[PEN-L:7803] (Fwd) Of G-8, Rambouillet, Compromise and Surrender - Stratfor

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Subject:                Of G-8, Rambouillet, Compromise and Surrender - Stratfor

Of G-8, Rambouillet, Compromise and Surrender

1744 GMT, 990607 – NATO’s permanent council of ambassadors made 
it official on Monday that the talks between the allies and the Yugoslavs 
was a standoff and it would be left to the G8 powers to obtain a suitable 
resolution. According to a source close to NATO the Yugoslav side 
hardened its position, "just after a Russian observer – the Russian military 
attache in Belgrade – arrived in Kumanovo." The G8 foreign ministers are 
meeting in Bonn today to save the Kosovo peace process and forge a UN 
resolution to be sent to New York for approval.

1711 GMT, 990607 – According to the Scotsman Online, talks in 
Kumanovo foundered today because of differences on two issues. The 
sticking points, as of now, appear to be a demand by the Yugoslavs that a 
25 kilometer buffer zone between Serb forces and the KLA be provided 
during their retreat and their assertion that they will be unable to extract 
their troops at the pace and numbers required by NATO, due to a lack of 
fuel. The Yugoslavs have also repeatedly turned their attention to the issue 
of the air campaign, in lieu of discussing troop withdrawal, which NATO 
maintains is not open for negotiation.

1656 GMT, 990607 – Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said Monday 
that his country could not vote for a UN resolution without a pause in the 
NATO bombing occurring first. Ivanov’s spokesman indicated there were 
still several unresolved problems at the political director’s level and a new 
meeting was scheduled for Wednesday. 

1940 GMT, 990606 - The Delay of the Cease-Fire

Things seem to have become a bit complex. In spite of NATO’s 
bombastic assertions that no negotiations are taking place, but only the 
presentation of non-negotiable demands, there are clearly negotiations 
going on. To be more precise, Belgrade is clearly not, at this moment, 
prepared to simply accept NATO’s terms for ending the conflict. After 
two days of discussions, talks adjourned again without a conclusive 
settlement emerging.

It is not clear what is holding up the agreement. NATO has hinted that it 
is simply a matter of timetables. We suspect that there are deeper issues 
involved. First, there is a question of what Milosevic agreed to. Milosevic 
agreed to the G-8 agreements. The G-8 agreements required that NATO 
be subordinated to the UN. NATO is representing Milosevic’s acceptance 
of the G-8 compromise as a capitulation by Milosevic to NATO. 
Milosevic may have been unprepared for the "spin" that NATO put on his 
acceptance of G-8. In practical terms, he was expecting a UN peace 
keeping force and found he had brought a NATO occupation. It is 
possible that Milosevic is genuinely surprised by NATO’s interpretation 
of his acceptance. Under some political attack at home, we must be open 
to the possibility that Milosevic is in the process of reconsidering his 
acceptance.

Second, there is a potential political crisis brewing in Moscow. 
Chernomyrdin has come under attack from the Duma for his handling of 
the negotiations and Yeltsin himself is said to be extremely unhappy that 
the bombing is continuing. The perception inside of Russia appears to be 
that Yeltsin caved in to the West. Yeltsin, who sacrifices politicians as a 
hobby, is quite capable of turning on Chernomyrdin and along with that, 
on NATO and the agreement.

It has been very important for NATO to represent Milosevic’s acceptance 
of the G-8 agreement as surrender by Serbia. Otherwise, if the G-8 
agreement were viewed as it originally was — a compromise between 
NATO and Russia—then the question would be whether anything was 
actually gained by the two month bombing campaign. NATO’s public 
gloating over Serb capitulation may have gone too far, humiliating both 
Milosevic and Yeltsin, and undercutting the credibility of Chernomyrdin. 
NATO has spun Belgrade’s acceptance for domestic political purposes. 
The issue on the table now is whether that spin has made it impossible for 
Milosevic and even the Russians to go through with the deal. 

It is possible that the only delays are technical in nature. It is also
possible 
that NATO’s public presentation of the agreement has caused second 
thoughts in Belgrade. The most important question, of course, is whether 
NATO's gloating has caused second thoughts in Moscow.

Stratfor                                                        1725 GMT, 
990604 

NATO Attempting to Redefine G-8 Accord

According to Russian news agencies, Moscow has not yet decided how or 
even if Russian troops will participate in a Kosovo peacekeeping force. 
Interfax quoted Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev as saying, "The 
chief of staff and the defense ministry's department of international 
military cooperation are working night and day" to propose several 
options for Russia's participation. However, "Krasnaya Zvezda," the 
official paper of the Russian defense ministry, expressed concern about 
the army's role in a Kosovo force if it is placed under NATO command. 
"Each side (Russia and NATO) has its own understanding of the 
document adopted in Bonn," the paper said.

Russia’s suggestion – even threat – that it could choose not to participate 
in a Kosovo peacekeeping force highlights the maneuvering currently 
underway to reinterpret the G-8 peace agreement to which Belgrade has 
agreed. The G-8 plan was a compromise between the Rambouillet accord 
and the Serbian position, primarily on the issue of the makeup and 
command structure of the international peacekeeping force in Kosovo. 
Rambouillet’s requirement for a wholly NATO force in Kosovo was at the 
heart of Belgrade’s rejection of the accord, in that it gave no guarantee of 
present or future Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo. The G-8 plan 
addressed Serbian concerns by proposing an international force under UN 
command for Kosovo. A neutral UN commander, if not entirely unbiased, 
at least would not facilitate the gross dismemberment of Serbia, while the 
presence of non-NATO troops – particularly Russian – would also 
guarantee Serbian sovereignty.

NATO is now busy trying to reinterpret the G-8 plan as the Rambouillet 
accord – twisting a compromise back into an unmitigated victory. 
Washington and London are defining the UN’s role as token at best and 
are continuing to advance a predominantly NATO force for Kosovo. 
Russia has responded by threatening to withdraw from the plan. By 
accepting the G-8 plan, Belgrade won one victory by guaranteeing that 
Serbia would not lose Kosovo – something not assured under the 
Rambouillet accord. If the G-8 plan collapses over U.S. and British 
insistence on a NATO dominated, NATO commanded force, Belgrade will 
have won a triple victory – framing NATO as the obstacle to peace, 
undermining Russia’s willingness to compromise with NATO, and 
thrusting a wedge deep into NATO, between members who accepted the 
G-8 accord and those who continued to fight for Rambouillet.