and a referendum within three years on the
future political structure of Kosovo.
During the ensuing weeks, the Rambouillet conditions became
merely "a basis for discussion" in the event of a ceasefire. The fact
that the Kosovo Liberation Army representing the Kosovo
Albanians now refuses to accept each and every one of the
Rambouillet conditions combined with the absolute rejection by the
overwhelming majority of the Kosovo refugees to the idea of
returning to an autonomous province within Yugoslavia, means that
NATO's goal has changed yet again.
It would seem to me that the current goal is to preserve as
much of NATO's credibility as possible with a secondary goal of
assisting the refugees to the extent practical, remembering that they
represent but a tiny percentage of the millions of refugees around
the world that need help but do not have the benefit of CNN
coverage. The point is that the current goal, whatever it might be,
has not been made clear and as a result NATO's decision making is
drifting and consensus building on an issue as critical as a ground
invasion will border on the impossible.
The U.S. leadership is adverse to the point of paranoia about
military operations that would expose their personnel to significant
risk. If the argument that there is an overriding national interest in
Kosovo was accepted by American citizens, aversion to risk would
not be a factor, as the majority of the population would support the
cause with their sons' and daughters' blood. That is not the case
however, and so a war has been conducted from the relative safety
of 5,000 metres and above.
The 24 Apache helicopters continue to sit on the ground in
Albania. NATO wants them to operate into Kosovo but the Pen-
tagon, on behalf of the Clinton administration, says no. A German
newspaper is reporting that the first of the Apaches to crash in a
training accident in Albania was shot down by a Yugoslav missile.
True or not, the U.S. is clearly not prepared to risk its ground
personnel and resources at this stage.
The third and last of the key criteria — "the support of at least
one other major ally" — presumably only applies when the U.S. is
attempting to gain consensus. That being the case there are lots of
allies who share the U.S. aversion to a ground assault into Kosovo.
If my diplomatic pen pal is correct, and I think that he is,
obtaining a consensus beyond the continuation of the air war will be
difficult, at least until NATO's credibility becomes the key issue. As
I've suggested before, it's the strongest side in a conflict that should
initiate direct discussions. With all its problems, that is still NATO.
If discussions fail, we can always go back to 5,000 metres.
Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, now retired, commanded UN
troops during the siege of Sarajevo during the Bosnian civil war of
1992.
