New York Times
February 1, 2002

Two, Three, Many?

By PAUL KRUGMAN

   H ere's a scary question: How many more Enrons are out there?
   Even now the conventional wisdom is that Enron was uniquely crooked.
   O.K., other companies have engaged in "aggressive accounting," the art
   form formerly known as fraud. But how likely is it that other major
   companies will turn out, behind their imposing facades, to be little
   more than pyramid schemes?

   Alas, it's all too likely. I can't tell you which corporate icons will
   turn out to be made of papier-mâché, but I'd be very surprised if we
   don't have two, three, even many Enrons in our future.

   Why do I say this? Like any crime, a pyramid scheme requires means,
   motive and opportunity. Lately all three have been there in abundance.

   Means: We now know how easily a company that earns a modest profit, or
   even loses money, can dress itself up to create the appearance of high
   profitability. Just the simple trick of paying employees not with
   straight salary, which counts as an expense, but with stock options,
   which don't, can have a startling effect on a company's reported
   profits. According to the British economist Andrew Smithers, in 1998
   Cisco reported a profit of $1.35 billion; if it had counted the market
   value of the stock options it issued as an expense, it would have
   reported a loss of $4.9 billion. And stock options are only one of a
   panoply of techniques available to make the bottom line look
   artificially good.

   Motive: The purpose of inflating earnings is, of course, to drive up
   the price of the stock. But why do companies want to do that?
   One answer is that a high stock price helps a company grow; it makes
   it easier to raise money, to acquire other companies, to attract
   employees and so on. And no doubt most managers have puffed up their
   stock out of a genuine desire to make their companies grow. But as we
   watch top executives walk away rich while the companies they ran
   collapse (there are cases worse than Enron; the founder of Global
   Crossing has apparently walked away from bankruptcy with $750
   million), it's clear that we should also think about the incentives of
   the managers themselves. Ask not what a high stock price can do for
   your company; ask what it can do for your personal bottom line.
   Not incidentally, a high stock price facilitates the very accounting
   tricks that companies use to create phantom profits, further driving
   up the stock price. It's Ponzi time!

   But what about opportunity? A confluence of three factors in the late
   1990's opened the door for financial scams on a scale unseen for
   generations.

   First was the rise of the "new economy." New technologies have,
   without question, created new opportunities and shaken up the
   industrial order. But that creates the kind of confusion in which
   scams flourish. How do you know whether a company has really found a
   highly profitable new-economy niche or is just faking it?

   Second was the stock market bubble. As Robert Shiller pointed out in
   his book "Irrational Exuberance," a rising market is like a natural
   Ponzi scheme, in which each successive wave of investors generates
   gains for the last wave, making everything look great until you run
   out of suckers. What he didn't point out, but now seems obvious, is
   that in such an environment it's also easy to run deliberate pyramid
   schemes. When the public believes in magic, it's springtime for
   charlatans.

   And finally, there was (and is) a permissive legal environment. Once
   upon a time, the threat of lawsuits hung over companies and auditors
   that engaged in sharp accounting practices. But in 1995 Congress,
   overriding a veto by Bill Clinton, passed the Private Securities
   Litigation Reform Act, which made such suits far more difficult. Soon
   accounting firms, the companies they audited and the investment banks
   that sold their stock got very cozy indeed.

   And here too one must look not only at the motives of corporations,
   but at the personal motives of executives. We now know that Enron
   managers gave their investment bankers not their investment banks but
   the individual bankers an opportunity to invest in the shell companies
   they used to hide debt and siphon off money. Wanna bet that similar
   deals didn't take place at many other firms?

   I hope that Enron turns out to be unique. But I'll be very surprised.

      Copyright 2002 The New York Times Company | Privacy Information

Reply via email to