---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------- The Progressive Response 10 September 1999 Vol. 3, No. 33 Editor: Tom Barry ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------- The Progressive Response (PR) is a weekly service of Foreign Policy in Focus (FPIF), a joint project of the Interhemispheric Resource Center and the Institute for Policy Studies. We encourage responses to the opinions expressed in PR. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------- Table of Contents I. Updates and Out-Takes *** APEC & ASEAN: MULTILATERALISM IN ASIA PACIFIC *** By John Gershman *** CONGRESSIONAL STAFF INVESTIGATE U.S. POLICY IN IRAQ *** II. Comments *** THOUGHTS ON EAST TIMOR AND ERITREA *** ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------- I. Updates and Out-Takes *** APEC & ASEAN: MULTILATERALISM IN ASIA PACIFIC *** By John Gershman (Editor's Note: The meeting of the Asia Pacific Economic Forum this week and the post-electoral violence in East Timor focus international attention on the role of regional institutions in dealing with regional crises. John Gershman of the Institute for International Development Research offers an overview and a critical analysis of these two multilateral institutions in his FPIF focus essay, "Still the Pacific Century? U.S. Policy in Asia and the Pacific" [forthcoming in an FPIF book published by St. Martin's Press], which is excerpted here.) The Asian financial and political crises exposed the weakness of regional institutions. Unlike the formal institutional structures that manage integration in North America under NAFTA or in the European Union, economic integration in East and Southeast Asia is not guided by structural accords. The inability of ASEAN, the oldest regional multilateral organization, to respond effectively to the regional economic and environmental crises is reflected in Singapore Premier Goh Chok Tong's observation that ASEAN "is seen as helpless and worse, disunited in a crisis." A major stumbling block is ASEAN's principle of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of member countries. More recent developments suggest that this principle is slowly being challenged. For example, the regional impact of the Indonesian forest fires of 1997 led Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines to pressure Indonesia to adopt policies to prevent a repeat occurrence, while Thailand and the Philippines initially opposed Cambodia's entrance into ASEAN. When, on occasion, Asian governments have attempted collective action on economic issues without including the United States, as in Malaysian Prime Minister Mohamed Mahathir's proposal for an East Asian Economic Caucus or in the case of the ASEAN Free Trade Area, Washington has objected. For example, one early attempt at a regional response to the Asian economic crisis was Japan's August 1997 proposal for an Asian Monetary Fund. This would have created a fund to protect Asian currencies from speculative assaults in their financial markets. But the U.S. Treasury Department torpedoed the proposal, arguing that it was duplicating the efforts of the IMF. The U.S. does not advocate multilateralism in Asia, per se, but uses multilateral institutions to advance U.S. corporate interests, as exemplified in its approach to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC). APEC consists of 21 countries on both sides of the Pacific. Trade among its members accounts for over half of world trade, and until the crisis, a growing proportion of world output. Technically, APEC is a forum of "economies" not countries, since Taiwan and the Peoples' Republic of China do not recognize each other diplomatically, and Hong Kong entered APEC first as a colony of Great Britain and is now a Special Administrative Region of China. Originally, APEC was an informal group of 12 Asia-Pacific economies: Australia, Brunei, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States. They were followed by China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan (1991), Mexico and Papua New Guinea (1993), Chile (1994), and Peru, Russia, and Vietnam (1998). APEC actually contains three parallel processes. The first is the original: economic and technical cooperation promoting economic and human resource development. The second process, a more explicit trade and investment liberalization agenda, emerged in 1993 at APEC's first-ever Economic Leaders Meeting. The "Bogor Declaration" released the following year stated that APEC's goal was "free and open trade and investment" in the region, by 2010 for industrialized economies, and 2020 for developing members. Resistance on the part of Japan and the ASEAN countries to the U.S. agenda has led to relatively vague goals, many of which merely repeated commitments under the WTO. At the 1997 Vancouver meeting APEC Leaders agreed to liberalize trade in nine sectors ranging from environmental goods to telecommunications--on a "fast track" basis covering $1.5 trillion in trade (known as Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization) followed by another six sectors at a later date. Most disturbing was the inclusion of fisheries and forest products as sectors to be liberalized, sectors for which rapid liberalization without ecological safeguards could have disastrous consequences for sustainable development and food security in the near term. Opposition to liberalization of the nine industry sectors from several members--particularly Japan--ensured that the agreements at the November, 1998 meeting did not significantly advance liberalization. The third, and weakest, process is the sustainable development agenda, which emerged within APEC in 1993 and is currently stalled. To date, this process has been characterized by a flurry of small-scale projects with virtually no progress in linking environmental and economic integration issues. Stalled progress has four main causes: poor leadership by the wealthier countries, most prominently the U.S.; popular opposition to APEC's free trade agenda, and the failure to connect the trade, investment, and environmental tracks. The fourth is the weakness of pro-sustainable development forces within negotiating governments (most of which are dominated by commercial interests) and the inability of pro-sustainable development forces from civil society to penetrate the national and regional processes of policy formulation. APEC currently has two main nongovernmental interlocutors: the APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC, founded in 1995), which describes itself as the private sector arm of APEC, and the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC, founded in 1980), a tripartite, nongovernmental organization committed to promoting economic cooperation and market-driven integration in the Pacific Rim. APEC and its members do not have any guidelines for participation by non-business civil society actors such as scientists and NGOs, although the U.S. and some other members have brought some NGO representatives to some of the ministerial meetings. In the late 1990s, APEC meetings were marred by heavy-handed efforts by the host governments to repress demonstrations and political opposition. APEC's effectiveness in promoting sustainable development has been hampered by the fact that, in President Clinton's words, "[the U.S. is] committed to making [APEC] a vehicle for liberalization in the region." The U.S. has, for example, used APEC countries to build support for free trade in the WTO, as it did in November 1996 with the International Technology Agreement. APEC is seen as something of a lame duck institution. As the only regional economic institution, however, APEC is worth preserving, particularly if it can catalyze subregional (e.g., ASEAN, Northeast Asian) cooperative efforts on sustainable development. The U.S. could gain support for a sustainable development agenda by stepping back from its liberalization-above-all-else approach, explore instruments to regulate short-term capital flows, provide resources to address the social and ecological costs of the crisis, and increase its support for capacity-building efforts, particularly at the sub-national level. Otherwise, APEC should be allowed to die a painless death. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------- *** CONGRESSIONAL STAFF INVESTIGATE U.S. POLICY IN IRAQ *** Earlier this week the congressional staff delegation to Iraq that IPS Fellow and In Focus contributor Phyllis Bennis accompanied returned home. The goal of the trip was to examine the effect of economic sanctions and the effects of depleted uranium from U.S. bombing raids on the population. It was the first visit by congressional members or staff to Iraq since 1991. Setting the stage for the trip, a recent UNICEF survey on Child and Maternal Mortality shows a dramatic increase in child mortality since the Gulf War. The report estimates that there have been at least half a million child deaths which could have been prevented and that "in the absence of the prolonged measures imposed by the UN Security Council," Iraqis would not have suffered the malnutrition and disease resulting in the increased death rates. The report estimates that 20% of Iraqi children under five suffer from stunted growth due to malnutrition. Criticism has been voiced by UN administrators of the Oil-for Food program, the Red Cross, and numerous religious leaders and human rights organizations. UNICEF officials have estimated that some 5,000-6,000 Iraqi children under five die each month. The staffers, representing Representatives Cynthia McKinney, Danny Davis, Sam Gejdenson, Earl Hilliard, and Bernie Sanders, visited a children's hospital in Baghdad, a bomb shelter, grain silos, and met with Deputy Prime Minister Tareq Aziz during the five-day, fact-finding mission. Although the State Department opposed the trip, the staffers and 40 nongovernmental organizations involved in organizing the trip felt it was necessary to obtain an on-the-ground assessment of the conditions. Previous In Focus briefs (U.S.-Iraq Conflict, Nov. 1997, available at http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/briefs/vol2/v2n51ira.html; and U.S.-Iraq Policy, Oct. 1996, available at http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/briefs/vol1/IRAQ.html) have suggested that U.S. policy be refocused. Bennis writes, "Current U.S. policy against Iraq provides no vision for a strategic long-term approach that takes into account a starving population, a crippled economy, and a blustering military government. The policy was already eroding long before the current crisis. It cannot be sustained indefinitely." Bennis recommends that policy changes include: * Military action should be eschewed in favor of truly diplomatic and multilateral approaches. * The UN Security Council should acknowledge that resolution 687's brutal economic sanctions have failed. *A redrawn UN mandate should work to limit potential Iraqi military threats, while ensuring that Iraq's civilian population does not pay the price for its government's unaccountability. The delegation presents a new opportunity for these ideas to gain exposure in a Congress that has been unwilling to consider alternatives to the nine-year policy in Iraq. Such delegations should be encouraged as should congressional hearings to review U.S. bombing and sanctions policy. Readers who favor such a review are encouraged to express their support by communicating with these and other congressional representatives: Rep. Sam Gejdenson (D-CT) Ranking Minority Member, House International Relations Com. Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Rep. Cynthia McKinney (D-GA) Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Rep. Danny Davis (D-IL) Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Rep. Earl Hilliard (D-AL) Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Rep. Bernie Sanders (I-VT) Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------- II. Comments *** THOUGHTS ON EAST TIMOR AND ERITREA *** (Editor's Note: FPIF contributor Dan Connell, author of policy briefs on Eritrea and Sudan, offered the following commentary on events in East Timor and similarities with the simmering conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia.) Both East Timor and Eritrea share the almost unique distinction (with Western Sahara) of being former European colonies that were annexed by neighboring third world states on the basis on pre-colonial claims. This has made decolonization far more difficult, certainly far longer and bloodier--and easier for the world to ignore. And it is now threatening massive loss of life in both states at almost exactly the same time. Since each former colony is small and strategically less significant than its much larger pro-Western neighbor, the world is wringing its hands but apparently unwilling to do what's needed to halt the carnage. On East Timor, no one should be surprised at what's happening now. The violence leading up to the elections foreshadowed it. The actions of the armed forces before, during, and after the referendum underlined it, and the political situation in Jakarta fueled it. What no one seems to be talking about is that the likely next president (after voting is finished late this fall) will be a woman who has always opposed independence for East Timor. I think the current violence is a systematic attempt to undo the referendum and play to changes in Jakarta that will later reverse it. Major massacres will come next. And I also think that the Clinton administration is doing essentially the same thing it did in Rwanda--delaying action to the point where a disaster will happen of potentially epic proportions. (Remember Bill's heart-rending apology in Kigalai last year? Watch for it again in Dili.) The last straw, and exactly what happened in Rwanda prior to the genocide there, is the pullout of the UN, slated for tomorrow. Instead, the UN compound should be reinforced with UN troops. And we should be sanctioning Indonesia today with arms embargoes and hold-ups in IMF loans at the least--measures designed to squeeze the regime, not starve the population (as Iraq). But troops on the ground are what's needed right away, best from regional states. Yet, as most commentators are now saying, Indonesia is more important to the industrial states (what we used to call first world) than East Timor, so who's going to buck Jakarta by ignoring its refusal on this? Meanwhile, Ethiopia rejected the peace proposal with Eritrea this week, so we can expect major fighting there, too, any day. As the Clinton administration can't deal with more than one, perhaps two, crises at once, this will also happen with no effective effort to stop it ahead of time, though U.S. pressure on its historic ally in the region, Ethiopia, could do so (and though U.S. involvement in crafting the current peace proposal has been surprisingly useful). This, too, could take the form of arms and other selected sanctions to hit the regime, not the people. It should start now, today, with a Security Council resolution calling on Addis Ababa to accept what is arguably a plan that incorporates its major publicly stated concerns (with Eritrea agreeing to withdraw first from nearly all disputed border areas). But this must happen very quickly as the clock is ticking there, too. The end of the rainy season this month is what Ethiopia was waiting for to restart the war, while feigning interest in the peace process. (Will we now wake up to the fact that Ethiopia has other interests in prolonging what they take to be a war of attrition that favors its larger numbers?) This time, however, if Ethiopia launches more human wave assaults along the frontier, Eritrea will undoubtedly strike back in other ways, spreading the conflict away from the border. Taken together, this will make the bloodiest war in the world even bloodier. The time to act in this crisis, like that in East Timor, is yesterday. Dan Connell <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------- The Progressive Response aims to provide timely analysis and opinion about U.S. foreign policy issues. The content does not necessarily reflect the institutional positions of either the Interhemispheric Resource Center or the Institute for Policy Studies. We're working to make the Progressive Response informative and useful, so let us know how we're doing, via email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] Please put "Progressive Response" in the subject line. Please feel free to cross-post The Progressive Response elsewhere. We apologize for any duplicate copies you may receive. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------- To subscribe or unsubscribe to the Progressive Response, go to: http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/progresp/progresp.html and follow the instructions. 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IRC Tom Barry Co-director, Foreign Policy In Focus Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC) Box 2178 Silver City, NM 88062-2178 Voice: (505) 388-0208 Fax: (505) 388-0619 Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] IPS Martha Honey Co-director, Foreign Policy In Focus Director, Peace and Security 733 15th Street NW, Suite 1020 Washington, DC 20005 Voice: (202) 234-9382 Fax: (202) 387-7915 Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[PEN-L:10913] Progressive Response: APEC, IRAQ, E.TIMOR
Interhemispheric Resource Center Mon, 13 Sep 1999 08:57:38 -0600
