Justin Schwartz wrote:
>>
>
>
> Well, I've been arguing with folks hereabouts. Ia gree that some
> anonmytity is possible under planning. However there is little under,
> for example, the Albert-Hahnel and Devine models, both of which require
> the consumer to justify her choices to the world.
No neither require it. In the Parecon model, justfifying private choices
was once advocated. But they have pretty much acknowledged that it is
not a REQUIREMENT of the model, and most advocates of Parecon don't
support discussion of consumption at the private level. In short, if you
want to spend your entire allocation on booze and drugs, your choice,
your consequences. Albert and Hahnel themselves may still favor this
sort of nattering, but it is not required by their system.
Still, it's good to
> see someone acknowledge that the democractization of choice is not an
> unqualified good. The best planning model on this dimension is Madel's
> cleaned up version of the Soviet system, where planning is basically
> matter of projecting from current demand. There are other problems with
> the model, such as insensitivity to changes in demand and stifling of
> innovation, but preserving anonymity isn't one of them.
Like I said I doubt any planning system REQUIRES discussion of personal
choices, at least it most cases. Advocates of a particular model may
tack it on, but that is not same thing as making a requiremetn of planning.
>
>
>>
>> I do think you give more weight to Hayekian incentive for information
>> gathering and transaction costs than neccesary.
>>
>> In terms of incentives, planning can be market like in this respect: A
>> workplace is rated on efficiency based on actual output vs. actual
>> input. (input being measured in money costs of buying the the inputs,
>> output being measured what people willing to pay for what is
>> produced). If efficiency falls below the minimum (say the average for
>> the economy as a whole, or for the particulars sector) then the
>> workplace is dissolved. Short of this workers have incentives to
>> discover how to do things right because they get feedback as to how
>> close to having this happen they are or how far away. In short, the
>> further from bankruptcy you are the more secure your job is; the close
>> to bankruptcy you are the less secure.
>
>
> That's an interesting thought.
Not new to you I hope.
> It does create consequences, which provide incentives, for inefficient behavior.
>Note, though, that the
> incentivesa re purely negative. There si the threat of "bankruptcy," but
> no promise of "profit" for doing things better.
I think "job security" is a pretty strong postive incentive. I note that
in capitalism, during tough times people may go for years without a
raise, and work damn hard and well for increased job security. But what
cosequences of this provide incentives for inefficient behavior? We
don't want the discussion to deteriorate to tis/tisn't - so when you
say stuff like this, you need to explicate a bit.
>
>
>
>
> Iterative feedback--like Albert and Hahnel? I think the transactions
> costs would be horrendous.
>
All iterative feedback? Because markets are a form of iterative feedback
too. So non-market iterative feedback automatically has horrendous
transaction costs compared to market iterative feedback.
