Venezuelan opposition plans new protests amid coup rumors. AFP - June 7, 2002
CARACAS -- Opponents of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez were preparing a new protest against his rule Friday, amid rumors that military elements are plotting a new coup to remove him from power. Opponents plan to demonstrate June 15 to demand Chavez's resignation and an end to the politicization of the armed forces. Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Roy Chaderton charged government opponents with floating rumors of another coup to create a climate of instability. "They want to create an impression of instability and of the imminent downfall of the legitimate government of Venezuela," Chaderton said. The Caracas daily El Universal published portions of what it said were communiques in which military officers call for a "constitutional rebellion" against Chavez. Earlier in the week, opposition journalist Patricia Poleo, editor of the daily Nuevo Pais, divulged the contents of a videotape of hooded officers declaring that they would "do whatever is necessary" to defend Venezuela's institutions and denouncing Chavez as a leftist. The authenticity of the tape could not be confirmed. A week ago, a hooded man claiming to be an officer of the National Guard made public statements against Chavez. Rumors circulating by word of mouth have been reinforced by news reports and handbills calling for an overthrow of the government. Chaderton said well-financed groups were using the Internet to foment subversion. +++++++++++++++ Storm Clouds Again Forming Over Venezuela 7 June 2002 Summary Multiple STRATFOR military and political sources in Caracas report that Venezuela soon may experience another outbreak of violence. This could result in a forced regime change, or it could serve to consolidate President Hugo Chavez's so-called "Bolivarian Revolution." If the reports are accurate, the violence likely will involve opposing elements of the armed forces and Chavez's armed civilian militias, called the "Bolivarian Circles." Analysis Multiple military and political sources in Caracas, including some within President Hugo Chavez's government, say another outbreak of violence in Venezuela, on par with that seen in April before the president's brief removal, is likely. Given the elevated political tensions between the Chavez government and its numerous (if uncoordinated) opponents, the possibility of a more permanent ousting of Chavez could be wishful thinking by some of these sources and exaggerated emotionalism by others. However, if the consensus opinion STRATFOR has obtained in the past two weeks is accurate, Venezuela could be on the verge of a violent confrontation between the Chavez government and groups seeking a change of regime by any means. The sources agree that potentially violent actors in a conflict would include opposing elements of the armed forces (FAN), National Guard and armed members of the Bolivarian Circles -- civilian militia groups financed and coordinated by the Chavez regime. If violent confrontation eclipses efforts to negotiate a political deal between Chavez and his opponents, there could be two possible outcomes. On one hand, if a second military rebellion fails to oust Chavez, he would finish ferreting out his political and military foes and consolidate his regime's control despite an economic crisis. On the other hand, if a rebellion against Chavez were to succeed, Venezuela's political instability likely would grow worse in the near- to mid-term, making it almost impossible for any post-Chavez transition regime to stabilize the economy. Moreover, regardless of the outcome, Venezuela likely would continue to suffer political instability, violence and economic stagnation for several years. The first scenario -- Chavez surviving a rebellion and consolidating his power -- would be a geopolitical nightmare for the United States, which is eyeing conflict in Colombia and economic collapse in Argentina with growing concern. A new regime without Chavez would be far less problematic in some respects for the U.S. administration, although many international critics of the United States likely would accuse the Bush administration yet again of encouraging a forced regime change. Defense Minister Lucas Rincon Romero, who will retire from the military on Venezuela's July 5 independence day holiday, when the president traditionally announces military promotions, insists that the internal situation within the armed forces is stable and controlled. The reality, however, is starkly different. The command purge Chavez launched after barely surviving a 48-hour military rebellion on April 11-13 has intensified the factionalism in the armed forces between those for and against Chavez. This situation has been exacerbated by the rapidly deteriorating economic conditions among military families, and what appears to be a deliberate government strategy to dismantle the FAN as an effective professional military institution. On June 4, a clandestine group of middle- and lower-ranking officers, called the "comacates" -- which stands for commanders, majors, captains and lieutenants -- issued a communiqué and videotape through Venezuelan reporter Patricia Poleo that openly threatened to kill all armed Bolivarian Circle members and force a regime change if Chavez did not drastically reform his policies. The alleged officers who appeared on the videotape hid their faces behind hoods, but the majority wore National Guard uniforms. Interior and Justice Minister Diosdado Cabello, a former army captain, dismissed the videotape as a fake, but STRATFOR sources in Venezuela's military intelligence have confirmed the comacates do exist within the military. Three days later on June 7, the Caracas daily El Universal published another document entitled "Manifesto of the Constitutional Rebellion," sent by a clandestine group that described itself as including active duty officers in all branches of the FAN and civil society groups from Caracas and the states of Carabobo and Aragua. A large proportion of the country's private industrial and manufacturing base is concentrated in these states, near Caracas, as well as most of the personnel and weapons assigned to the army's Fourth Infantry Division, which now is commanded by Brigadier Gen. Raul Baduel. An ongoing military command purge has inflamed the political tensions and potential disloyalties it was meant to suppress. So far at least 117 of the FAN's 260 general and admiralty-rank officers have been relieved of their commands and sent home, and as many as 700 active duty officers are believed to be under investigation to determine whether or not they are loyal politically to Chavez and his increasingly socialist "Bolivarian Revolution." Moreover, the military command purge is happening as Venezuela's economic crisis takes an ever-bigger chunk from the pocketbooks of middle- and lower-class Venezuelan families. Military families have not been spared the impact of their country's economic crisis and in fact may be hurting even more than civilian families because many military garrisons have not received their budgeted operating funds for fiscal year 2002, STRATFOR sources in the FAN report. These budgets include not only funds for military training purposes but also salaries and other social benefits military families have not received because the central government has run out of cash. Since Chavez became president in 1999, the military's economic difficulties have mounted while its operational readiness and personnel have declined, military sources in Caracas report. In fact, high-ranking sources in all branches of the FAN -- army, air force, navy and National Guard -- acknowledged that their equipment is deteriorating, training maneuvers have been scaled back drastically and the number of soldiers in many battalion-size units is down to company-size strength. Additionally, army sources told STRATFOR that the FAN's defensive deployments along Venezuela's frontier with Colombia have been reduced to significantly less than 10,000 soldiers, instead of the nearly 30,000 claimed as recently as three months ago by then-Defense Minister Jose Vicente Rangel. Our sources also report that the FAN is having manifold difficulties recruiting personnel despite laws mandating 24 months of service for army and air force personnel and 30 months of conscript service in the navy. As the FAN's operational readiness has deteriorated over the past three years, the Chavez government has spent, by the president's own public admission, millions of dollars organizing, training and indoctrinating thousands of Bolivarian Circles members. Cabello told a national assembly hearing in May that there were 130,000 Bolivarian Circles groups throughout the country, with 12 members in each circle or more than 1.5 million members in all. Chavez, Cabello and other government officials insist they are peaceful and unarmed. In fact, FAN intelligence officials who oppose the circles think there are likely no more than 180,000 individual members in all of Venezuela, and of these only a handful are armed and spoiling for a confrontation to consolidate Chavez's revolution. However, even a relatively small number of organized armed civilian militias could inflict a significant amount of carnage and panic, especially if pro- and anti-Chavez elements in the military and National Guard were to open fire against the circles and each other simultaneously.
