CIA Explains What Went Wrong By JOHN DIAMOND Associated Press Writer WASHINGTON (AP) -- In an extraordinary admission of error, the CIA said Monday that outdated maps, a lack of communication within the U.S. government and educated guesses that went terribly wrong led to the NATO air attack on the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. Grim-faced intelligence officials briefed lawmakers behind closed doors, then met with reporters to explain how a B-2 stealth bomber came to drop a load of satellite-guided bombs on a plainly marked embassy compound well-known in Belgrade to diplomats and civilians alike. The B-2s were all too accurate in hitting targets. The problem was that CIA operatives misidentified the target, and pre-strike checks by the Pentagon and other allied military commands failed to catch the error. In addition, neither the State Department nor other NATO allies had alerted target planners that the Chinese Embassy had moved in Belgrade in 1996. Defense Secretary William Cohen called the bombing a ``tragic mistake'' and said, ``If there's culpability to be found, we will consider appropriate action.'' The incident came less than a year after the CIA recommended an attack on a target in Sudan that turned out to be a pharmaceutical plant and that may or may not have been involved in chemical weapons production. The Chinese Embassy bombing has made the CIA a laughing stock. Regulars on Don Imus' talk radio program were joking that the CIA could have simply called a taxi cab company to locate its target. In fact, target planning is far more complex than that. Several weeks ago, CIA officials ``nominated'' the Yugoslav Federal Directorate for Supply and Procurement for destruction by NATO bombers, pointing to the directorate's role in supplying weapons to the Yugoslav Army and exporting munitions. The planning began with a street address -- a correct one, it turns out -- on Cherry Blossom Boulevard in Belgrade. The problem was finding that address on National Imagery and Mapping Agency maps. Some guesswork was involved. The CIA had fixed the locations of some buildings on the street, but not the directorate. Using a variety of undisclosed sources, the CIA tried to extrapolate the location of the directorate based on known addresses nearby. Those sources did not include an agent on the ground in Belgrade actually looking at the prospective target because no agent was available. From now on, an intelligence official said, it will be an ironclad requirement to have sources on the ground checking targets visually when they lie in urban areas. This was the initial and critical error. The CIA's extrapolation was off by a few blocks. The actual directorate is down the street, which changes names to the Boulevard of the Arts. NATO has not ruled out striking the directorate -- now that it knows where it is. Outdated maps turned this mistake into a diplomatic and political disaster. The CIA and Pentagon have developed what they call a ``no strike'' list -- churches, hospitals, schools and embassies that NATO seeks to avoid. But the U.S. intelligence ``City Plan of Belgrade'' used in planning the strike dated to 1992. It was reviewed twice after that for accuracy, once in 1997 and again last year. On this map, the Chinese Embassy, depicted as a red rectangle with a symbolic flag, lies in its former location across the Danube River in Belgrade's old quarter. The State Department, which maintained a mission in Belgrade until the strikes began in March, never notified Pentagon strike planners that the Chinese Embassy had moved, the intelligence officials said, speaking on condition of anonymity. A senior State Department official said officials at the mission knew the Chinese Embassy's new location but did not consider it their responsibility to pass the information on to the Pentagon. Cohen announced ``steps to prevent such a mistake from happening again,'' including a requirement that the State Department report embassy moves or constructions overseas. The Pentagon and CIA will also be ordered to update maps and set up procedures to make last-minute changes to ``no strike'' lists as new information comes in. Cohen said that in 4,036 combat sorties over Yugoslavia, NATO knows of only a dozen instances involving civilian casualties, and this is the first in which erroneous target-selection was the cause. ``In combat, accidents will happen despite our best efforts to prevent them,'' Cohen said. Sens. Richard Shelby, R-Ala., and Bob Kerrey, D-Neb., the chairman and vice chairman, respectively, of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said decades of intelligence budget cuts may have played a role. ``While this was a horrible mistake, we cannot avoid the fact that we have overtasked and underfunded our intelligence agencies for too long,'' Kerrey said. The intelligence officials said, however, that they were making no excuses based on finances. Copyright © Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.