Inside corporate America
Time to cry for Argentina

There are few tears from the IMF when a South American economy dies, but the
latest cut, cut, cut reforms are the unkindest of all

Gregory Palast
Observer

Sunday August 12, 2001


The news last week in South America was that Argentina had died, or at least
its economy had. One in six workers was unemployed even before the beginning
of this grim southern winter. Millions more have lost work as industrial
production, already down 25 per cent for the year, fell into a coma induced
by interest rates which, by one measure, have jumped to more than 90 per
cent on dollar-denominated borrowings.

This is an easy case to crack. Next to the still-warm corpse of Argentina's
economy, the killer had left a smoking gun with his fingerprints all over
it.

The murder weapon is called a 'Technical Memorandum of Understanding'. Dated
5 September 2000, it is signed by Pedro Pou, president of the Central Bank
of Argentina, for transmission to Horst Kohler, managing director of the
International Monetary Fund.

Inside Corporate America received a complete copy of the understanding,
along with a companion letter from the Argentine Economics Ministry to the
IMF, from... well, let's just say the envelope had no return address. Close
inspection leaves me in no doubt that this understanding fired fatal bullets
into Argentina's defenceless body.

To begin with, the understanding requires that Argentina cut its budget
deficit from $5.3 billion last year to $4.1bn in 2001. Think about that.
Last September, Argentina was already on the cliff-edge of a deep recession.
Even the half-baked economists at the IMF should know that holding back
government spending in a contracting economy is like turning off the engines
on an aeroplane in stall. Cut the deficit? As my four-year-old daughter
would say, 'That's stooopid.'

The IMF is never wrong without being cruel as well. And so we read, under
the bold heading, 'Improving the conditions of the poor', an agreement to
drop salaries under the government's emergency employment programme by 20
per cent, from $200 a month to $160.

But you can't save much by taking $40 a month from the poor. For further
savings, the understanding also promised, 'a 12-15 per cent cut in salaries'
of civil servants and 'rationalisation of certain privileged pension
benefits'.

In case you haven't a clue what the IMF means by 'rationalisation', it means
cutting payments to the aged by up to 13 per cent. Cut, cut, cut in the
midst of a recession. Stooopid.

Salted in with the IMF's bone-head recommendations and mean-spirited plans
for pensioners and the poor are economic forecasts bordering on the
delusional. In the 'understanding' the globalisation geniuses project that,
if Argentina carries out its plans to snuff consumer spending power, somehow
the nation's economic production will leap by 3.7 per cent and unemployment
will decline. In fact, by the end of March, the nation's GDP had already
dropped 2.1 per cent below the year-earlier mark, and it has nosedived
since.

What on earth would induce Argentina to embrace the IMF's goofy programme?
The payoff, if Argentina does as it is told, is that this week the IMF will
lend $1.2bn in aid. This is part of an emergency loan package of $26bn for
2001 put together by the IMF, World Bank and private lenders announced at
the end of last year.

But there is less to this generosity than meets the eye. The understanding
also assumes Argentina will 'peg' its currency, the peso, to the dollar at
an exchange rate of one to one. The currency peg doesn't come cheap.
American banks and speculators are charging a whopping 16 per cent risk
premium above normal in return for the dollars needed to back this currency
scheme.

Now do the arithmetic. On Argentina's $128bn of debt, normal interest plus
the 16 per cent surcharge by lenders comes to about $27bn a year. In other
words, Argentina's people probably won't net one penny from the $26bn loan
package. Little of the bail-out money escapes New York, where it lingers to
pay interest to US creditors holding the debt, big fish such as Citibank and
little biters such as Steve Hanke. Hanke is president of Toronto Trust
Argentina, an 'emerging market fund' that loaded up 100 per cent on
Argentine bonds during the last currency panic, in 1995.

Cry not for Steve, Argentina. His annual return that year of 79.25 per cent
put the Toronto trust at the top of the speculation league table. This year
he'll do it again.

Hanke, it seems to me, seems to profit on the failure of the IMF's policies.
In his day job as professor of economics at Johns Hopkins University,
Maryland, he freely offers straightforward advice to end Argentina's woe,
advice that would put him out of the speculation game: 'Abolish the IMF.'

To begin with, Hanke would do away with the 'peg' - that
one-peso-for-one-dollar exchange rate - which has proved a meat-hook on
which the IMF hangs Argentina's finances.

It's not the peg itself that skewers Argentina, but the peg combined with
the four horsemen of IMF neo-liberal policy: liberalised financial markets,
free trade, mass privatisation and government surpluses.

'Liberalising' financial markets means allowing capital to flow freely
across a nation's borders. Indeed, after liberalisation five years ago, the
capital has flowed freely and with a vengeance.

Argentina's panicked rich have dumped their pesos for dollars and sent the
hard loot to investment havens abroad. Last month alone, Argentines withdrew
6 per cent of all bank deposits.

Once upon a time, government-owned national and provincial banks supported
the nation's debts. But in the mid-Nineties, the government of Carlos Menem
sold these off to Citibank of New York, Fleet Bank of Boston and other
foreign operators. Charles Calomiris, a former World Bank adviser, describes
these bank privatisations as a 'really wonderful story'. Wonderful for whom?
Argentina has bled out as much as three-quarters of a billion dollars a day
in hard currency holdings.

There's more cheer for creditors in the understanding, including 'reform of
the revenue sharing system'. This is the kinder, gentler way of stating that
the US banks will be paid from drawing off tax receipts that could otherwise
benefited education and other provincial services. The understanding also
finds cash in 'reforming' the nation's health insurance system . Cut, cut,
cut.

But when cut cut cut isn't enough to pay the debt holders, one can always
sell 'las joyas de mi abuela' (grandma's jewels), as journalist Mario del
Carvil describes his nation's privatisation scheme. The French picked up a
big hunk of the water system and raised charges in some provinces by 400 per
cent. The understanding's final bullet is imposition of 'an open trade
policy'. This means Argentina's exporters, with their products priced via
the 'peg' in US dollars, are forced to compete with Brazilian goods priced
in a devaluing currency. Stooopid.

Still, the IMF's scheme could work. All that is required is a 'flexible'
workforce, willing to bend to lower pensions, lower wages or no wages at
all. But, to the dismay of Argentina's elite, the worker bees are proving
inflexibly obstinate in agreeing to their own impoverishment. After Anibal
Verón, a 37-year-old father of five, lost his job as a bus driver, with his
company still owing him nine months' pay, he joined the 'piqueros', the
angry unemployed who blockade roads. In clearing a blockade in November, the
military police allegedly killed him with a bullet to the head.

The death in Genoa of anti-globalisation protester Carlo Giuliani made page
one news in the US and Europe. Verán's death was page zero. Nor did you read
about Carlos Santillán, 27, and Oscar Barrios, 17, gunned down in a church
courtyard in Salta Province when the police fired on a protest against the
IMF austerity plan.

Globalisation boosters such as Tony Blair prefer to portray resistance as a
lark of pampered Western youth. The media plays to this theme, focusing on
the few thousand marching in Genoa, but not on the 80,000 on the streets of
Buenos Aires last May, nor the general strike honoured by 7 million
Argentine workers last June.

In Argentina, President Fernando de la Rua blames violence on the
protesters. But the Peace and Justice Service (Serpaj) charges de la Rua's
government with using hunger and terror to impose the IMF plans. Serpaj
leader Adolfo Pérez Esquivel told me he is documenting cases of torture of
protesters by police. To Pérez Esquivel, who won the Nobel Peace Prize in
1980, repression and liberalisation are handmaidens. He told The Observer he
had just filed a complaint charging police with recruiting children as young
as five into paramilitary squads.

But Peréz Esquivel, who led protests against the Free Trade Agreement of the
Americas, doesn't agree with my verdict against the IMF in Argentina's
death.

He notes that the 'reforms' are embraced with enthusiasm by the nation's
finance minister, Domingo Cavallo, best remembered as the head of the
central bank during the military dictatorship. For the ageing pacifist, that
suggests that the untimely demise of the nation's economy wasn't murder, but
suicide.

[EMAIL PROTECTED]



Stephen F. Diamond
School of Law
Santa Clara University
[EMAIL PROTECTED]

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