In an earlier missive in this thread, I wrote: >>Sen and de Long are saying
that even with close-to-perfect markets (or even perfect ones), people can
starve, simply because they don't have enough money to buy food when the
price goes up. That's a pretty damning indictment of markets, but it
doesn't explain why people don't have the money. <<

After writing this, the little neoclassical homunculus in my head (a result
of college and graduate school indoctrination) woke up and said: "wait a
'sec. If markets were _really_ perfect, as in the Arrow-Debreu Walrasian
General Equilibrium Model, no-one could starve. After all, the potentially
starving person could borrow money on the perfect futures market, taking
advantage of his or her potential to earn wages in the future (after the
food shortage) to pay the interest & principle, smoothing life-time
consumption of food over the life cycle, so that there would be no
significant dip in food consumption in the short run due to a bad harvest
or other factors that limit the supply of food. In any case, any inadequacy
on the supply-side of the food market are clearly due to tariffs or other
trade barriers. Given free trade, the borrowed money could buy food at
reasonable prices. (The idea of a world-wide bad harvest and food shortage
is almost impossible.) So the problem is that markets aren't perfect
_enough_." I'm surprised that Brad didn't bring the issue of futures
markets up. 

I "forgot" to assume away perfect futures markets (without which the rest
of the story doesn't work). But that's the difference between neoclassical
economics and realistic economics. Pure neoclassicals use the Arrow-Debreu
model (or some other equally ideal theory) as their baseline, bringing in
one or two "imperfections" (i.e., real-world facts) to try to come up with
something relevant. On the other hand, realistic economists like Adam Smith
and Karl Marx started with the empirical world as their baseline, trying to
develop valid abstractions based on empirical reality. (Some of the nominal
or pragmatic neoclassicals are also this way.) 

The pure neoclassical necessity of "assuming away perfect futures markets"
is like a physicist being compelled to "assume away God" when doing
cosmology. Perfect futures markets are absurd (like the existence of God in
my book), given (among other things) our fundamental uncertainty concerning
future events. 

Louis writes: >... hasn't capitalism (and imperialism) historically been
wedded to anti-market mechanisms? Wasn't the British East India Company
antithetical to Adam Smith's ideals, as he even stated explicitly? Isn't
the Bengali famine an outgrowth of these policies dating back to the 17th
century?<

In theory, the only non-market mechanism that capitalism is "wedded to" is
the state, which enforces property rights (along with the inequality of
such rights). In theory, therefore, mercantilism can go away. It's been
going away for the rich capitalist countries (more for the US than for
Japan, for example). Classical mercantilism in Europe was linked to
domestic absolutism and efforts to engage in primitive accumulation. It
resulted in the polarization of classes (and the sometimes fast, sometimes
slow abolition of self-employment) and the wealth distribution, which has
since been preserved by "normal" state activity, such as busting or taming
unions. 

Recent famines are due to wars, weather, and the like disrupting food
supplies (something we should expect more of as global warming kicks in) at
the same time that rural populations become increasingly dependent on the
market -- rather than their own gardens -- for food. The commercialization
of agriculture (and such events as the "Green Revolution") is almost always
linked to proletarianization of the small-holders, so that these people
become vulnerable to famine. Again, this isn't in Sen (as far as I know)
but doesn't contradict his work.

> On the other hand, is the cure laissez-faire capitalism? If the
capitalist is free to invest, and the state does not interfere with his
decisions, isn't the result famine just the same? Export agriculture in
Latin America might proceed by the "Wealth of Nations" textbook, but the
result is hunger and premature deaths from malnutrition. The answer is to
be found in what Marxists have always called for, production for human need
rather than profit.<

In theory, eventually stable commercial agriculture with a steady
work-force will settle in, as the process of primitive accumulation and
proletarianization swallow up the last of the world's rural populations.
Agriculture, in theory, will be like the automobile industry, perhaps even
able to insulate itself from the seemingly growing swings of weather
conditions. 

But it seems to me as if commercial agriculture aims to promote pesticide
and herbicide use, the use of chemical fertilizer, and the development of
hybrid and genetically-altered crops. Though profitable to individual
capitalist-farmers and to chem and bio corporations, these seem dangerous
in terms of their impact to the environment and the eaters, especially in
combination with each other. So it's quite possible that we urban
proletarians and semi-proles will starve due to some kind of world-wide
environmental disaster-driven famine some time in the future. Here the
problem is definitely a matter of production for profit being behind the
problem. 

Hey, didn't someone on pen-l once publish a book titled FARMING FOR PROFIT
IN A HUNGRY WORLD?

Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] &
http://clawww.lmu.edu/Faculty/JDevine/jdevine.html



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