Ricardo,
The cotton gin was invented in 1793. That made
for a much expanded production of cotton and a
lowering of the price. Presumably this fed into the
British expansion of its mechanized textile industry.
Barkley Rosser
-----Original Message-----
From: Ricardo Duchesne <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Monday, September 27, 1999 1:40 PM
Subject: [PEN-L:11747] Re: Role of Total Foreign Trade
>
>> Ricardo,
>> One reason why these ratios are not as impressive
>> in the direction you mean them to be is that the rise
>> of industrial capitalism is all about the development of
>> certain technologically advanced and mechanized
>> sectors that carried forward that revolutionary process.
>> Those sectors were a minority of the GDP well into
>> the late 1800s, but that does not mean that the revolution
>> did not happen and was not important.
>
>Barkley,
>
>I would not say late into the 1800s. Yes, I did forward numbers which
>give credence to the 'leading sector hypothesis', namely, that cotton
>was the industry which pulled the British economy into take-off and
>mechanization. But here are some interesting facts: 1) the main
>mechanical innovations in the spinning of cotton had already been
>accomplished by the 1780s, except for the application of steam power
>which followed soon in the 1780s, which is before the cotton export
>market became a major component of British exports
>(as only by 1800 did cotton textiles account for 1/4 of British
>exports).
>
>2) which raises the question of Britain's internal aptitute for
>technological innovation, a complicated institutional issue which
>includes a lot more than the profitability of a particular export
>market.
>
>> In fact your numbers can easily be interpreted to say
>> that exports were very important for the development of
>> that leading sector and that the most important part of
>> those exports and that leading sector was related to
>> cotton imports. Now, I have not been one of those who
>> have argued that slave trade profits were a key to all this
>> (am agnostic on that issue). But cheap cotton made by
>> slaves certainly looks to have played a role, and possibly
>> an absolutely crucial one. I believe that this point was made
>> by Brad De Long way back in the early stages of this discussion,
>> which he has absented himself from for some time.
>> Barkley Rosser
>
>I think my last point about substitutes and that new markets are not
>new income partially answers your point. I mean, you are assuming
>that if the British had acquired the raw cotton fibres at a higher
>price there would have been no industrial revolution, or if they had no
>colonial market to export the finished cottons they would have had no
>capital to innovate, but this would have simply meant higher prices
>(higher costs), or finding new markets, or looking for other
>substitutes.
>export market
>
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Ricardo Duchesne <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>> Date: Friday, September 24, 1999 3:48 PM
>> Subject: [PEN-L:11652] Role of Total Foreign Trade
>>
>>
>> >In contrast to anyone else here, I have put together data that do not
>> >favour my interpretation, which is/should be the true mark of all
>> >scientific enquiry. Science does not consist in the simple gathering of
>> data
>> >in justification of one's pre-determined views, but in looking for data
>> that
>> >may falsify one's interpretation.
>> >
>> >Last post I summarized some of the basic arguments about the "vital"
>> >role of total trade in the industrial revolution. Now, in addition to
>> >the points already presented against the primary role of the colonial
>> >trade, I would like to put forward the counter arguments, which show
>> >that foreign trade was an important component of Britain's
>> >industrialization, but not the "vital" sector.
>> >
>> >If we consider the ratios of exports to gross national product for
>> >the British economy over the 18th century, we have the following
>> >numbers: the proportion of exports relative to GNP was
>> >about 8.4% in 1700, growing to 14.6% in 1760, falling to 9.4% in 1780
>> >and then increasing to about 15.7% in 1801 (Engerman, 1994).
>> >(Remember these numbers are on total exports - not the considerably
smaller
>> >colonial exports)
>> >
>> >Now, there is indeed a rapid rise in the ratio of exports to GNP in
>> >the period 1780 to 1800. Moreover, considering that most exports were
>> >manufactured goods, the shares of exports in industrial output were
>> >higher than the shares of exports in national output. However, most of
>> >these exports were textiles of cotton, wool and linen, which amounted
>> >to almost 3/4 of the value of exports around 1800, with cotton
>> >textiles increasingly taking the lead. And cotton represented only 1% of
>> >industrial production in 1770, and only 8% in 1815.
>> >
>> >Moreover, these stats would seem to say that removing the export trade,
say
>> in
>> >1801, would have resulted in a lowering of the national income by 15.7%.
>> >Yet, this argument forgets that, if resources had not been used in the
>> >foreign trade sector, they would have found employment elsewhere.
>> >This is just a simple fact about the way the market operates;
>> >every activity has a substitute (Thomas& McCloskey, 1981; Mokyr, 1985).
>> >If they did not export cotton - keeping in mind, too, that at lower
prices
>> >the home market would have consumed some of what was exported -
>> >the British could have engaged in another economic
>> >activity, like paving new roads, constructing new buildings, or
>> >making beer. As McCloskey reminds us, "exports are not the same thing as
>> >new income. They are new markets, not new income" (1994).
>> >
>> >All this talk about whether trade was a necessary or a sufficient
>> >condition is meaningless unless we make a distinction between
>> >slave profits, the colonial trade, and total foreign trade. My
>> >conclusion, given the findings and arguments I have forwarded so far,
>> >is that *slave profits* played an insignificant role. Not only were
such
>> >profits *not* a sufficient cause; they were not necessary either:
>> >Europe would have industrialized anyways.
>> >
>> >Now, the *colonial trade* played a statistically moderate, not too
>> >significant, role. Europe would also have industrialized without it -
>> >although at a lower rate, and at a later date.
>> >
>> >Total foreign trade was significant but was not the major cause.
>> >
>> >
>>
>>
>
>
