> forwarded by Michael Hoover > > Very important documents. German govt. reports state that no extensive > > persecution of Albanians in Kosovo was taking place prior to the Nato > > bombing. ( The German govt. nonetheless supported the bombing decision. ) > > This revelation completely undercuts the pro-war argument that Nato bombing > > was intended to prevent "genocide." It is not that the "genocide" or "ethnic > > cleansing" accelerated after the bombing; it simply did not exist prior to > > the bombing--it began with the bombing. The documents point out that the > > Serbian forces were fighting the KLA, not Albanians in general. > > > > http://www.zmag.org/ZNETTOPnoanimation.html > > > > IMPORTANT INTERNAL DOCUMENTS > > =46ROM GERMANY'S FOREIGN OFFICE > > REGARDING PRE-BOMBARDMENT > > GENOCIDE IN KOSOVO > > > > As in the case of the Clinton Administration, the present regime in > > Germany, specifically Joschka Fischer's Foreign Office, has justified its > > intervention in Kosovo by pointing to a "humanitarian catastrophe," > > "genocide" and "ethnic cleansing" occurring there, especially in the > > months immediately preceding the NATO attack. The following internal > > documents from Fischer's ministry and from various regional > > Administrative Courts in Germany spanning the year before the start of > > NATO's air attacks, attest that criteria of ethnic cleansing and genocide > > were not met. The Foreign Office documents were responses to the > > courts' needs in deciding the status of Kosovo-Albanian refugees in > > Germany. Although one might in these cases suppose a bias in favor of > > downplaying a humanitarian catastrophe in order to limit refugees, it > > nevertheless remains highly significant that the Foreign Office, in contrast > > to its public assertion of ethnic cleansing and genocide in justifying > > NATO intervention, privately continued to deny their existence as > > Yugoslav policy in this crucial period. And this continued to be their > > assessment even in March of this year. Thus these documents tend to > > show that stopping genocide was not the reason the German government, > > and by implication NATO, intervened in Kosovo, and that genocide (as > > understood in German and international law) in Kosovo did not precede > > NATO bombardment, at least not from early 1998 through March, 1999, > > but is a product of it. > > > > Excerpts from the these official documents were obtained by IALANA > > (International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms) which sent > > them to various media. The texts used here were published in the German > > daily junge welt on April 24, 1999. (See > > http://www.jungewelt.de/1999/04-24/011.shtml as well as the commentary > > at http://www.jungewelt.de/1999/04-24/001.shtml). According to my > > sources, this is as complete a reproduction of the documents as exists in > > the German media at the time of this writing. What follows is my > > translation of these published excerpts. > > > > Eric Canepa Brecht Forum, New York April 28, 1999 > > > > I: Intelligence report from the Foreign Office January 6, 1999 to the > > Bavarian Administrative Court, Ansbach: > > > > "At this time, an increasing tendency is observable inside the > > =46ederal Republic of Yugoslavia of refugees returning to their > > dwellings. ... Regardless of the desolate economic situation in > > the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (according to official > > information of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 700,000 > > refugees from Croatia, Bosnia and Herzogovina have found > > lodging since 1991), no cases of chronic malnutrition or > > insufficient medical treatment among the refugees are known > > and significant homelessness has not been observed. ... > > According to the Foreign Office's assessment, individual > > Kosovo-Albanians (and their immediate families) still have > > limited possibilities of settling in those parts of Yugoslavia in > > which their countrymen or friends already live and who are > > ready to take them in and support them." > > > > II. Intelligence report from the Foreign Office, January 12, 1999 to the > > Administrative Court of Trier (Az: 514-516.80/32 426): > > > > "Even in Kosovo an explicit political persecution linked to > > Albanian ethnicity is not verifiable. The East of Kosovo is still > > not involved in armed conflict. Public life in cities like Pristina, > > Urosevac, Gnjilan, etc. has, in the entire conflict period, > > continued on a relatively normal basis." The "actions of the > > security forces (were) not directed against the > > Kosovo-Albanians as an ethnically defined group, but against > > the military opponent and its actual or alleged supporters." > > > > III. Report of the Foreign Office March 15, 1999 (Az: 514-516,80/33841) > > to the Administrative Court, Mainz: > > > > "As laid out in the status report of November 18, 1998, the > > KLA has resumed its positions after the partial withdrawal of > > the (Serbian) security forces in October 1998, so it once > > again controls broad areas in the zone of conflict. Before the > > beginning of spring 1999 there were still clashes between the > > KLA and security forces, although these have not until now > > reached the intensity of the battles of spring and summer > > 1998." > > > > IV: Opinion of the Bavarian Administrative Court, October 29, 1998 (Az: > > 22 BA 94.34252): > > > > "The Foreign Office's status reports of May 6, June 8 and July > > 13, 1998, given to the plaintiffs in the summons to a verbal > > deliberation, do not allow the conclusion that there is group > > persecution of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo. Not even > > regional group persecution, applied to all ethnic Albanians > > from a specific part of Kosovo, can be observed with sufficient > > certainty. The violent actions of the Yugoslav military and > > police since February 1998 were aimed at separatist > > activities and are no proof of a persecution of the whole > > Albanian ethnic group in Kosovo or in a part of it. What was > > involved in the Yugoslav violent actions and excesses since > > =46ebruary 1998 was a selective forcible action against the > > military underground movement (especially the KLA) and > > people in immediate contact with it in its areas of operation. > > =2E..A state program or persecution aimed at the whole ethnic > > group of Albanians exists neither now nor earlier." > > > > V. Opinion of the Administrative Court of Baden-W=8Drttemberg, February > > 4, 1999 (Az: A 14 S 22276/98): > > > > "The various reports presented to the senate all agree that the > > often feared humanitarian catastrophe threatening the > > Albanian civil population has been averted. ... This appears to > > be the case since the winding down of combat in connection > > with an agreement made with the Serbian leadership at the > > end of 1998 (Status Report of the Foreign Office, November > > 18, 1998). Since that time both the security situation and the > > conditions of life of the Albanian-derived population have > > noticeably improved. ... Specifically in the larger cities public > > life has since returned to relative normality (cf. on this Foreign > > Office, January 12, 1999 to the Administrative Court of Trier; > > December 28, 1998 to the Upper Administrative Court of > > L=8Dneberg and December 23, 1998 to the Administrative Court > > at Kassel), even though tensions between the population > > groups have meanwhile increased due to individual acts of > > violence... Single instances of excessive acts of violence > > against the civil population, e.g. in Racak, have, in world > > opinion, been laid at the feet of the Serbian side and have > > aroused great indignation. But the number and frequency of > > such excesses do not warrant the conclusion that every > > Albanian living in Kosovo is exposed to extreme danger to life > > and limb nor is everyone who returns there threatened with > > death and severe injury." > > > > VI: Opinion of the Upper Administrative Court at M=8Dnster, February 24, > > 1999 (Az: 14 A 3840/94,A): > > > > "There is no sufficient actual proof of a secret program, or an > > unspoken consensus on the Serbian side, to liquidate the > > Albanian people, to drive it out or otherwise to persecute it in > > the extreme manner presently described. ... If Serbian state > > power carries out its laws and in so doing necessarily puts > > pressure on an Albanian ethnic group which turns its back on > > the state and is for supporting a boycott, then the objective > > direction of these measures is not that of a programmatic > > persecution of this population group ...Even if the Serbian > > state were benevolently to accept or even to intend that a part > > of the citizenry which sees itself in a hopeless situation or > > opposes compulsory measures, should emigrate, this still > > does not represent a program of persecution aimed at the > > whole of the Albanian majority (in Kosovo)." > > > > "If moreover the (Yugoslav) state reacts to separatist strivings > > with consistent and harsh execution of its laws and with > > anti-separatist measures, and if some of those involved > > decide to go abroad as a result, this is still not a deliberate > > policy of the (Yugoslav) state aiming at ostracizing and > > expelling the minority; on the contrary it is directed toward > > keeping this people within the state federation." > > > > "Events since February and March 1998 do not evidence a > > persecution program based on Albanian ethnicity. The > > measures taken by the armed Serbian forces are in the first > > instance directed toward combatting the KLA and its > > supposed adherents and supporters." > > > > VII: Opinion of the Upper Administrative Court at M=8Dnster, March 11, 1999 > > (Az: 13A 3894/94.A): > > > > "Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo have neither been nor are now > > exposed to regional or countrywide group persecution in the > > =46ederal Republic of Yugoslavia." (Thesis 1) > >
