I strongly applaud this suggestion by MacKenzie
of what the Russians should do in Kososo-Metohija.
Sealing off the UCK/KLA from its camps in Albania
is clearly key to long term peace in the area, as indeed
it was prior to the beginning of this recent (current?) war.
Barkley Rosser
-----Original Message-----
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Tuesday, June 15, 1999 1:48 AM
Subject: [PEN-L:7977] (Fwd) NATO SHOULD DISARM KLA BEFORE IT'S TOO LATE - A
Soldier'
>
>------- Forwarded Message Follows -------
>Date sent: Mon, 14 Jun 1999 14:08:19 -0700
>To: (Recipient list suppressed)
>From: Sid Shniad <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Subject: NATO SHOULD DISARM KLA BEFORE IT'S TOO LATE - A Soldier's
View
>
>THE VANCOUVER SUN JUNE 12, 1999
>
>A Soldier's View
>
>NATO SHOULD DISARM KLA BEFORE IT'S TOO LATE
>
> The commander of the Kosovo Liberation Army has
> shown bloodthirstiness against civilians in the past.
>
> By Lewis Mackenzie
>
> A funny thing happened between the 4th and 5th of June. A
>subtle but extremely significant change occurred in describing the
>Kosovo Liberation Army's obligations following any ceasefire.
> The Rambouillet accord, signed by the KLA-led Kosovo
>Albanian delegation in March clearly stated the KLA would be
>disarmed once there was a ceasefire. The precise term was often
>repeated and reinforced by all the key NATO leaders and their
>representatives during the first 70 days of the bombing campaign.
> During the June 5-6 weekend, members of the U.S. executive
>branch, starting with Defence Secretary William Cohen, started to
>the use the term "demilitarize" rather than "disarm" to describe the
>KLA's postwar future.
> This change in the language of the Rambouillet accord is highly
>significant, particularly to the international peacekeepers, including
>Canadians, entering Kosovo.
> Disarming means just that — handing over all your weapons
>with the possible exception of sidearms, a concession the United
>Nations authorized when the UN forces were ordered to disarm
>the Serbs and Croats within the three UN-protected areas in
>occupied Croatia in 1992.
> Demilitarization merely requires the KLA to give up its
>military structure, take off uniforms and, in accordance with the
>UN Security Council resolution of June 10, turn in their "heavy"
>weapons.
> For the most part, the KLA does not have big guns such as
>tanks, artillery and anti-aircraft missiles. Its weapons of choice due
>to the nature of its operations, are assault and sniper rifles and
>grenade launchers. It can now keep those.
> Its few heavy weapons would have been moved by now away
>from NATO's prying eyes, across the border into Albania, where
>the KLA has its training camps.
> The KLA has been conducting a war of secession against
>Yugoslav security forces for a number of years. Belgrade's
>heavy-handed response to the KLA's activities had the effect of
>increasing its following, and its sophistication.
> During NATO's bombing campaign, the KLA was in frequent
>contact with NATO headquarters, coordinating its efforts on the
>ground with NATO air strikes. This contact became even more
>reliable in the latter stages of the war as "liaison teams" from some
>allied countries married up with the KLA and assisted with the
>coordination.
> I must say I was more than a little disappointed to hear Jim
>Wright, the credible and persuasive spokesman for our foreign
>affairs department, state just a few days ago that, "We [NATO]
>have no contact with the KLA." Let's face it, this was not the case.
> Numerous western reporters were filmed standing with KLA
>members as they spoke directly with the NATO operations centre
>and, in one quite bizarre incident, with U.S. Secretary of State
>Madeleine Albright herself.
> I assume the decision to allow the KLA to keep its weapons is
>a payback for its help on the ground.
> Not a good idea.
> The KLA has stated publicly and repeatedly that its political
>objective is nothing short of independence for Kosovo and ul-
>timately a Greater Albania. The fact that it has softened its lan-
>guage over the past few days should convince no one that it has
>changed its mind. The group will continue to recruit, train and
>otherwise prepare for an independent Kosovo and it will maintain
>a number of camps in Albania.
> Its chief of staff, a retired officer from the Croatian army was
>the same officer who masterminded the 1993 Medak offensive in
>Croatia that saw Canadian soldiers using deadly force to stop
>horrendous atrocities against Serb civilians.
> This officer also ordered the overrunning of lightly armed UN
>outposts, in blatant contravention of international law. His
>influence within the KLA does not augur well for its trustwor-
>thiness during Kosovo's political evolution.
> A practical solution to the continuing threat posed by the KLA
>would be the sealing of the border between Kosovo and Albania.
>The best national contingent of peacekeepers to take on this task
>would be the one from Russia.
> Using the Russians to look after the small number of Serbs
>who will remain in Kosovo will only perpetuate the separation of
>the Albanian and Serb communities.
> Western peacekeepers can look after the Serbs. Let the
>Russians keep the KLA in line.
>
>
>Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, now retired, commanded UN
>troops during the siege of Sarajevo during the Bosnian civil war of
>1992.
>
>
