The Thunderer thunders:
The document says that the move towards an independent
intelligence-gathering operation may "be a serious test of the European
ambitions of the United Kingdom and of the EU's capacity for integration".
It adds: "Intelligence gathering may be the issue which forces the United
Kingdom to decide whether its destiny is European or transatlantic."
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Britain's ambiguous position here is unquestionable. But there are at least
two other reasons why the formation of a pan-EU intelligence capability
might be difficult. Firstly, the French are clearly having difficulties
adjusting to the assertiveness of Germany, and are less able to manipulate
the development of EU institutions to suit their interests (which have
evolved anyway with the passing of Mitterand and his clan). Strident anti-US
nationalism aligns them with those critical of Echelon, but a more general
crisis afflicting the French state as regards its domestic and international
roles, as evidenced by a long overdue reassessment of the Algerian war,
makes French participation in further EU integration problematic. Secondly,
the decisive victory of Berlusconi in Italy, and his immediate promise to
become the US's strongest ally within the EU, makes Italian participation
similarly problematic. As Germany assumes a more dominant position within
the EU, rival powers will use their US links as counterweights to an EU
apparatus that inexorably moves toward a German character, since the EU
itself is becoming more of a counterweight to US power, a process
accelerated by the Bush administrations pronounced unilateralism. Meanwhile
Germany has adopted a much more careful stance toward the US government,
which rightly sees France as the main "problem" EU-member given its loud
defence of language, culture and economy. This makes sense for Germany,
given the amount of capital investment that has been made by German
companies in the US during the last 5 years. So Britain's "marginal"
position within the EU can be tempered by a rekindling of the Blair-Schröder
axis that gave us "The Third Way/Die Neue Mitte" (now quietly buried) which
renders France's position equally marginal. This would be consistent with
Blair's tactically astute (if strategically unclear) use of ad hoc alliances
in the EU bargaining process (including a rather tasteless and apparently
inconsistent linkage with Spain's Aznar). Spain meanwhile has dug its heels
in against Germany's intentions to restructure redistributive funding in the
wake of Poland's entry to the EU, since Spain anticipates (correctly) that
it will be a major loser. Meanwhile Blair has very pointedly been the first
EU "socialist" [sic] leader to welcome Berlusconi to the table, while France
is engaged in battle with Berlusconi's administration as the latter
continues its predecessor's attempts to block the further purchase of shares
in electricity utility Montedison by Electricite de France, itself protected
by legal restrictions preventing other non-French EU companies from buying
in.
This tends to emphasise France's marginality. However, one major player not
mentioned so far is the defence industry, which, especially since the
Westland affair, has a very pan-European character, and will be crucial to
any further integration. The economics suggest that the bonanza awaiting
arms companies as they equip the new European rapid reaction force will tilt
any lingerers in the UK state-military complex toward the EU. The problem
remains the punk Thatcherite Little Englanders, the Conrad Black/Rothermere
press, and the poujadists who brought the country to a standstill last
autumn. Hence Bob Worcester's justifiable scepticism. MI5's involvement in
the UKIP as a means to split and thereby marginalise the punk Thatcherites
makes sense, allowing either (1) a recapture of the Conservative Party by
pro-Europe Clarke/Heseltine types, or (2) an emergent Liberal Democrat party
that steals the mantle of HM Official Opposition and attracts the more
libertarian Tories, while the Heathites join New Labour (following Peter
Temple-Morris, Shaun Woodward, Alan Howarth), thus further marginalising Old
Labour and rendering the 2 party system "safe" once again.
Mark, does any of this make sense?
Michael K.
