---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------ The Progressive Response 30 April 1999 Vol. 3, No. 16 Editor: Tom Barry ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------ The Progressive Response is a publication of Foreign Policy In Focus, a joint project of the Interhemispheric Resource Center and the Institute for Policy Studies. The project produces Foreign Policy In Focus (FPIF) briefs on various areas of current foreign policy debate. Electronic mail versions are available free of charge for subscribers. The Progressive Response is designed to keep the writers, contributors, and readers of the FPIF series informed about new issues and debates concerning U.S. foreign policy issues. Please feel free to cross-post The Progressive Response elsewhere. We apologize for any duplicate copies of The Progressive Response you may receive. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------ Table of Contents *** BOMBS AWAY *** By Tom Barry, Codirector, Foreign Policy in Focus Program *** OPTIONS FOR REFUGEES *** by Karen AbuZayd, representative of the U.N. High Commission on Refugees *** CONGRESS MOVES TO BOOST MILITARY SPENDING *** By Chris Hellman, Senior Analyst, [EMAIL PROTECTED] ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------ *** BOMBS AWAY *** (Ed. Note: The following is the latest FPIF policy brief, Vol. 4, No. 13. It calls for a unilateral end to the NATO bombing campaign in Yugoslavia. See the FPIF's Kosovo Crisis Page for more information and perspectives: http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/media/releases/crisis_eu99.html) *** Bombs Away *** By Tom Barry, Codirector, Foreign Policy in Focus Program Key Points * The bombing of Yugoslavia was not authorized by the UN. * The dynamics of conflict and intervention in the Balkans embody many of the new peace and security challenges of the post-cold war era. * The U.S.-led NATO command--caught up in its own credibility crisis and lack of strategic mission-has made the Balkans a more volatile, dangerous place. By calling for air strikes against Serbian targets the Clinton administration made good on its threat to Yugoslavia's president Slobodan Milosevic: either accept NATO peacekeeping forces or face the wrath of the West. On March 24, 1999, "smart" laser-guided bombs began falling over the provinces of Serbia and Kosovo to demonstrate NATO's resolve to stabilize the region. Well into the second month of the bombing campaign, Serbian forces have managed to continue their own campaign to assert ethnic control over Kosovo by ridding the province of the insurgent Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and hundreds of thousands of Kosovar Albanians (who constitute 90% of the province's population). Failing to achieve a quick fix, NATO has steadily expanded the range of its bombing missions. The high-tech onslaught targets not only military facilities and forces but also Serbia's entire public infrastructure. In the face of unexpected Serbian resolve, NATO is introducing Apache attack helicopters and has intensified the bombing campaign. Increasingly, NATO strategists are considering the introduction of ground troops. The launching of NATO's bombing campaign came on the eve the alliance's 50th anniversary. Functioning during the cold war as a U.S.-led defensive alliance to protect Western Europe against Soviet aggression, NATO in the post-cold war years has sought to recreate itself as the main guardian of regional interests and stability. Rather than disbanding with the demise of the Soviet Union, NATO has expanded its membership and mission at the urging of Washington. As predicted by NATO critics, the revived NATO has seriously undermined security relations with Russia and has further degraded the UN's authority. Unlike the bombing campaign against Iraq in response to its occupation of Kuwait, the bombing of Yugoslavia was not authorized by the UN. The Serbian forces made no extraterritorial advances but were pursuing within their own country a counterinsurgency campaign against an emerging guerrilla army. Citing the need to preserve stability in Europe and to protect the Kosovar Albanians against Serbian ethno-fascism, NATO--led by Washington--initiated an offensive operation against a sovereign European state. It is the latest and most aggressive of the U.S.-led "humanitarian interventions" of the post-cold war period. The dynamics of conflict and intervention in the Balkans embody many of the new peace and security challenges of the post-cold war era. The containment, revolutionary, and rollback strategies that characterized the bipolar security environment of the cold war decades have given way to a situation in which civil wars, ethnic and religious conflicts, humanitarian crises, failed states, and looming environmental problems are the leading challenges to maintaining global peace and stability. Strutting on the world stage with the arrogance of power (and liberal rhetoric) so typical of the U.S. foreign policy establishment, the Clinton administration decided to demonstrate the U.S. and NATO's determination to rid Europe of its most persistent challenge to stability. Although world opinion (with the prominent exceptions of China and Russia) largely applauded this latest U.S.-led "humanitarian intervention" (earlier cases include Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia), the bombing campaign raises an array of troubling questions about the action's legal, moral, institutional, military, and political implications. Clearly, the bombing circumvents the authority of the United Nations and thereby violates international law. An argument can be made that when international human rights norms are grossly violated by sovereign nations, the necessity for swift intervention offsets the need to respect international laws and institutions. Yet even accepting this argument, questions remain about whether the severity of the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo warranted this abrogation of international law and the further degradation of the UN. Also of concern is Washington's increasing practice, reinforced by its new stature as the world's single superpower, to regard itself as the final arbiter of when and where intervention is needed to enforce international norms. Having NATO--as the world's most powerful military alliance--available to enforce the U.S. vision of international stability, heightens this concern. Aside from these important questions of law and procedure are the more immediate repercussions of the bombing campaign, including the humanitarian crisis of refugees and internally displaced persons resulting from this intervention, signs of regional political and economic destabilization, and the heightening of NATO-Russia tensions. Despite declared humanitarian intentions and a stated commitment to diplomatic solutions, the U.S.-led NATO command--caught up in its own credibility crisis and lack of strategic mission--has made the Balkans a more volatile, dangerous place. Problems With Current U.S. Policy Key Problems * The U.S. has held itself above international law and appropriated the right to define new rules of global engagement. * Washington has demonstrated its unwillingness to abide by a global system of checks and balances. * The U.S-ordered departure of OSCE monitors and the bombing itself gave Milosevic the opening and justification to pursue an ethnic cleansing campaign. The array of problems associated with NATO policy in Kosovo should not be attributed solely to a misdirected U.S. foreign policy. At the core of this crisis stand Slobodan Milosevic and his Serbian forces that have appealed to ethnic identity to construct a sense of nationhood in the political and economic disarray following the end of the cold war. This policy--which has included campaigns of ethnic cleansing--secured Milosevic's political power during the Bosnia conflict and appears to be working in Kosovo. Given their proximity to the unfolding civil wars and ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, the European political leaders also bear a major share of the responsibility for addressing the deepening humanitarian crisis in their own backyard. Drawn late into the conflict in Bosnia, the UN as an institution and as a forum for all the world's nations also must share the blame for the continuing humanitarian crisis in the Balkans. It failed to involve itself sooner in Bosnia, didn't develop the intelligence and response capabilities necessary to address this type of internal conflict, and it gave the U.S. and NATO too much latitude in acting independently as its regional enforcement arm in Bosnia. The conflict in the Balkans, despite its own particular history and complexities, is emblematic of a worldwide problem of humanitarian crises resulting from internal strife. Unconstrained by a security framework shaped by the U.S-Soviet power balance and spheres of influence, policymakers face the challenge of defining new rules of engagement: why, where, and how to intervene to maintain global stability and uphold international human rights norms. As the world's undisputed military and economic power and as the dominant influence in such multilateral institutions as NATO, the IMF, and the UN, the U.S. plays a key role in shaping these new rules. For the most part--and certainly in the case of the Balkans bombing campaign--the U.S. has not used its power responsibly. The U.S. has squandered the opportunity presented by the end of the cold war to strengthen multilateral capacities for preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution, and peace enforcement. Instead of working to reform and empower the UN and to strengthen inclusive conflict-resolution entities like the Organization of Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the U.S. has chosen to establish itself as the "globocop" of the new world order. When convenient, the U.S. will exercise its power through the UN, as it did in the Persian Gulf War. But increasingly, as in the current bombing campaigns against Serbia and Iraq, the U.S. has held itself above international law and appropriated the right to define new rules of global engagement. As part of its global policing strategy, the U.S. has decided to relegate the UN to the sidelines and establish NATO as its primary instrument for maintaining regional and perhaps international order. The folly of this strategy and its adverse consequences are becoming increasingly evident in the Balkans: International Law: Although the U.S. system of governance is based on a series of checks and balances, Washington has by its actions demonstrated its unwillingness to abide by such a system of global governance. The main legal check is Article 2 of the UN Charter, which prohibits nondefensive military action without Security Council authorization. By failing to seek UN authorization (fearing a Chinese and Russian veto) for the bombing campaign and asserting the independence of NATO, the Clinton administration has further undermined the credibility of its own global leadership while seriously degrading the authority of the UN. Security Council deliberations would have likely forced Washington to pursue a judicious strategy of negotiations and international pressure (involving Russia) aimed at halting gross human rights abuses in Kosovo. Humanitarian Crisis: The bombing campaign has resulted in the largest refugee flow in Europe since World War II. The U.S-ordered departure of OSCE monitors and the bombing itself gave Milosevic the opening and justification to pursue an ethnic cleansing campaign that will set the stage for the eventual inclusion of Serbian-held, ethnically cleansed areas of Kosovo into the existing province of Serbia. By extending the bombing campaign to nonmilitary targets, the bombing is terrorizing the entire population of Yugoslavia, destroying the basic public infrastructure, and undermining the advances of Serbia's democratic opposition. Political/Military Repercussions: The bombing campaign has bolstered the dubious credentials of the KLA (who only a year ago were regarded as terrorists by the international community), defining it as the legitimate representative of the Kosovar Albanians and has brought Albania into the war. By escalating ethnic tensions and increasing refugee flows, the bombing campaign threatens to destabilize neighboring Macedonia, and the province of Montenegro fears that it too will be overcome by the widening war. On the world stage, the NATO air campaign has heightened tensions with Russia and angered China, thereby creating new security concerns for the United States. Meanwhile, the war has also given rise in the U.S. to increasing Republican pressure to pad the military war chest. As long as the bombing campaign continues, these and other problems (such as the economic and environmental damage) will likely worsen, making a negotiated solution ever more difficult and post-war reconstruction more expensive. Especially worrisome is the belief of many U.S. policymakers and military strategists that the U.S. and NATO must now persist and prevail--whatever the cost and no matter how reckless the decision to intervene was--because our credibility is at stake. Such sentiment echoes that of U.S. officials in the 1960s while they unconscionably led the country into the deepening Vietnam quagmire. Toward a New Foreign Policy Key Recommendations * The NATO bombing should stop. * The U.S. should support a truly international peacekeeping force in Kosovo. * The U.S. bears a heavy responsibility to ensure the well-being and resettlement of the refugees and internally displaced people in Kosovo. The NATO bombing should stop. The campaign has failed to meet its strategic objectives of preventing a humanitarian crisis, forcing Milosevic to negotiate a settlement, and building a more stable security environment in Europe. Instead, the bombing has proved counterproductive on all three counts. The humanitarian crisis has deepened, the resolve of the Serbs to resist NATO has increased, and the credibility of NATO as an instrument to ensure European stability (without threatening Russia) has been irrevocably dashed. Continuing the war against Serbia by other means--either through a ground invasion or by support of the KLA as a U.S. surrogate--would likely have the same counterproductive results and should not be considered as viable options. Continued NATO reliance on superior military might to resolve the Kosovo crisis is certainly misguided. The air attacks contravene international law and set a dangerous precedent of the alliance injecting itself militarily into civil wars. Furthermore, NATO has failed to demonstrate that it has the capability and commitment to implement a military solution that will not destroy the country in order to save it. Similarly, the NATO command and the U.S. have failed to articulate a vision of a military solution that is just and equitable--the conditions necessary for an enduring peace. There are, of course, no guarantees that diplomatic pressure and negotiations would establish the conditions that would foster a permanent peace. But such diplomatic activity, unencumbered by an ill-considered bombing campaign, would likely enjoy broad international support and avoid the considerable human, material, and economic cost of the military approach. The halt to the bombing should be immediate and unconditional. Such an opening would defuse tensions with Russia, increase the opportunities for UN involvement, and likely open Serbia to the presence of foreign journalists, relief agencies, and other nongovernmental organizations. It would also increase the burden on the international diplomatic community to intensify pressure on Serbia. Empowered by the Security Council and with the concurrence of the U.S., Russia would be in a promising position to engineer the terms under which Kosovo could be demilitarized and the Albanian Kosovars could return home. The end of the bombing and the resumption of negotiations would not untie the Kosovo knot. However, several basic accords could restore a degree of stability necessary for any enduring solution: * Serbia must agree to stop its campaign of ethnic cleansing and to withdraw its forces from Kosovo. * International peacekeepers (not NATO forces as the U.S. had insisted at Rambouillet but an international team, including Russians, under joint UN-OSCE supervision) should be stationed in Kosovo to monitor any transgressions by either Serbian or KLA forces. * Kosovar Albanians should be allowed to return to their homes. * Upon completion of an initial settlement, international economic sanctions against Yugoslavia should be terminated and a generous package of reconstruction aid should be authorized by the UN, with NATO countries providing most of the funding. International diplomacy under the auspices of the UN would maintain pressure on Serbia to address the likely demands of Kosovar Albanians for autonomy (rescinded by Milosevic in 1989), the establishment of a UN protectorate, or eventual independence. In the event that Serbia failed to halt its ethnic cleansing operations, the U.S. and other concerned countries could seek UN authorization for a military solution. As NATO's leading member, the U.S. bears a heavy moral and financial responsibility to ensure the well-being and permanent resettlement of the refugees and internally displaced people in Kosovo. The administration and Congress didn't let budgetary constraints limit the expense of their "humanitarian intervention" against Serbia. They should be just as generous in addressing the humanitarian crisis in its wake. The Clinton administration is right that gross transgressions of international norms should not be tolerated by the world community. But Washington should not establish either itself or NATO as the arbiter and enforcer of international law. The one positive development that may emerge from Washington's misguided response to the Kosovo crisis is the realization that the United Nations must be reformed (overhaul the voting structure and composition of the Security Council and General Assembly), sustained (with adequate financing), and empowered (with its own standing volunteer army and rapid deployment and intelligence capabilities) to make it a more credible and effective institution. Combined with a new commitment on the part of the U.S. to preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping, the world community could respond to humanitarian crises with smart conflict-resolution strategies-not with smart bombs. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------ *** OPTIONS FOR REFUGEES *** by Karen AbuZayd, representative of the U.N. High Commission on Refugees (Ed. Note: The following description of the situation of Kosovar Albanian refugees by Karen AbuZayd came from her presentation at the FPIF congressional briefing, "Kosovo: What are the Other Options?" on April 21, 1999.) I came to this position last summer from being the High Commissioner's Chief of Staff in Geneva at our headquarters, and before that I was the chief of commission during the war in Sarajevo from 1993 to 1995. >From the UNHCR point of view, the question might even be put more simply than what are the other options: just what are the options? Since we find ourselves doing simultaneous contingency planning quite unprecedentedly for different options: return of at least half a million refugees, outflow of an additional half million more, added to the 600,000 already out and carrying on with the current numbers in location, minus those who were temporarily evacuated from Macedonia to third countries totaling 17,000 so far. This leads me to mention particular dilemmas which UNHCR is facing: one, bending the principal of preserving first country of asylum, and two, resorting to support for the military involved in the conflict. Both have been deemed necessary measures to take, first, to save refugee lives and second to protect, both politically and economically, Macedonia. The arbitrary and somewhat inexplicable but certainly unsettling opening and closing of the borders by the Serbs have prompted parallel policies. After the first border closure, the Macedonian government, UNHCR, and other aid agencies agreed to cooperate on consolidating camps and assisting the refugees in Macedonia, while moving the refugees who volunteered, mostly those with family ties, to nearby European countries. Systems were put in place and ten thousand refugees have been moved to Germany, three thousand seven hundred to Turkey, over a thousand to Norway, many of these medical or otherwise vulnerable cases, as well as a few hundred to other countries in Europe. And the border suddenly opened again last week; UNHCR and IOM activated other European offers and several hundred refugees have already moved this week to Austria, Belgium, France and Poland. This of course is taking place in a worrying context of knowing there are still several hundred thousand persons inside Kosovo, most of whom we understand are in hiding, either in their homes, or, more frighteningly, in the forests and mountains, probably most of them without shelter or food. Some thousands of those we have seen lined up at the borders, then disappearing overnight, shoved helter skelter at the whim of Serb security forces. Should hundreds of thousands or even tens of thousands more cross the border, so that we have to activate the more distant offers of evacuation from Canada, Australia and the U.S., we would ask you to help us and the many refugee-assisting NGOs to persuade the U.S. government that Guantanamo Bay should not be an option for holding these much-traumatized refugees. On working with the military, given the combination of high numbers, rapid arrivals and poor infrastructure, there was little choice but to ask the military for logistical support in building camps and moving supplies both by road and air. Now that such an efficient job has been done by NATO in setting up and running camps, it becomes even more difficult for the humanitarian agencies under UNHCR and the NGOs to take over and keep up the same standards, given their much more limited human and material resources. And I might add that of the $101 million dollars that the U.N. organizations have put out as a special appeal from the 5th of April, only $45 million has been given so far, $8.5 million of that from the U.S. And I think we've probably all seen on television the dozens of doctors in some of the Italian military camps who prepare three hot meals a day for the people in their hospitals. This is something that goes way beyond any possible refugee standard. However we are beginning the transfer process; we have already begun the handover in the camps in Macedonia to the NGOs, and more transfers are scheduled to take place later this week and next week in Albania as well. A further concern of everyone, but most of all the refugees themselves, is that of whether local government security can be trusted to protect the camps--in some places because of local hostility towards the refugees and in others because of the weakness of the structures themselves. Still in both cases, that is, camp management and law and order, humanitarian principles demand that humanitarian actors and local authorities assume their responsibilities. The former, in providing assistance and ensuring protection, and the latter to ensure security. The refugees fear that they are being sacrificed to principle, although NATO will maintain a minimal presence around the camps in Macedonia around their perimeters and OSCE monitors will continue to work there, while the western European police training efforts in Albania are ongoing. We must be careful not to further blur the military and humanitarian mandates as this will bring nothing but regrettable consequences for the future of both organizations. On other issues and options, particularly for the longer term, many of you may have seen the op-ed by the High Commissioner for Refugees in the Financial Times in which she outlines several practical steps which she insists must be taken to limit the suffering of the Kosovar people and bring stability to the region. She enumerates the following steps: First, scrupulous respect for the principles of international law allowing all Kosovars to seek refuge in neighboring states if they so desire, not moving refugees except voluntarily, and reinforcing their security but maintaining the strictly humanitarian character in the camps. Second, ensuring sufficient contributions to fulfill their basic needs; third, family reunification; fourth, establishing the conditions for the only viable solution, that is, the return of refugees to Kosovo, including the withdrawal of the security forces who have been responsible for expelling the Kosovars, and the deployment of an international monitoring mechanism. Fifth, accelerated planning to begin already for reconstruction and reconciliation based on the political settlement which includes full support for the international criminal tribunal for Yugoslavia in its attempts to bring to justice those guilty of crimes against humanity. And finally, taking account of the regional dimensions, something neglected by the Dayton Accords, focusing particularly on the help needed by Albania and Macedonia to build their national institutions and civil society, can provide for their future stability and economic growth. Montenegro, which I must say has performed heroically in attending to 72,000 Kosovars in their territory, and eventually even a democratic Serbia will be brought into such a plan. As the High Commissioner notes, dealing with these options requires vision, something which she contends has been lacking in previous attempts to end the conflict. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------ *** CONGRESS MOVES TO BOOST MILITARY SPENDING *** By Chris Hellman, Senior Analyst, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Ed. Note: The following piece by Chris Hellman, excerpted from the CDI Defense Monitor, is representative of the presentation made by CDI's Hellman at the congressional briefing sponsored by FPIF and the Progressive Challenge on April 29.) Just before heading out for the current Spring recess, both the House and Senate adopted their respective versions of the Fiscal Year 2000 Budget Resolution, which sets overall spending levels for each annual appropriations bill. While the numbers in the two versions vary slightly, both add $8 billion to the Administration's spending plan for the Pentagon, and do so by cutting other federal programs. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA) set specific limits on annual discretionary spending -- the money that the President and Congress must decide on and act to spend each year. In addition, the BBA set caps on the amount of total defense vs. non-defense discretionary spending, and created "firewalls" between the two categories. Until this year, any reductions in either the defense or non-defense accounts could only be used for deficit reduction, and could not be transferred to the other account. Members of Congress interested in increasing military spending could not do so by cutting other federal discretionary programs. However, the firewalls expire this year, and with them gone, the BBA only caps the total amount of discretionary spending, making it possible to shift funds between defense and non-defense programs. Last year, Congress and the Administration agreed to add $23 billion in federal spending to the levels set for FY'99 by the BBA, including $8.3 billion for the military. They did this by declaring the additional spending as "emergency," and thus exempt from BBA caps. The funds were then taken from the FY'98 budget surplus. This year's budget resolution complies with the BBA, and therefore, in order to increase military spending, reductions had to be made in other federal programs. Both budget resolutions increase military spending by $16 billion over last year's appropriated levels to about $289 billion. This is approximately $8 billion more than the Administration's request for FY'00, and $17 billion more than was planned for FY'00 in the BBA. To help fund these increases, the House proposes a 19% reduction for community and regional development programs, which provide local governments with funds to promote economic development and job creation. The Senate version makes even deeper cuts, reducing the program by 42%. Both the House and Senate cut the commerce and housing credit accounts by 32%. These funds support small and minority businesses and the Federal Housing Assistance (FHA) program. Most telling perhaps is the Senate's proposal to cut the International Affairs budget (Function 150) by $4.9 billion, to $12.5 billion, a reduction of 28%. The House goes even further, reducing funding by nearly 36% below the Administration's request. These cuts are even more draconian when you consider that the International Affairs budget for FY'90 was $18.6 billion, which, if adjusted for inflation, would be $23.2 billion in current dollars. The congressional leadership's spending priorities are clear -- weapons at the expense of job creation and assisting low-income Americans, war-fighting at the expense of international diplomacy. There are some practical ramifications of the proposed budget as well. According to some estimates, the budget resolutions will require a 27% reduction of non-defense discretionary programs by 2004, yet they do not make decisions about how to achieve this. There is growing concern that when members of Congress are actually called upon to vote for the specific cuts needed to make this budget work, they will find the political choices too tough. Unable to reach agreement and pass annual spending bills, Congress would likely be faced with additional government shut-downs. In fact, Senator Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ), a member of the Appropriations Committee and top-ranking Democrat on the Budget Committee, recently referred to the budget proposal as "a roadmap to gridlock." ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------ Sources for More Information on Kosovo: Organizations: British American Security Information Council (BASIC) 1900 L Street NW, Suite 401 Washington, DC Voice: (202) 785-1256 Fax: (202) 387-6298 Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Website: http://www.basicint.org Center for Constitutional Rights 666 Broadway, 7th Floor New York, New York 10012 Voice: (212) 614-6464 Fax: (212) 614 6499 Center for Defense Information 1779 Massachusetts Ave, NW, Ste. 615 Washington, DC 20036 Voice: (202) 332-0600 Fax: (202) 462-4559 Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Websites Legal Guide to the Kosovo Conflict http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/kosovo.htm Z Magazine http://www.zmag.org/ZMag/kosovo.htm John Albee's directory of links on the Balkans http://home.revealed.net/albee/pages/Balkans.html Foreign Policy In Focus Kosovo Crisis Page http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) http://www.osceprag.cz/ Center for Defense Information NATO Page http://www.cdi.org/issues/europe/nato.html NATO at Fifty (maintained by USIA) http://www.nato50.gov/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------ To subscribe or unsubscribe to the Progressive Response, go to: http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/progresp/progresp.html and follow the instructions. For those readers without access to the www send an email message to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] with the words "join newusfp" in the body of the message. To unsubscribe, send an email message to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] with the words "leave newusfp" in the body of the message. Visit the Foreign Policy In Focus website, http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/iflist.html, for a complete listing of In Focus briefs and text versions of the briefs. To order policy briefs, our book Global Focus: A New Foreign Policy Agenda 1997-98, or for more information contact the Interhemispheric Resource Center or the Institute for Policy Studies. IRC Tom Barry Co-director, Foreign Policy Project Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC) Box 2178 Silver City, NM 88062-2178 Voice: (505) 388-0208 Fax: (505) 388-0619 Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] IPS Martha Honey Co-director, Foreign Policy Project Director, Peace and Security 733 15th Street NW, 10th Floor Washington, DC 20005 Voice: (202) 234-9382 Fax: (202) 387-7915 Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[PEN-L:6340] Progressive Response: Bombs, Refugees, Military Spending
Interhemispheric Resource Center Mon, 03 May 1999 10:17:51 -0600
