1. Let's assume that the US/Northern Alliance has truly taken power in Kabul. If so, there are key questions of how they are to govern (if they actually can hold the city). In addition to the ethnic dimension (the NA represents non-Pushtun groups, while Kabul and its environs is largely Pushtun), there's the issue of the US power elite's attitude toward the NA.
Does the US want the NA to be a puppet? if not, it's quite likely that the NA will engage in the revenge killings, looting, raping, in-fighting, etc. that it did the last time it ran Kabul (for 4 years). The US elite seems quite conscious of this problem, so that US advisors were accompanying the NA troops as they moved in. So it's possible that the US will try to control the NA, and perhaps bring in the Rome-based king and friendly Pushtuns into a coalition government, while having a tame election to legitimize US rule there. The problem with this solution is that it prevents the creation any organic connection between the government and the country, by making any new government mostly a creature of the US rather than having true popular support (beyond the relief felt now that those Taliban jackals are gone [*] and thus the US is relenting in its terror-bombing campaign). This opens the way for splits within the NA, either between the different ethnic groups (or sub-groups) or between the elites (included in the puppet government) and the middle-level officers and the rank and file (excluded). The same applies to possible splits between the NA and other parts of the US-sponsored coalition. Add in the possibility that the US will repeat its record in Afghanistan and won't provide much in the way of financial aid to help economic & social recovery (especially since the US now eschews "nation-building" and is much better at destroying than building). Add in the continued presence of the Taliban in the hills and the tendency for different forces to switch sides at the drop of a hat. And you've got a recipe for yet another civil war, with US or UN forces stranded in Kabul. [*] It's amazing that no-one in the press notes that people _always_ cheer incoming conquering armies (including the Taliban a few years ago), since it's a basic ploy for survival. 2. on reforms: I'm all in favor of progressive ones, i.e., those that provide benefits or power to the working classes and other dominated parts of society. As I've said many times, I'd love to have social democracy in the US. However, progressive reforms don't come without the good guys -- the working classes and other dominated parts -- having power and struggling for such reforms. The fact that the left is "irrelevant" (as Greg notes) says that it's quite unlikely that we can get the kinds of reforms we want. This reduces us to cheer-leading. I admire cheer-leaders, but the real point is the actual game. The point is to figure out how to increase the power of "the working classes and other dominated parts" outside of the state apparatus in order to push the state to institute progressive reforms. At 09:18 PM 11/13/01 +0800, you wrote: >The first thing I should say is that I am not altogether convinced that >the Taliban has collapsed, it was in Kurisowa's film the Seven Samurai >that the character Kambei says that every good fortress leaves a way open >to entice the enemy into a trap. > >Kabul is such an opening, and has been used as such in previous Afghan >wars, Kabul has been taken many times, holding it and leaving it is where >the trouble begins. Kabul is a magnet, naturally for the Northern >Alliance, but it is also an Allenby's Damascus, the place where imperial >power must be demonstrated by governance - it is one place where large >numbers of American's must congregate and then be enclosed by winter (a >mini-Stalingrad comes to mind). Of course this is mere speculation and the >Taliban may have simply run into the hills never to return. > >A lot of POWs may be the most convincing sign of real collapse, even the >signs of joy at the the Taliban's exodus may be a misreading of actual >loyalities when push comes to shove. But so much for armchair readings of >far off battles - chances are that things are exactly as portrayed in the >media and it is all over bar the shouting. > >"So at the moment of victory for the Empire, we should ask what version of >Empire it will be. Not of course a social imperialist one. But why not a >social democratic one? Will that keep the multitude under more effective >control?" > >"Can the US hegemonists and the neo-liberals maintain a stable and >defensible front line against this war of movement?" > >A good and thoughtful contribution Chris especially these last two >paragraphs which is the critical contradiction of our period. Things are >moving fast, so fast I find it difficult to keep in view very much of the >whole picture. Intentions are one thing (re Bush and Blair) the >contradictions they are responding to another, somewhere in between >history is being made. > >I am also glad you raised the all important problem of whether reforms >help or hamper humanity. The normal knee-jerk reaction from Marxists is >that the mere mention of raising reforms is to succomb to reformism. > >However, the contradiction we face is our own irrelevance, that is if we >do not start to raise sensible and realisable reforms the direction is >given and it is not in the end a pretty one. There is no-one putting >forward the interests of working class in any meaningful way, there is no >coherence to what is said on the left and no political direction except >cultish oppositionalism. > >In short, unless individual states are reformed, the international order >cannot be otherwise than chaotic. > >What seems to be ignored is the predicament of historical >social-democracy. There is no social ground for such reformism, in just a >decade it seems to have evaporated completely. Yet the revolutionary left >reifies reforms as the essence of reformism, which was never the case - >reformism is not even simple the restriction of struggle to legalisied >procedures though it necessarily requires this form, but the substitution >of class power for inter-class recognition of leadership - little wonder >it has vanished as the ruling class cares little for the fine balancing of >social hegemony within any particular state. > >The question is what does the left fear from realisable reforms when the >historical conditions for reformism have so obviously dissappeared? > >Practicality and realisability would bring coherence and platform to any >number of class interests, interests in making the state much more >democratic, controling capital and providing for all variety of social >need without relying on bureacratic measures. > >It seems obvious that by so changing states from the bottom up, there >becomes a basis in the real world for creating a more sensible >international order. > >Could this lead to Empire more completely, in the end, stupidfying the >masses (multitude if you like), it is difficult to see how, in fact it >seems difficult to comprehend how Empire may be fought by any other means. >For Empire to recreate reformism on a significant scale in this period of >time would be to turn the clock back and recreate a parochial bourgeoisie. > >Greg Schofield >Perth Australia > > > > > > > > > >--- Message Received --- >From: Chris Burford <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >Date: Tue, 13 Nov 2001 07:31:29 +0000 >Subject: [PEN-L:19564] Victory to Empire > ><snipped> Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] & http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~jdevine
