Jim D. writes: Why is trying to "exert control over wayward, actually and potentially, allies and other less committed types" a symptom of US imperial decline? All empires always try to control as much as possible. If Finland were to be brought into the NATO fold, that would be a symptom of US imperial _rise_. ===== MK: It would be, simultaneously, a diminution of US power. The more NATO keeps expanding the more diffuse its bases of power become, and before long you end up with the United Nations again. The process is well understood by eurosceptics who press for EU enlargement because they know the mechanics of such a process will keep European institutions preoccupied and less focused on developing the dreaded "superstate". With any luck it would also seriously weaken the single currency. The effectiveness of the instruments of US global hegemony lies in their exclusivity, whether with regard to membership (G7, G8, G22, OECD, British American Project, NATO, ANZUS, Echelon) or bankrolling/effective control (IMF, World Bank). The WTO might offer hope for the replication of textbook economic models of competition for dim-witted technocrats, but it has not proven to be such an effective instrument of US hegemony thanks largely to European rivalry. That process can be expected to be replicated wherever greater responsibility/sovereignty/authority is awarded to non-US actors. This logic has been clearly understood by the US traditionally, as with all hegemons. The fact that Bush I, in the aftermath of the Cold War, felt sufficiently constrained to construct a broad coalition against Iraq was the first sign of a process of relative decline that has gathered pace under Clinton and now, for the time being at least, reaches its apogee with Bush II which, if it has not already been accomplished, will likely oversee an absolute decline of US imperial power. In a sense this has been acknowledged with the invocation of the Monroe Doctrine and the junking (for now at least) of Larry Summers-type globalism. The notion of imperial decline is well understood by those most concerned to halt, if not reverse, the process, such as Samuel Huntington and Chalmers Johnson, and, to a certain extent at least, Edward Luttwak. Johnson in particular is acutely aware of the very Marxian point that the system (in this case US imperialism) is sowing the seeds of its own destruction. There is no sign whatsoever, in my view, to suggest that this is not the case even now. Indeed, the past few days suggest that the process is intensifying. To subscribe to the imperial state thesis does not mean I foresee a "thousand year reich" or anything of the sort. Perhaps too many on the Left have underestimated the weakness of the US imperial state and its rather more fragile condition than appearances might suggest. You continue in further response: But most -- or even all -- of the "mounting costs" are shouldered by the victims of the IMF programs. The rentiers haven't suffered (not due to the IMF). ===== MK: The "law" of diminishing returns may apply here. How much more capital can "emerging markets" export to the US? Or anywhere else? The costs are certainly being borne by the inhabitants of countries like Argentina and Turkey. But, and this is a big but, the rentiers' own criteria, especially given the dizzy heights of euphoria that only very recently characterised our "new economy", mitigate against further bailout because there is progressively less in it for them. The IMF, at one level, is imposing its "one capitalism fits all" models upon unwilling and undeserving peoples but, at another level, is engaging in an ever more frenetic game of firefighting which, as underdevelopment renders "emerging markets" ever more peripheralised, becomes *apparently* less relevant to the functioning of the global system. I stress apparently because Tuesday's events show how mistaken it is for the hegemon to write off the periphery, however neolithic it may regard such. Thus either to continue as before or to cease entirely (the options apparently before O'Neill) will, in their own distinct ways, exacerbate the structural tensions and weaknesses that threaten to undermine further US hegemony. You continue later: Right now, military Keynesianism could prop up the US economy. It may sap the US industrial strength in the long run, but then the US elite can get others to pay the cost. ===== MK: Which brings me back to points made above. In the short term the US can probably extract more usurious rents from its allies/underlings, but that's going to grate after a while. For some it already does. It is also a clear signal of the US's inability to "go it alone", further dispelling any notions of unassailable might. You conclude: BTW, it's important to distinguish between imperialism (the now world-wide system of capitalist socio-economic domination and exploitation) from the US role in that system (as hegemon). ===== MK: Absolutely. That's why a declining US imperial state isn't much use if it's going to be replaced by a resurgent European capitalist state, Chinese capitalist state, any capitalist state. We might be able to measure degrees of awfulness, but the distinctions would necessarily be very fine. BTW, I'm deliberately flying a number of kites here and I appreciate the chance to test them out. I'm sorry I didn't cover every point mentioned but I'm also competing with other tasks, ones that put food on the table, as opposed to this twittering. Speculative the latter might be, but an infinite regress of irrelevance I believe it is not. Michael K.
