The house of cards that Jacques built

Larry Elliott
Monday December 10, 2001
The Guardian

The house that Jacques built is almost ready. In three weeks time,
crisp euro notes and shiny euro coins will be replacing francs, marks,
pesetas and all the other currencies of the nations that joined
monetary union.

As the last lick of paint is applied, there are wistful looks from
this side of the channel.

Tony Blair, we are told, would like to live in the house that Jacques
Delors built. He feels he has rather outgrown his cosy little semi and
wants to move into something bigger. Like any potential homebuyer,
Tony knows that it is one thing hankering after a new pile, quite
another being able to afford the asking price, however. The sums, in
other words, have to add up. And that's where the difficulties begin.

Although it has been more than a decade in the planning, the house
that Jacques built already looks passé, the economic equivalent of a
1960s tower block.

Back in 1988 when the Delors commission started laying the foundations
for monetary union, it seemed natural that the central bank charged
with setting interest rates should be based on the German Bundesbank.
Germany was the most successful country in Europe and, together with
Japan, seemed to have all the answers to the economic problems of the
day.

Even had this not been the case, the Bundesbank would still have been
the template for the European Central Bank. Everyone knew that without
Germany there would be no monetary union, and the German people needed
reassurance that a single currency would not involve the dilution of
their beloved mark.

Doing things the German way meant not just setting up the ECB as a
carbon copy of the Bundesbank, but creating an institution that would
be even more dedicated to fighting inflation.

Balanced budgets


Nor was this the end of it. While the German government was happy
enough about the arrangements for monetary policy, there was always
the danger that some of the more profligate members of the club -
Italy, for one - would play fast and loose with fiscal policy.

There had to be a mechanism for preventing governments running large
budget deficits as a way of mitigating the effects of a centrally
controlled monetary policy.

As such, Theo Waigel, the German finance minister at the time, came up
with the idea of adding an extension to the house that Jacques built,
called the Stability and Growth Pact.

All countries would agree to balance budgets over the medium term,
with fines threatened for those whose deficits exceeded 3% of GDP.
Warnings that this would make recessions worse by preventing fiscal
policy acting as a shock-absorber during economic downturns were
ignored.

There are those in Paris - and even Berlin - who now wish that the
advice had been heeded, because Europe's macroeconomic framework no
longer looks like the latest in swish design and the obsession with
fighting a war that was over long ago is amplifying the effects of the
global downturn.

German bankruptcies are up nearly 20% in the past year, unemployment
has been rising for the past 11 months and is forecast to rise above
4m over the winter.

The German economy contracted in the second and third quarters of this
year and - judging by Friday's dire figures for industrial output -
will contract even more rapidly in the fourth.

"We have particular concerns over Germany," said the City firm ABN
Amro last week. "The ECB is explicitly setting monetary policy for the
euro zone in aggregate. This means that interest rates will remain far
too high for Germany.

"In addition, the permanent fixing of the nominal exchange rates rules
out the option of a sizeable depreciation of the mark and EMU also
means there is limited scope for fiscal stimulus."

ABN Amro believes that Germany could become the next Japan. In fact,
the medium-term outlook could be even worse, since Japan at least has
the ability to apply the remedies necessary for recovery. Germany does
not.

The one-size-fits-all policy means it is impossible to regulate the
central heating system in the house that Jacques built; some rooms are
too hot, some too cold. Germany is too cold. The ECB's obsession with
inflation and its failure to be act pre-emptively means that it is
keeping interest rates too high for too long.

Inflation in the eurozone is 2.1%, above the ECB's ceiling, but
pressures are abating fast. Prices have risen by an annualised 1.2% in
the past six months, and with Europe's economy weakening, rates should
be coming down fast. Delay means another grim year ahead. Faced with
the consequences of a deflationary monetary policy, the sensible thing
for Germany would be to ease fiscal policy, even though that would
mean breaching the 3% limit set by the stability and growth pact. Not
possible, said Didier Reynders, Belgium's finance minister last week.
Rules are rules.

The world has moved on. Inflation is no longer the only problem facing
policy makers. Central banks that go in for monetary overkill end up
by harming growth prospects and, in the end, damage their own
credibility with the markets.

Inflation targets need to be symmetrical so that deflation is treated
as seriously as inflation. For fiscal policy, it makes sense to build
some "give" into the system so that deficits are looked at over the
course of the economic cycle and there is scope to borrow for
investment.

And this is where we come back to Britain and to a book launch last
week. This was no ordinary book launch, being held at 11 Downing
Street and hosted by the chancellor of the exchequer. Reforming
Britain's Economic and Financial Policy (£50 hardback, £15.99
paperback) is never going to be a best seller, but it pulled in the
cream of UK economic policy making from the Treasury and the Bank of
England.

Proud parents


What was clear, both from the book and its launch, was that Gordon
Brown and his advisers are remarkably proud of the framework they have
established. They believe that the Bank of England is a better
designed central bank than the ECB, and that the government's rules
for fiscal policy avoid the pitfalls of the stability and growth pact.

Treasury mandarins and the Bank of England's top officials share this
view and there is little appetite in either institution to adopt a
regime they consider inferior.

In his foreword Brown says: "A sustained track record of stability is
the best foundation upon which the government can deliver its wider
goals of higher levels of growth and employment, and so deliver rising
living standards and better public services."

Brown thinks it is no accident that Britain is on course to be the
fastest growing economy in the G7 both this year and next. Neither
would deny the British economy still suffers from serious defects, but
they argue that since the rebuilding of the UK's macro-economic
structure from the foundations up means that it is now possible to
give the shabby interior a makeover as well, with extra spending on
health and education.

All of which helps explain why the chancellor is serious about the
five economic tests and is no particular hurry to move into the house
that Jacques built. With its deflationary monetary policy and
anti-Keynesian fiscal policy it has the appearance of a folly put up
by a right-wing eccentric.

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