(The following article I translated from Internationale Samenwerking (May 
2002, p.31-33), a monthly published free by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. For the benefit of my anti-Dutch Marxmail critics I should perhaps 
point out that I mail this because I think it's interesting. Wallerstein 
can reduce complexity to simplicity and tell a story, a skill I value 
highly. But I don't agree with everything he says, just as I have many 
books on my shelf that I don't fully agree with. For example, Wallerstein 
oversimplifies capitalist behaviour, as leftists typically do.  In reality 
- as Wallerstein probably knows quite well - foreign investment strategy is 
not simply guided by lower wages, but by a combination of factors which 
provide an acceptable, stable rate of return. The biggest part of 
investment is usually the fixed capital outlay, not wages, and that is 
especially true if the wages themselves are low. Even if wages are low, 
this doesn't necessarily mean that an investor will take the risk of having 
a plant built somewhere, many other factors are involved including social 
stability, legal frameworks, production chains, proximity to markets, and 
all sorts. As I said on a previous occasion, there are numerous influences 
affecting the rate of profit, which is why schematic Marxist 
falling-rate-of-profit theories often look so weird. So anyway just because 
you have low wages, this doesn't automatically mean you will attract 
investment; most of the capital flows today are between rich countries. 
Also, when Wallerstein foresees the collapse of capitalism, this is just 
false, just as when Mandel predicted the collapse of capitalism by the year 
2000 twenty years ago. As Lenin remarked at the second Comintern Congress, 
there are no absolutely hopeless situations for capitalism in crisis, you 
have to kill it in order to end it. For example, the economy of Argentina 
may have collapsed, but that doesn't mean capitalism has collapsed there, 
that is a social and political question - JB).

HISTORY IS ON NOBODY'S SIDE - Interview with Immanuel Wallertein by Barbara 
Coolen

Immanuel Wallerstein made his name in the middle of the 1970s with his book 
The Modern World System, about the emergence and growth of the capitalist 
world economy. Three decades and innumerable publications later the 
sociologist announces the end of capitalism. Twenty-five, maybe fifty 
years, then the world system will collapse. What will take its place ? 
Nobody knows.

Wallerstein looks surprisingly young at 71. The American, who in the past 
has been called the new Marx, talks vigorously and with big gestures. His 
story is just as big. He hops with great leaps through five centuries of 
history, from North to South and back again, from The Netherlands to Porto 
Alegre in Brazil. There Wallerstein attended the World Social Forum last 
February, opposing the negative effects of globalisation.

Q: You call globalisation a hype. Why is that ?

IW: Because it's nothing new under the sun. Globalisation is as old as 
capitalism itself. The building materials used for ships rolling off the 
wharves in 17th century Amsterdam came from here, there and everywhere. 
Just like the workers. Cross-border production and trade are therefore 
nothing new. At the same time, globalisation is  described
as something positive and inevitable, prescribed really. You have to open 
your borders, because that's better for everybody.But there is a lot of 
hypocrisy in this discussion. The European Union is in favour of free 
trade, but not for farm products. The USA wants France to open its borders 
for American movies, but their own borders remain closed for Third World 
textiles. Or steel.

Q: You say that globalisation is part of capitalism. Elsewhere you claim 
that capitalism is justabout dead. Why ?

IW: It is defeated by its own success. Capitalism begins and ends with the 
limitless accumulation of capital. A capitalist amasses capital so that he 
can generate more capital in order to gain even more capital. Looked at 
from the outside, it's a strange system really: it has no function beyond 
its own driving force, it must move forwards. For the first time in 500 
years I now see real obstacles for further capital accumulation. The limits 
have been reached, the sources of growth are being exhausted.

Q: In what way ? What keeps capitalism going ?

IW: For capital accumulation you need profit; the difference between 
costprices and salesprices. The price of products can only be driven up to 
a certain level. Beyond that more profit can only come out of driving down 
production costs. The principal costs - wages, raw materials and taxes - 
have risen enormously in the last two to three hundred years. And they will 
continue to do that.

Q: Is this inevitable ?

IW: Yes, ultimately it is. Labour ultimately always organises itself 
everywhere, to negotiate better pay. This causes enterprises at some point 
to flee and shift production to low wage countries. There you can make more 
profits for the simple reason that people there are prepared to do the same 
work for less money. Historically these are people who have just migrated 
from the countryside to the cities. They settle in the slums of the cities 
and for them low wages mean a rise in their income. They are happy, the 
capitalists are happy too.

Q: That sounds positive.

IW: Yes, but 25 years later the migrants understand their situation better, 
they are used to city life by then and starts to organise themselves, 
demanding better wages. Another 25 years later the wages have become so 
high that the capitalists again go elsewhere. In this way you can trace the 
whole history of the world system backwards in terms of the migration of 
capital. This process does demand a continuous stream of cheap labour. The 
world urbanises at an unprecedented high speed. The USA and Europe no 
longer have a rural population of any significance anymore.

Q: But the urban poor do need an income, however small...

IW: Sure, because why does an African, South American or Asian shift from 
the countryside to these terrible slums ? Because he is actually better off 
there. This means that in one way or another he has a higher income. That 
creates the informal economy. And that has been the same story the last 500 
years as well.

Q: This suggests that the informal economy is able to feed everybody.

IW: No, those people suffer terribly, but that does not deny the fact that 
their minimum wage is much higher than 50 years ago. The second concern of 
the capitalist is to keep raw materials costs low. It sounds strange, but 
you do that by not paying your bill. For example, you don't pay for the 
replacement of natural resources or for the detoxification of the water 
that you pollute.

Q: Who ends up being responsible for that ?

IW: Well, somebody: society, the state, the government. The state can 
commit mountains of money for it, but that means taxes rise again. Moreover 
it doesn't make much sense if companies keep on doing what they were doing. 
So a government can therefore decide to charge firms for these costs. This 
is called the internalisation of costs. Even if the firms scream blue 
murder, this happens more and more often. But even this process is finite. 
One day there are no longer any treaas to cut down or rivers to pollute. A 
third structural brake on profits are taxes. These have risen gigantically. 
Capitalists always complain about that and on this score they are 
undoubtedly right.

Q: Why have taxes risen so much ?

IW: That is explained by the democratisation of the world. People demand 
three things of their government: education for their kids, health care and 
a certain guarantee for lifelong income. This all costs money. More and 
more people in the world demand this. And the expectations are also 
increasingly higher. A hundred years ago, people were happy with primary 
school, fifty years ago with highschool, now everybody wants to be able to 
send their kids to college. This happens not just in the Netherlands but 
also in countries like China and India. These means growing costs. They are 
paid for with tax money.

Q: But these costs could also fall as we saw in the 1980s ?

IW: Of course, the capitalists fight back. That is exactly what 
neo-liberalism is about: keeping down wages, costs and taxes. That is what 
Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan did, what Bush does now, and to a 
lesser extent many European countries. If howver you look at the reality 
behind the rhetoric, then you see that they are able to reduce those costs 
much less than they would like. They are politically unable to do it. Even 
with merciless neo-liberals in power, there are political limits. Many of 
these costs therefore fell in the 1980s, but not as much as they increased 
between 1945 and 1975.

Q: Doesn't the capitalist system prove already for 500 years that it is 
flexible enough to surmount obstacles ?

IW:It has indeed proved remarkably flexible. But we should look at the 
mechanisms which made it so flexible. Point is, those mechanisms are 
structurally limited. Shifting production to low wage countries, 
internalisation of costs and taxes - the slack is almost gone.

Q: I still don't see how this will lead to the end of the capitalist world 
system in fifty years....

IW: You should not take my time-frame too literally. But it is finite. We 
are already in a transition period, a period of big chaos and 
dissatisfaction. Just look at the rapid political changes, the political 
uncertainty and spectacular increase in violence. Look at 11 September.

Q: Do you really see these terrorist attacks as proof of the terminal state 
of the capitalist world system ?

IW: Sure ! This proves the incapacity to maintain a world order if a 
majority of the population doesn'taccept it as legitimate. A world order is 
not something you can maintain with violence alone, Machiavelli already 
knew this six centuries ago. A much simpler example of widespread 
dissastifaction is urban crime. I am old enough to remember how much crime 
has increased in cities like Amsterdam, New York, and in African 
metropoles. When I lived in Africa in the 1960s, people were hardly 
concerned about their personal safety. That has changed radically. That 
change is no accident. Violence doesn't increase by accident. Capitalism is 
polarising, that is the basis of it. People have not become more immoral.

Q: So what has changed ?

IW: There was an inbuilt optimism that the state could guarantee a better 
future. That was preached and believed. If people are convinced the system 
improves bit by bit, that their kids will do better, they are prepared to 
tolerate many unpleasant things in their daily life. That faith in the 
future has disappeared. The collapse of communism is one of the causes. 
Really this was the death-stab for capitalism. With the fall of the Berlin 
Wall the belief disappeared that the system could change from the inside. 
That there was a better world on the horizon. A consequence is that the 
state lost its legitimacy; a disaster for capitalists. A strong state is 
crucial for them. That makes semi-monopolies possible, the true 
profitmakers. And a strong state knows how to keep people calm with 
repression and concessions: education, healthcare, income security.

Q: How does the weakening of the state contribute to the impending 
implosion of the world system ?

IW: The growing anti-statism makes for fear and chaotic behaviour. We took 
a couple hundred years to create a role for the state as maintainer of 
order. Now people take it back into their own hands. They no longer believe 
that the state does the job properly. They distrust its capacity - or worse 
- its intentions. That means that people are for example less prepared to 
pay taxes or that they vote differently. This erodes the capacity of the 
state even further. In turn, this lowers confidence - in brief, a downward 
spiral.

Q: On the other side, we can see that a number of regions in the world have 
clearly progressed in the last decades. Take for example Asia....

IW: Our world knows three categories of people: the first category, just 
one percent, is extremely well off. Then there's some 19 percent or so 
whose life is reasonable. These two groups have seen their income rise 
enormously in the past two hundred years. It is to those people that the 
protagonists of globalisation are always pointing. But globalisation has 
not done anything much for the other eighty percent. They are only faring 
worse. If you say that people in Asia are better off, then you mean the 
people in the second category. That group has increased maybe three to 
seven percent. You see that clearly in the cities. What you don't see are 
the people who are worse off.

Q: Can development aid mean something for them ?

IW: Development is a misleading term. For it implies that you can develop 
countries by means of policy. But development is not a matter of the 
correct set of policies. Point is, all countries are part of the same world 
system. And within that there is no space of development for everybody. If 
we look at the last 400 years, then you see that irrespective of the 
criteria that you use, the percentage of people doing well has more or less 
stayed the same.

Q: Can the poor of the world look to a better future if capitalism does 
indeed collapse as you predict ?

IW: Hope is a tricky concept. Everybody loves hope, especially people who 
don't really have any hope. What system we will have in 50 years, depends 
on countless, partly unknown decisions. The outcome is unpredictable.

Q: But what are the options ? You should be able to say something about 
that. You are not just concerned with history, but also with what you call 
"futuristics', the study of what lies ahead.

IW: I would rather not talk about political strategy. Political influence 
is small within this system anyway. The last 200 years many people have 
done mountains of work, with very little result. I expect that the future 
system is partly determined by who is able to mobilise people the most.

Q: The rainbow coalition from Porto Alegre ?

IW: That's a possibility. This loose alliance of different tendencies as 
yet doesn't have the characteristics that made the "old left" fail. The 
people of Porto Alegre don't feel the need to conquer state power in order 
to be able to change the world. The coalition doesn't strive for 
centralisation either and it doesn't exclude people who think differently. 
That is a gain compared with earlier oppositional groups. But if they will 
succeed, I don't know. It is a tricky question.

Q: Tricky ?

IW: The ruling elites will do everything to make sure that as little as 
possible changes. They will for example appeal to progressive ideals like 
human rights and loyalty. We have to stay alert and weigh their words 
constantly for their real meaning and consequences. In the chaos that lies 
ahead, human intervention is however potentially more influential than 
ever. If the system wobbles, then one small push can maybe cause a 
sea-change. Everything is possible, even progress is not inevitable. 
History is not on anybody's side.



Reply via email to