+++++   From: "snnoonan" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: rationalizatin and reification
Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2000 02:32:55 -0600

In the essay "Reification and and the Consciousness of the 
proletariat" Lukacs recognized that  the dominance of commodity 
exchange in social relations produces effects which result in the 
reduction of social life to "... the principle of rationalization 
based on what can be calculated."  For Lukacs, following Weber, 
rationalization consists: "... of being able to predict with ever 
greater precision all the results to be achieved...by the exact break 
down of every complex into to its elements and by the study of the 
special laws governing production."  This breaking down a complex 
phenomena into elements which can be quantified, studied and 
manipulated in the interests of ever increasing control and 
prediction is the central mechanism of the capitalist imperative, it 
is an essential feature of reification (or thingification) to come to 
see humans, machinery, raw materials and everything else as merely 
factors of production and loci of competitive advantage.

>From 1912 to 1918 Lukacs was an active participant in the lively 
intellectual circles of Heidelberg and to a lesser extent, Berlin. 
During this time Lukacs had contacts with Max and Marianna Weber, 
Georg Simmel, Karl Mannheim, Ernst Bloch, Karl Polanyi, Martin Buber 
and Karl Jaspers and I think Thomas Mann as well.  Lukacs 
incorporated key elements of Weber's thematic on rationalization in 
his own theoretical work.  For Weber, rationalization is the 
structural consequence of social actions premised upon instrumental 
rationality (zweckrational) and stands in constrast to value-rational 
(wertrational), affectual and traditional forms of social action. 
Instrumental rationality is social action: "...determined by 
expectations as to the behavior of objects in the environment and of 
other human beings; these expectations are used as conditions or 
means for the attainment of the actor's own rationally pursued and 
calculated ends."  Weber traced instrumental rationality between 
historic periods and across a variety of social contexts.  His study 
of bureaucracy, economic organization and even his sociology of 
religion address the circumstances that either influenced or 
inhibited instrumental rationalization.  From these disparate cases 
Weber constructed a loose model of rationalization that includes: the 
disenchantment and intellectualization of the world; the 
objectification of things and actions via formal analysis and 
mathematical abstraction and technical mastery via specialized 
practices and discourse.  In the essay Science as a Vocation Weber 
argued that instrumental rationality began several millenia ago in 
specifically occidential culture and has gained momentum until today 
it instills the believe that: "...one can in principle master all 
things by calculation."  In the closing pages of Science as a 
Vocation Weber says:

"The fate of our times is characterized by rationalization and 
intellectualization and, above all, by the disenchantment of the 
world... To the person who cannot bear the fate of the times like a 
man, one must say: may he rather return silently and simply...nothing 
is gained by yearning and tarrying alone, and we shall act 
differently.  We shall set to work and meet the demands of the day in 
human relations as well as in our vocation."

Weber - so frequently used to bash Marx for the crimes of stagism and 
for the the crimes excessive reduction - regarded human behavoir 
fixed, predetermined and fated has always struck me as pretty funny. 
In contrast to this Lukacs saw the dominance of instrumental 
rationality over substantive rationality as the organizational effect 
of commodity production.  Lukacs was a better historian than Weber. 
Blaut, Furuhashi and others have demonstrated the Weber's work is at 
least implicitly racist.  Weber's theory of rationalization is also 
far more teleological than anything Marx himself wrote.  And Weber 
never really provides an adequate explanation for what caused 
rationalization to emerge in the first place. Lukacs provides the 
useful insight within rationalization with an adequate causal 
explanation by grafting it onto the historical specificity and 
context of Marxism.

In providing the necessary historical context and showing which way 
the causal arrow really points (from class relations and mode of 
production to culture) Lukacs rescues all that is useful in Weber and 
abandon's the rest.  Weber is mostly just footnotes and quibbles with 
Marx and the majority of it is shit.  Nevertheless, Weber serves 
bourgeois sociology quite nicely.  He is always invoked as the more 
subtle "multi-causal" not "economically deterministic"  not "stagist" 
sociological thinker.  George Ritzer's McDonaldization theory is 
Weber redux with a catchy brand-name attached making it easier for 
undergrads to swallow.  Someone really needs to write an undergrad 
friendly book on Lukacs and reification, showing that 
rationalization, bureaucracy, instrumental reason etc. are (1) 
historically specific (2) propelled by capitalism (3) far from 
historically inevitable and (4) that resistance to such processes can 
and must be more than Ritzer's advice that we eat Ben and Jerry's ice 
cream, that we pick up after ourselves in McDonalds and grab bag of 
other guilty conscience, liberal life hating, hair-shirt, nonsense. 
If you have to do sociology (and teach it), it might as well be 
scientific and therefore Marxist.

Sean Noonan
[EMAIL PROTECTED]   +++++

+++++   Date: Sat, 9 Dec 2000 12:33:29 -0500
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
From: Yoshie Furuhashi <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: rationalisation and reification

>En relaci�n a Re: rationalisation and reification,
>el 9 Dec 00, a las 8:26, Louis Proyect dijo:
>
>>  Phil:
>>  >PS: BTW, does anyone know any good books on the subject of the
>>  >origins/evolution of sociology?
>
>Positively yes. Lucien Goldmann's _Les sciences humaines et la philosophie_ is
>directly engaged with this.
>
>N�stor Miguel Gorojovsky
>[EMAIL PROTECTED]

Lucien Goldmann is wonderful.  I'm reading Eric R. Wolf's _Europe and 
the People Without History_ now.  In the introduction, Wolf briefly 
discusses the rise of the social sciences and the development of 
sociological theory (how both became divorced from political economy, 
which in turn got compartmentalized into economics & political 
science):

*****   The rising tide of discontent pitting "society" against the 
political and ideological order erupted in disorder, rebellion, and 
revolution.  The specter of disorder and revolution raised the 
question of how social order could be restored and maintained, 
indeed, how social order was possible at all.  Sociology hoped to 
answer the "social question."  It had, as Rudolph Heberle noted, "an 
eminently political origin....Saint Simon, Auguste Comte, and Lorenz 
Stein conceived the new science of society as an antidote against the 
poison of social disintegration" (quoted in Bramson 1961: 12, n. 2).

These early sociologists did this by severing the field of social 
relations from political economy....


Bramson, Leon 1961.  The Political Context of Sociology.  Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton UP.


(Eric Wolf, _Europe and the People Without History_, Berkeley: U of 
California P, 1982, _p. 8)   *****

Yoshie

P.S.  Thanks to Sean Noonan for his very fine post.   +++++

Yoshie

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