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Date sent:              Mon, 10 May 1999 17:41:55 -0700
To:                     [EMAIL PROTECTED]
From:                   Sid Shniad <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject:                CLINTON’S SEARCH FOR THE APPEARANCE OF  
        VICTORY

http://www.stratfor.com/crisis/kosovo/specialreports/special60.htm?section=3

Stratford                      0200 GMT, 990505

CLINTON’S SEARCH FOR THE APPEARANCE OF VICTORY

President Bill Clinton is on his way to Brussels. He will be confronting
allies, particularly the Italians and Germans, who are weary of the war. At
home, Clinton has achieved the truly impossible: getting Trent Lott and
Jesse Jackson on the same side of the issue, urging moves toward a
cease-fire and a peace agreement. Clinton understands that his political
ground both internationally and domestically is weak and can collapse.
He also understands that if he is seen as capitulating outright, his ability
to act during the remainder of his presidential term will evaporate. Quite
apart from Clinton’s ego, this is a dangerous time for American leadership
to be paralyzed. Therefore, Clinton has to extract something resembling
victory from this situation. He cannot simply walk away.

Whenever a political leader is placed in a situation where he cannot
simply walk away, the danger to him multiplies dramatically. In bad
situations, a politician needs to increase his room for maneuver.
Whenever a politician finds himself with decreased room for maneuver,
the resulting intractability and inflexibility tends to compound the damage.
Lyndon Johnson’s fear was that diplomatic maneuvering in Vietnam
would be perceived as "cutting and running." He locked down his policy,
with devastating results.

With the example of Johnson before him, a deteriorating political climate
at home, and a shaky coalition backing him, Clinton does not want to get
locked in, nor can he simply capitulate. This is resulting in two parallel
maneuvers. On one hand, the Clinton administration is, from top to
bottom, generating an aggressive, bellicose tone. The rhetoric is that of
resolve and unwillingness to compromise. On the other side, Clinton is
trying very hard to find a formula acceptable to Milosevic that will allow
for a cease-fire and a peace agreement. The two go together. If Clinton
"spins" the issue as if he were inflexible and then an agreement is
reached, the atmospherics could permit him to claim a victory. Thus, we
see a two-tiered negotiation. On the surface, there is no give.
Underneath, there is increasing flexibility.

The two issues that have to be settled have not changed since the
beginning of the war. Will the Albanian refugees be permitted to go home
and will they be safe when they do return? Clinton’s argument thus far is
that the only way that this can be guaranteed is by the complete
withdrawal of all Serb forces with a NATO force to replace them. The
idea of a NATO force is dead and Clinton knows it. The force will be UN
with some NATO countries represented. The issue of what arms they are
permitted to carry is not nearly as important as it might appear. The force
will not be fighting and the Serbs really don’t care much about what they
carry. Thus, the key issue is the Serb forces. Here too, a compromise is
being forged. Clinton was talking about the withdrawal of all military
forces, leaving the door open for some Serb police forces to remain.

Which brings us to the crux of the problem. If a UN force, however armed,
is permitted into Kosovo, can the Albanians return? This appears to be
the key issue, but is really an illusion. There is no doubt that the Serbs
will agree to the demand. They can hardly resist this demand, since it is
the Serbs’ contention that they never drove the Albanians out of their
homes in the first place. Everyone will agree that the Albanians will be
able to go home. But obviously, that won’t happen immediately. First, the
Serbs will have to withdraw. Only the police will remain behind. That will
take several days that will stretch into weeks. No one will resume the
bombing because of delays caused by bombed bridges, lack of fuel, and
a dozen other real and imagined excuses. Then the UN force has to be
assembled and moved into place. 

All in all, that means a bombing halt of several weeks while these forces
move about. Then it will be discovered that some of the police forces
remaining behind are actually troops. The Serbs will deny this
vehemently. The UN will investigate. With the UN involved, it will not be
NATO’s business to solve the problem. Certainly, no one will want to start
the bombings again over minor squabbles. And all this time the Albanians
will remain in their camps.

Actually, the Albanians will be moving about Albania, migrating to other
countries, and remaining in the camps. For those in the camps seeking to
return to Kosovo, the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees
will have to establish processes for identifying the refugees, issuing
papers, organizing transportation, etc. Inside Kosovo, roads, bridges,
power plants, and other infrastructure will need to be reconstructed
before they can move in. It can take additional months before substantial
numbers of refugees can be moved. By then, of course, tensions will
have risen in Kosovo and many refugees will hesitate to return. But, of
course, by then, NATO’s attention will have shifted elsewhere, the public
will be bored by Kosovo stories and a renewal of the war would be
unthinkable.

Clinton and his advisors are fully aware that their room for maneuver is to
be found in the refugee question. With all other questions settled, NATO
will demand the return of all refugees and the Serbs will agree. That will
end the bombing and begin an endless process of troop movements,
rebuilding, refugee bureaucracy, and public amnesia. Clinton will have
his victory. The Serbs will have redefined the demography of Albania.
The bombing will end. History will move on.

Clinton is flying to Brussels to be tough and unyielding. If Milosevic is
smart, he will give Clinton the victory he craves: UN troops in Kosovo;
Serbian police as a symbol of Serbian sovereignty and to protect Serbs in
the province; and above all, the right of the Albanians to return to their
homes. That last, alone, will open the door for long-term paralysis on the
Kosovo question.