It's a nice review and it looks to be a book well worth reading. About the following point:
>>Dore often numbers the points of his discussion. For example, "On the third of the four features which mark Japanese economic structure and behaviour off from the classical Anglo-Saxon model-a greater tilt towards cooperation in the competition/cooperation balance among market competitors" (p. 143).<< This cooperation in competition element gets misunderstood in the West. The associations are often set up to self-police and assure competition, I think. There could be some collusion and price-fixing in some products, but it actually seems to allow more producers into a market. Afterall, it's in 'competitive' America where you end up with completely uncompetitive situations like MS and Intel dominating the desktop and notebook pc market. This is also where American companies misjudge entering the Japanese market. They underestimate just how competitive it is. Kodak underestimated how hard it would be to equal Fuji on their home turf, but it was also because they failed to compete with Konica when they entered the Japanese market. German AGF did well by becoming a supplier to generic film marketers, like Daiei. The only way foreign companies can compete in automobiles is by using their large stock valuations and ability to leverage takeovers to take over Japanese companies. Ford-Mazda. GM-Suzuki and Isuzu (and GM has significant capital tie ups with Subaru/Fuji Heavy Industry as well). Renault-Nissan. And Daimler-Chrysler-Mitsubishi. Coke largely created the market here for sugary softdrinks and still dominates, though Suntory tied up with Pepsi to compete. McDonald's largely created fastfood eating here, and used price cutting to drive most others out of business (regrettable because now all you find are McD's everywhere). Charles Jannuzi