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Date sent: Tue, 10 Oct 2000 11:26:28 -0700
To: (Recipient list suppressed)
From: Sid Shniad <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: From Milosevic to the Future - Stratfor
Stratfor.com's Weekly Analysis - 09 October 2000
>From Milosevic to the Future
>From the standpoint of cameras and Western journalists, the fall of
Milosevic appears indistinguishable from other velvet and near-
velvet revolutions that have toppled dictators from Prague to
Manila. A righteous outpouring of people into the streets, a ham-
handed, venal government capitulates and a new day is born.
But it is never as simple as breathless broadcasts might paint it.
To understand the fall of Slobodan Milosevic, it is important to
understand the manner in which he fell. The truth in Yugoslavia
lies somewhere between the grand aesthetic of the public drama and
the more mundane details of deal making. Indeed, the latter is
frequently more defining than the former. And many disappointed
expectations are rooted in details overlooked by revolution's
glamour.
The roots of Milosevic's demise can be traced to the frustration of
the American and British governments, enmeshed in the realities of
peacekeeping in Kosovo, with no hope of conclusion. NATO was
trapped in a quagmire without exit. In Belgrade, the opposition
failed, divided, and were discredited as agents of NATO, all
against a backdrop of Serb victimization.
Everyday Serbs were convinced of two things: They had not committed
atrocities, and they themselves were the targets of an unjust
bombing campaign. Milosevic was the great beneficiary. He might
have been a swine, but he was Serbia's swine. Incompetent on many
fronts, he at least defended the national interest. In this
context, the opposition had as much chance of winning as Quisling
had of carrying Norway in World War II.
The United States reacted with a new strategy. Described in
"Toppling Milosevic: The Carrot Instead of the Stick," the new
strategy consisted of splitting Milosevic from his followers.
Cracks opened but were contained when Milosevic called for
elections. But before the election it became clear Milosevic had
nearly trapped himself, as recounted in "Checkmate in Yugoslavia,".
Milosevic's Cabinet, his cronies and the army and police held the
key to the drama. Milosevic had to be isolated from those levers of
power before the crowds could storm parliament. Thousands could
have been killed, as they were in Romania with the fall of
Ceaucescu. Milosevic might cling to power.
It was imperative the leadership split from Milosevic and
accommodate Kostunica. Public displays of police suddenly embracing
demonstrators probably had less to do with the passions of the
moment than with fevered deals being made between Kostunica and
former Milosevic followers. These deals brought both the peace and
the revolution.
The deals also created a revolution with a complex genesis and an
uncertain future. Milosevic is certainly gone. The temptation among
many, including his closest followers, is to blame everything on
him. The head of the international war crimes tribunal in the Hague
has made it clear Milosevic should be tried for war crimes, but
Kostunica has made it clear he does not want to see prosecution
proceed.
As president, he might be able to stomach Milosevic's trial, but
many of the people he and the United States had to deal with over
the past few months are also subject to indictment and trial. They
would not have been as cooperative had Kostunica and likely the
United States not made guarantees about their legal status. Given
the example of former President Augusto Pinochet of Chile, it seems
probable that any world-wise operators asked for promises.
As important as the status of charges against Milosevic followers,
is the issue of Serbian territorial claims, particularly in Kosovo.
Kostunica was an adamant supporter of Serbian claims in Kosovo.
What did the United States promise Kostunica? Indeed, how long can
Kostunica survive without some movement on Kosovo? And what will
Albanians do about the new darling of the West?
Kostunica himself remains an enigma. The West would like to turn
him into another Vaclav Havel. He is not a communist, but he is not
a liberal either. He is a nationalist who, like the rest of Serbia,
has viewed the West with suspicion. He has also created a coalition
of diverse elements, including former Milosevic supporters who hope
to retain their influence, if not their position.
It is reasonable to say Kostunica is a snapshot of Serbia today:
tired of Milosevic, deeply suspicious and resentful of the West,
nationalistic to the very bone. Kostunica is formally democratic,
but he understands the complex personalism and clannishness that
comprise Balkan culture. No Havel, Kostunica is a hardline
nationalist who has come to power partly by accommodating his
public enemies.
The fall of Milosevic gives the West the opportunity to wash its
hands of the mess. But trying to wash hands and actually washing
them are different things. The West now finds itself in a position
in which it must support a political figure financially and
politically. The problem is that political figure has certain
interests that will likely be anathema. If the West does not
support him, it loses credibility. If it does, it can wind up
supporting the very perspectives that helped lead to war in the
first place.
This is what the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo will fear most. They
see Kostunica as the West's excuse to abandon the Albanians to the
Serbs once again. And, indeed, that might be the case. Washington,
weary of the mess, may well declare victory and go home.
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