Michael,
In Hardin's scenario, there already is private property rights: "As a
rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly or
implicitly, he asks, "What is the utility to me off adding one more animal
to my herd?"
So what you have under Hardin's schematic, in fact, is private property
predating on non-property under conditions of perfect competition, absence
of a governance structure and marginalist doctrine. Is it any wonder he
reaches the conclusions he does?
The property rights that exist under Asian terraforming agriculture seem to
be far more scale-efficient in terms of sustainability than what our great
cowboy capitalists in Montana and Wyoming can come up with.
Ian
> -----Original Message-----
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]On Behalf Of Michael Perelman
> Sent: Monday, July 31, 2000 7:18 AM
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: [PEN-L:4] Re: Chinese desertification; disappearing bluecrabs
>
>
> I should have been more clear. The Tragedy of the Commons suggests that
> environmental destruction comes from the lack of property rights.
> There is a
> group in Montana that suggests that all environmental problems
> can be solved by
> giving property rights to private owners. Supposedly, if I owned
> all the fish
> in the world, I would be careful not to overfish -- like the
> private owners of
> the forests.
>
> My point, which Jason mostly understood, many pre-market societies [before
> markets became dominant, not without markets altogether]
> developed methods of
> avoiding the problem of over-exploitation.
>
>
> --
> Michael Perelman
> Economics Department
> California State University
> Chico, CA 95929
>
> Tel. 530-898-5321
> E-Mail [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
