Scott,
You are right to reproach me for my caustic and rude tone, and your
responded better than I deserved, for which thanks, and I apologize directly
to you. We disagree on many things, however. I do have tremendous admiration
for the logical positivists. I probably am a lot closer to the positivists
than many, although there are no more logical empiricists in philosophy, as
I've said. I call myself a pragmatist in the tradition of Quine and Sellars,
both of whom were strongly influenced by the positivists. However
neopragmatism in this spirit shares positivism's respect for natural science
and the concern with understanding it; the belief in the utility of formal
logic in the project of understanding it; the importance of empirical
evidence in support of one's theories; positivist's skepticism about sharp
differences between the study of humans and the rest of nature; and
positivism's doubts about the utility of many traditional philosophical
debates, among other things.
The fact that positivism is a big umbrella term doesn't mean that it
encompasses all forms of scientifically oriented philosophy, if indeed one
wants to include the early Wittgenstein as among "scientifically oriented."
If some Marxists want to lump everything that influenced logical positivism
as "positivist," then Marxism is positivist, because Neurath's Marxism was
not a personal idiosyncrasy but integral to his views, and he was
influential in the circle. Popper was not a P; to call him one is like
calling Russell a Communist because he was a socialist. (And I did not say
that R was sympathetic to communism; I identified him as a socialist critic
of Bolshevism.)
I don't find your form of criticism particularly helpful, since it stops
with what Lenin wrote before logical positivism was even invented. Lenin was
of course a philosphical amateur. He was not a professional philosopher or
trained in technical philosophy; he was an intelligent reader who
contributed an interesting book to a debate that was going on at the time,
and one that has some importance in intellectual history. To treat it as the
last word on sophisticated ideas that were developed decades later is rather
odd. The book also contains many mistakes, as one would expect from an
amateur job, although it has a number of good arguments.
Logocal positivism is a form of radical empiricism, fair enough. To say that
it is subjective idealism is not helpful, though. Apparently you attempt to
assimilate LP to Mach and Avernarius (Lenin's secondary targets), and thence
to Berkeley, as Lenin does. This won't do. There are affinities between the
LP and Mach, who influenced them--less through his Analysis of Sensations
than through his attack on Newton's idea of absolute space, though, but they
are not the same. LP says it rejects both idealism and materialism as
meaningless, and thsi claim cannot be brushed off. Certainly, LP would have
nothing to dow ith Berkeley's idea that the external world in constructed
from ideas in the mind, a claim LP would regard as metaphysical. If LP has
an idealist falvor, it is not because it is Berkeleyan, but because it is
conventionalist; it allows one to construct the world from any arbitrary
starting point, materialist or not. This is not an idea that has a lot of
supporters today, though.
It is odd to say that LP takes a hostile line to the theoretical summation
of knowledge, unless you mean something nonstandard by that. LP is itself a
general theory of scientific knowledge.
The existence of atoms was not conclusively established until Einstein's
paper on Brownian motion, 1893 or thereabouts, so it was not irrational for
Mach to remain skeptical until the 20th century. His doubts were in any case
scientific and not philosophical.
--jks
>
>In a message dated 4/27/01 8:39:56 AM Pacific Daylight Time,
>[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
> >
> > Beating on "positivism" is beating a dead horse, if logical empiricsim
>is
> > meant--at least in philosophy. However there are serious inaccuracies
>in
>the
> > following that I will comment on.
> >
>
>Justin Schwartz doesn't like much of anything that either I, or the Soviet
>philosophers I quoted, had to say about positivism... or Popper, or
>historicism, or ethics, or... anything else. He raises way too many issues
>for me to try to respond to here, because--unlike him--I am not content to
>just quickly dismiss all the theories and views I disagree with with a few
>contemptuous words. Doing so may make you look like a brilliant star, but
>it
>almost always serves to cover up major substantive issues.
>
>I am new to this mail group and don't know how far afield it is proper to
>go.
>But I assume that most people want to keep the theme pretty closely tied to
>political economy, and not get too far off into purely philosophical or
>other
>extraneous debates. (There are other forums for those things.) When Carrol
>Cox raised the question of the definition of positivism, I figured it was
>in
>connection with one of the common criticisms by Marxists, and others on the
>left, of bourgeois political economy. I take Carrol to be asking, "Just
>what
>are you getting at when you condemn specific bourgeois economic theories or
>theorists as being 'positivist'?" And that is a fair question.
>
>I thought that some of the responses to Carrol's question, including
>Justin's, were not overly helpful, and did not really address the issue
>Carrol raised. One thing Justin said, however, is important here--that
>positivism is "a big umbrella term". And Marxism, in particular, has viewed
>positivism NOT just as the views of the Vienna Circle (which Justin wants
>to
>focus on), but as a general set of views and tendencies which are reflected
>in Comte, Russell's "logical atomism", the early Wittgenstein, the logical
>positivists, AND ALSO people like Popper--even if he DID break with the
>Vienna Circle and criticize what HE CALLED "positivism".
>
>In short, the term 'positivism' in Marxist discussion is BROADER than it is
>in bourgeois philosophy. It is important to understand that we call some
>people positivists who do not see themselves as positivists. Indeed, among
>bourgeois economists, there may well be some who have no idea what
>positivism
>means to any philosopher, but who still put forward positivistic theories
>in
>the Marxist sense.
>
>I tried to bring out some of the major characteristics of positivism as the
>term has in fact been used by Marxists and many others influenced by
>Marxism.
>In general, positivism is a form of radical empiricism and subjective
>idealism, which takes a rather hostile line toward the theoretic summation
>of
>knowledge. Is this an absolute? No, of course not. The positivists even put
>forward their own theories. But it is nevertheless a strong tendency of
>theirs. Thus pointing out "counter-examples" would be beside the point. (A
>contrary counter-example does not disprove a tendency.) In the same way,
>the
>fact that Mach finally admitted, IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY!, that atoms
>really
>exist, in no way shows that he was not extremely (and ridiculously)
>reluctant
>to admit their existence. And this is typical of the positivist's approach
>to
>things.
>
>I also tried to move things back in the direction of the positivist's views
>about social science, and it is here that Justin gets the most agitated. He
>states over and over again that a number of positivists held progressive
>political views, that Otto Neurath was a Marxist, that Wittgenstein thought
>well of the Soviet Union and that Russell--even Russell??--was supposedly
>"sympathetic to communism". (Should I mention that in the late 40's Russell
>favored unprovoked nuclear attack on the Soviet Union?) The implicit
>argument
>here is this: If some people who hold a general philosophical outlook are
>progressives, or even support revolution, then that philosophy cannot
>possibly be reactionary and false. When openly stated like this, that is
>obviously an absurd argument.
>
>The fact is, positivism is both wrong and reactionary, even if some of its
>defenders have nevertheless held progressive views on some points. At
>various
>times there have been all sorts of inroads even into Marxism of alien and
>reactionary philosophies. Lenin wrote his "Empiro-criticism..." in order to
>attack the inroads of positivism and Kantianism into Marxist thought in his
>day--even among the Bolsheviks.
>
>Justin seems to have a tremendous admiration for the logical positivists.
>Does he perhaps even agree with important aspects of their philosophy? Did
>you notice that he even puts down Lenin as a philosophical "amateur"? That
>would be a necessary move for anyone intent on foisting aspects of
>positivism
>on us. I don't say that Lenin was a god, or that everything he wrote on
>philosophy (or anything else) was invariably 100% correct. But the fact is
>that "Empiro-criticism is a great book, well worth reading today, and shows
>in many ways a profundity that professional bourgeois philosophers cannot
>possibly comprehend. No doubt Lenin would have happily bowed out and let
>some
>professional Marxist philosophers do the job he was forced to do--if there
>were any such animals back then willing and able to do. (And are things
>really that much better now?)
>
>Well, I won't try the patience any further of those who came here to
>discuss
>political economy. I will only close by saying that Carrol's question is a
>valid one, and that I would also like to see those more knowledgeable of
>political economy provide specific examples of why this or that doctrine or
>theory in bourgeois economics may be appropriately called positivistic, and
>exactly why this is a correct characterization in those cases.
>
>I hope you will notice that I got through this entire response without once
>calling Justin "ignorant" or "stupid" as he repeatedly said of me. Not that
>I
>wasn't tempted! We are all ignorant in various ways, even in the areas we
>specialize in. Some of us recognize this; some don't. And some find it
>necessary to constantly put down their opponents in order to "prove" their
>own superiority. What do you think--does this reflect well on them?
>
>--Scott Harrison
>
>
> > > >
> > >
> > >Most of the folks attempting to answer Carrol's question about
>postivism
> > >have
> > >been referring to A. J. Ayer, the Vienna Circle
> >
> > Ayer was a left Labourite, fairly radical. The LPs of the Vienna Circle
> > were, as we now know, almost all revolutionary socialists.
> >
> > and others who were or are
> > >positivists of one variety or another. They might also mention the
> > >Wittgenstein of the "Tractatus"--who inspired the VIenna Circle, and
> > >Bertrand
> > >Russell of the "logical atomist" period, who inspired Wittgenstein.
> >
> > There are affinities between W's Tractarian views and the LPs, but W
>was
>no
> > positivist even at this point. He was, btw, sympathetic to Communism.
> > Russell's Logical Atonomism also has affinities to LP, but is a quite
> > distinct view. Though no Bolshevik, indeed a critic of Bolshevism,
>Russell
> > was a radical socialist, and a militant,
>put-your-money-where-your-mouth-is
> > actvist his whole long life.
> >
> > But I
> > >think what Carrol is looking for is some definitions and condemnations
>of
> > >positivism FROM THE LEFT perspective which explain why the LEFT has
> > >traditionally despised positivism (and rightly so in my opinion).
> >
> > The biographical facts I have mentioned above suggesr that thsi may be
>a
> > mistake.
> >
> > >
> > >A good place to start on questions like this is the old "Handbook of
> > >Philosophy", adapted by Howard Selsam from the Soviet "Short
>Philosophic
> > >Dictionary" edited by M. Rosenthal and P. Yudin. (Yes, I know there
>are
> > >more
> > >sophisticated works of this type, including later revisions of this
>work
> > >from
> > >the USSR. But this early work is a good place to start on matters like
>this
> > >just because it IS shorter, and "less sophisticated". I.e., it often
>jumps
> > >right to the heart of the matter, and doesn't pull any punches. That
>is,
> > >its
> > >crudeness, partisanship and intemperance is something of a virtue!)
> >
> > What it has to offer is a rehash of Lenin's 1908 attack on Mach,
>AVernerius,
> >
> > and the empiriocritics, a book that is not bad for a philosophical
>amateur,
> > but full of errors and confusions--L doesn't, for example, distinguish
> > between positivism and Berkelyean idealism, or between Berkleyean
>idealism
> > and Kantian transcendental idealism. He ties idealism to "fideism" and
> > religion, not grasping that the religious need to be realists as much
>as
>the
> >
> > left. Etc.
> >
> > Here is
> > >what the 1949 edition has to say about positivism:
> > >
> > >"POSITIVISM, one of the most widespread of the anti-materialist
>currents
>in
> > >contemporary bourgeois philosophy. Claiming to stand above materialism
>and
> > >idealism, positivism holds that it bases itself only on 'experience'
>and
> > >that, consequently, it must reject the attempt to discover the
>essential
> > >nature of things. In this regard, it takes the position of
>philosophical
> > >agnosticism (see).
> >
> > This is a correct characterization so far as it goes of LP, but the LPs
>did
> > not think that the reality of the external world was a matter about
>which
>to
> >
> > be agnostic. They thougtht the question of whether it was real made no
> > sense.
> >
> > However, limiting its concept of experience exclusively to
> > >subjective sensations, it falls into the position of idealism.
> >
> > This is probably fair, although the LPs thought that idealism was just
>as
> > much nonsense as materialism. But the Lps were clear that one might do
>the
> > "logical constructioon of the world" (Carnap) starting from material as
>well
> >
> > as sensational postulates--subjective sensation was not privileged for
>them.
> >
> > The starting point is arbitrary. Nelson Goodman wrote a book doing just
> > this, The Structure of Appearance. The "idealism" is not the
>privileging
>of
> > subjective sensation but the failure to privilege objective reality.
> >
> > When it deals
> > >with social phenomena, it tends to explain the evolution of society by
>the
> > >levels reach in the intellectual development of man, of which the
>three
> > >principal stages are: the theological, the metaphysical, and the
>positive,
> > >as
> > >asserted in the work of Comte (see), nineteenth-century progenitor of
> > >positivism.
> >
> > This confuses LP with Comtean positivism. LP had no general view of
>social
> > reality. The most prominent LP who had such an articulated view was
>Otto
> > Neurath, a Marxist and defender of historical materialism.
> >
> > Positivism supports the existing order, admits only slow
> > >evolutionary processes, and opposes revolution.
> >
> > As a statement of the philosophy, not true. LP and related views say
>nothing
> >
> > about these topics. As a statement about the philosophers who held
>these
> > views, also not true. See above.
> >
> > At the close of the
> > >nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century all philosophers who
> > >tried
> > >to find a place somewhere between materialism and idealism, and to
> > >'transcend' the opposition between these two basic schools of thought,
> > >tended
> > >to gravitate to the positivists.
> >
> > Not true either. What about the existentialists and their precusors,
>the
> > phenomenologists and theirs?
> >
> > > "Lenin in his 'Materialism and Empirio-Criticism' [1908] presents
>a
> > >thorough-going critique of positivism. After the First World War
>positivism
> > >was revived in Europe, especially in Austria, and spread to England
>and
> > >America under the name of 'logical positivism' or 'logical
>empiricism'."
> > >
> > >I would add there there tends to be a fairly strong Kantian odor to
> > >positivism, suggestive of his claim that we can't know the real
>essential
> > >nature of a thing, the "ding-an-sich", but merely exterior "sense
>data"
>(as
> > >Russell put it).
> >
> > There is a Kantian odor to LP--Michael Friedman has explained the
>Kantian
> > roots of LP. However, it is incorrect to characterize it as you do. The
>LPs
> > thought that questioons about "real natures" literally made no sense,
>had
>no
> >
> > cognitive content. Not only is there nothing to know, there is nothing
>to
> > ask. There is nothing "exterior" about the experience we seek to
>organize
>in
> >
> > science, for the LPs, because there is nothing "interior" or "real" of
>which
> >
> > it is experience. This is not a Kantian position. Kant throught you
>could
> > ask, but couldn't answer.
> >
> > For example, we can't know what a tree actually looks like,
> > >since all we "really" come in "contact with" are photons which bounce
>off
> > >the
> > >tree and end up on our retinas.
> >
> > Ugh. This is hopelessly wrong as to both Kant and the positivists. Of
>course
> >
> > you can know what a tree actually looks like. It _looks_ like that
>bushu
> > thing we experience. What the LPs denied was whether we could senisibly
>as
> > if it was _really_ like the way it looks, apart from any implications
>such
>a
> >
> > question might have about other experiences we might have of it. K
>denied
> > that we could _know_ the tree in itself apart from the transcendental
> > conditions of knowledge--most importantly causality, space and time.
> >
> > Positivists (and Kantians) assume that the
> > >existence of any intervening MEANS of knowing something precludes true
> > >knowledge of it. (If they really thought about this for a moment they
>might
> > >realize it implies nobody can ever really know ANYTHING.)
> >
> > This is ignorant on two counts. Neither K nor the LPs thought any such
> > thingh. K thought that we had lots of empirical knowledge, and that it
>was
> > only through the action of the kind that we did. The LPs also thought
>we
> > have lots of empirical knowledge; they just denied that there was other
> > kinds of knowledge, such as metaphysical knowledge. Here they followed
>Kant.
> >
> > And it is a rash person whoa ccuses K or the LPs of not having thought
>of
>an
> >
> > obvious point.
> >
> > >
> > >Positivists often oppose theoretical postulated entities, and denounce
>them
> > >as mere "hypothetical constructs". Or even deny they exist at all, as
>Mach
> > >did in the case of atoms. (He recanted late in life, but only when the
> > >evidence had long since become overwhelming.)
> >
> > No, the LPs don't "oppose" theioretical entities. Even the msot austere
>view
> >
> > of them allows science to use them--after all, who are the LPs to
>dictate
>to
> >
> > science!--but treats them as "constructs," ways to organize experience.
> > Mach's doubts about atoms were quite reasonable in his day, and
>motivated
>by
> >
> > science, not philosophy. He was, as you say persuaded by the evidence.
>If
>it
> >
> > had been a philosophical objection to unobservable entities as such, he
> > wouldn't have been.
> >
> > >
> > >But it is in the social sphere that positivism really gets totally
>screwy.
> > >All morality and ethics, for example, is denounced as
>"metaphysics"--by
> > >which
> > >the positivists mean "nonsense".
> >
> > Rubbish. The LPs thought that ethics had "emotive" rather than
>"cognitive"
> > meaning, that it wasn't true or falsa, but correct or not. You confuse
>their
> >
> > denunciation of traditional philosophy and religion with their views of
> > ethics.
> >
> > (Ethics is pretty easily explained in terms
> > >of collective interests, and of class interests in class society,
> >
> > Pretty easily, eh? Well, explain em, and get yourself a chair at
>Harvard.
> >
> > but
> > >positivists are completely ignorant of such ideas which arose first
>among
> > >the
> > >great thinkers of the Enlightenment,
> >
> > This is really stupid. The LPs, as explained, lived in Red Vienna. Most
>of
> > them were radical socialists. Neurath was a Marxist,a nd explained his
>ideas
> >
> > to his friends at length--persuaded many of them, too. In the broader
>sense
> > of positivism, there was not a one of the thinkers who had nod heard
>and
> > thought about class conflict and collective interest, not even someone
>as
> > unworldly as Wittgenstein.
> >
> > and were re-formed in class terms by
> > >Marx and Engels.)
> >
> > Marx, I recall, denounced morality as "mere ideology," and calledtalk
>of
> > justice "the old shit."
> >
> > Instead positivist writers on ethics hold views such as
> > >that moral statements merely express emotions. (E.g., "Murder is
>wrong"
> > >means
> > >"I disapprove of it and you should too.")
> >
> > This is inconsistent with the characterization of ethics as
>metaphysical
> > nonsense. It is also the crudest sort of emotivism. Noncognitivist
>views
>can
> >
> > be sophisticated and plausible. It is possible they are right--they are
> > certainly more promising thana glib dismissal of moarlity as ideology.
> >
> > >
> > >Karl Popper, who was strongly influenced by the Vienna Circle, and
>remained
> >
> > >a
> > >positivist of sorts his whole life,
> >
> > Aaaak. Popper was a savage critic of psoitivsim, and it drove him bats
>when
> > people confused his falsificationsit realism with their verificationist
> > antirealism.
> >
> > took a similar line against the very idea
> > >that a science of history might be possible. He condemned all such
> > >theories,
> > >including Marx's historical materialism as "historicism".
> >
> > Nonsense again. That is not what Popper means by "historicism"--he's
> > attacking a whole set of relativist views--he reads Marx as relativist.
>He
> > does have arguments that there cannot be historical laws--nontrivial
> > arguments. It is not clear how these affect a plausible version of
> > historical materialism.
> >
> > Of course,
> > >attacking Marx will win you lots of friends and influence in bourgeois
> > >society.
> >
> > It's stupid to suggest that Popper only believed his ideas to win
>friends
> > and influence respectable people. He was a right winger, as it happens,
>but
> > he offered real arguments for his views. And what about Neurath and
>Carnap
> > and Hempel and Reichenbach, LPs and socialists all?
> >
> > Note once again the common thread here though--the dogmatic claim
> > >that scientiific knowledge of various types are "impossible".
> >
> > Nothing dogmatic about Popper's views: they are extensively reasoned.
> > Hempel, btw, defendedthe possibility of historical laws and knowledge.
>So
>he
> >
> > doesn't fit it with this thread?
> >
> > But since the
> > >bourgeoisie has no coherent theory of history of their own, and since
>they
> > >cannot possibly accept the Marxist theory that says that capitalism is
> > >merely
> > >a transitory stage to history, their only alternative is to argue that
>NO
> > >scientific theory of history is possible.
> >
> > Well "the bourgeoisie" might not, but the LPS, or some of them, not
>only
> > accepted this, but argued for it.
> >
> > >
> > >Modern bourgeois economics, too, has a strongly positivistic streak.
> >
> > True enough/
> >
> > Most
> > >bourgeois economists don't even seriously TRY to explain basic things
>like
> > >business cycles,
> >
> > Huh?
> >
> > and all of them denounce nearly every aspect of Marxist
> > >economics.
> >
> > True, but frankly most AMrxist economics isn't that much tow rite home
> > about. A lot of it reads like the stuff you're peddling here.
> >
> > >They tend to focus on narrow esoteric and technical issues,
> >
> > Unlike people concerenedw ith the rising organic composition of
>capital,
> > say? Or the solution to the transformation problem? Come on,
>scholarship
>is
> > the stody of esoteriv, narrow, and technical issues.
> >
> > and
> > >deny that a true scientific POLITICAL economy of capitalism is even
> > >possible.
> > >The folks in this mail group can give many specific examples of how
> > >positivism manifests itself in establishment economics much better
>than I
> > >can.
> > >
> > >But the fact remains that it is not wrong to point out positivist
> > >tendencies,
> > >and condemn them, whether they are in economics or elsewhere. It is
>true
> > >however that we should all do a better job of explaining just what is
>wrong
> > >with such views, and not just leave it at the level of perfunctory
> > >sloganeering.
> >
> > Amen to that.
> >
> >
> > --jks
> > >
> >
>
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