Many analytical philosophers have been interested in the philosophy of
science. Often they are interested in analysis of scientific concepts both
in psychology and physical sciences. Norman Malcolm for example argued at
great length with Skinner re Behaviorism. Ryle's Concept of Mind on the
other hand is a critique of Cartesian type assumptions re Mind that some,
but not Ryle himself, regard as a type of linguistic behaviorism. Ryle also
has written on the relationship of scientific to everyday concepts. Stephen
Toulmin's work in the philosophy of the physical sciences is very readable
and perhaps somewhat neglected. Much more sophisticated and often on
specific topics, eg. a whole book on the concept of a positron, is Norwood
Russell Hanson. Elizabeth Anscombe seems to identify herself to a
considerable extent with the Thomistic and Aristotelian traditions even
though she is a Wittgensteinian.
CHeers, Ken Hanly
----- Original Message -----
From: Jim Devine <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Wednesday, December 13, 2000 3:28 PM
Subject: [PEN-L:6113] Re: Re: analytical philosophy
> I wrote:
> >>Perhaps "AP" can be _defined_ as the rejection of discussions of
"method"
>
> Justin writes:
> >No, the anti-method thing is more of a pragmatist trope than a general AP
> >thing. I, predictly, do not believe there is any such thing as
"scientific
> >method," and as someone trained in philosophy of science and political
> >science, I will say that I find nothing so silly and irrelevant as social
> >scientists who look to the philosophy of science literature for a models
> >of how to do social science--it's appallingly common. I would sit in my
> >pol sci seminars and laugh, tell the other stidents and prof, pay no
> >attention to what WE say, just go out and find good examples of actual
> >reserach and follow those! That's the danger of discussions of method,
> >they will be treated as recipes.
>
> I can see that some -- many -- social scientists _overdo_ the study of
> scientific method (and escape into method when they can't do empirical
> research or say anything substantive about the world), but how can you
find
> "good examples of actual research" if you don't have some idea of what
> "good" is? It sure seems that the whole point of the study of scientific
> method is to answer that question. (Much of the study might involve waste
> motion, like most academic ventures, but at least people like Lakatos give
> some guidance for what "good" research is.) Following pragmatism, do we
> define good research as what's useful? to whom?
>
> One of the reasons I'm interested in scientific method issues (Lakatos,
> etc.) is because economists, as a bunch, absolutely reject such issues.
> When I took economic theory in 1974 at UC-Berkeley, our introduction to
> method was reading a debate between Milton Friedman and Paul Samuelson.
The
> MF argued that it's okay to make totally outrageous assumptions in making
a
> model as long as the model as a whole predicted empirical data accurately.
> PS had some counter-argument which was pretty superficial, though I've
> forgotten his exact point (singular). (All of the debate was basically
> nonsense, especially since the MF doesn't follow his own method and the
> polite PS didn't mention that.) Anyway, even that reading was dropped from
> the theory course the next year. We wouldn't want our students to reflect
> on what they're doing! After all, "economics is what economists do,"
> especially those economists at prestigious institutions (who in turn
decide
> which institutions are prestigious).
>
> In the absence of some sort of philosophical basis, the only academic way
> to decide what "good" research is by having the tenure and promotion
> committees (along with the Dean and the college President) decide. Or have
> the journal editors or the foundation grant-givers decide. It's like
having
> the market decide the worth of your work, where of course those with the
> most "dollar votes" have the most say. But people need to reflect on the
> research they do beyond thinking about how the "powers that be" value it.
> Robert Oppenheimer knew that.
>
> >>Okay, so the AP types gave us greater understanding of formal logic.
> >>...Then, how is AP distinguished from other schools of
> >>philosophy that accept the validity and importance of logic?
> >
> >In a pragmatic, sociological sort of way, by the articles students are
> >taught to read and model their work on and that professors are expected
to
> >cite and discuss, and also by a sensew of what problems and what kind of
> >answers are important and acceptable. But you knew this, so whya re you
> >asking me? Are you trying for a concession that there is no essence of
AP,
> >that all philosophy is AP? What?
>
> My impression is that "analytic philosophy" simply defines itself as
valid,
> so that anything deemed to be "sensible" is part of AP (so Bertrand
Russell
> can be appropriated as part of the pack). That's hardly philosophical
> reflection, especially about the meaning of "validity."
>
> Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] & http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~jdevine
>
