TITLE: MAIN REMARKS AT A ROUND TABLE ON IRAQ, GEORGIA, BUSH
DOCTRINE AND RUSSIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS
[UL. MOSFILMOVSKAYA, 40, 15:10, OCTOBER 2, 2002]
SOURCE: FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE (http://www.fednews.ru/)
[Alexei] Pushkov: Let us start our Round Table meeting. Let me begin by
saying that as always, American imperialism has sprung a surprise
on us. Dim Simes has not come. He has been infected. I don't know
by whom.
Voice: Iraqis.
Pushkov: I don't know. The Iraqis or al Qaeda. He called me
yesterday and said he was running a fever and he canceled his trip
to Russia. So, he cannot physically take part in our Round Table.
Which is a pity because he could have given us an authentic picture
of what is happening in the United States around Iraq.
But since this is the 11th Round Table organized by
Postscriptum program and the previous ten round tables took place
without Simes -- I am told that he did take part in one Round Table
-- so, nine round tables took place without him. But I hope any way
that it will be just as successful without him. Our discussion will
focus not so much on the Russian-American perspective as on the
Russian perspective. That is, in what situation do we find
ourselves in connection with the recent developments.
I will permit myself to make a brief introduction just to
outline the main parameters of the discussion.
First, it is obvious that Iraq is just a field where a very
powerful world-wide trend is manifesting itself. And if it weren't
Iraq, it would have been some other country. The trend is as
follows. To prevent the United States becoming a latter-day Roman
Empire, and to prevent the establishment of a Pax Americana is
practically impossible. But there are empires and empires. Some
empires have unlimited sway and some have limited sway. There are
reasonable empires and unreasonable empires. The question is, what
will the United States be like and accordingly, what will we be
like. And the question is whether Vladimir Putin would like to
become a governor of one of the provinces in this empire or to be
a partner, if not an equal partner, who will take part in solution
of issues that affect the new empire and the destinies of the
world.
This is the choice facing Putin, but it also faces the whole
nation because with all due respect, even if he is reelected in
2004, his tenure is finite. Meanwhile, for Russia this will
continue to be a dilemma. Iraq is only the beginning.
That was my first point. Second point. The second point is
that we have had signals indicating that international events will
go in this direction. The first signal was the situation around
Bosnia. It was very complicated, involving as it did ethnic
conflicts and so on and not everybody could get the message.
The second failed signal was Somalia when the Americans had to
retreat when they met with stiff resistance from Somalian warlords.
And the third and most convincing signal was Kosovo. Obviously,
Kosovo was to be followed by something else. Let me remind you that
the Pentagon is seriously discussing a report on what is to be done
next, after Iraq. The issue of Iraq has practically been closed.
What next?
Several influential intellectuals in America led by Ronald
Asmus, one of the three people who first promoted the idea of NATO
expansion to the East in 1993. That is, they made that idea public
triggering a debate in America. They were Asmus, Kruger and
Talbott. Asmus leads a group which says that the next task of
American policy and NATO is to bring about a change of regime in
Iran. If you raise this issue in Washington today everybody will
tell you, who is listening to Asmus. This is some strange piece of
paper. I've been hearing from the Americans for ten years, don't
pay attention to it. In 1993 I was told, don't pay any attention to
it. You must be mad to talk about the Baltic countries joining
NATO. This is impossible. Now the Baltics are in NATO.
Then they started talking about Ukraine joining NATO. You must
be crazy, I was told. But now we see that Kuchma is about to be
replaced and three years later Ukraine will be a member of NATO.
Obviously, this is an on-going trend and we will see a progressive
change in the world order. Nobody will stop at Iraq. It won't be a
one-off affair like after September 11 when America had to be
backed, what with the national syndrome and so on. This is my
second point.
Point three. On September 20, America adopted a new national
security doctrine, a very interesting doctrine developed by
Condoleezza Rice. Condoleezza Rice is a very charming and
intelligent woman, she obviously tries to emulate George Kennan who
in his time thought up the doctrine of deterrence which for some 40
years formed the content of America's foreign policy. The new
doctrine, called the Bush Doctrine, or Preemptive Action Doctrine
boils down to two points.
First, the United States should promote a balance of forces
that favors freedom. The New York Times which wrote about it meant
that the balance of forces should be in every way favorable for the
United States, if one strips the proposition of its propaganda
aspect.
And the second point is that Americans mega-power should be
used to turn the next decade in the world into a decade of
prosperity, freedom and peace.
If this were really the case and America's super power could
be committed to achieving peace, prosperity and freedom that would
have been wonderful and we would all have united in ecstasy. I
would instantly back SPS on practically every issue. And in general
all the problems would go away.
Voice: He backs you secretly.
Khakamada: That's Nemtsov, not Bush.
Voice: I think he backs you secretly at present.
Pushkov: I can't support Nemtsov all the way. But the problem
of course is -- look, what is happening after the end of the Cold
War. After the Cold War we have had a string of wars one after
another. I am not suggesting that this is entirely the fault of the
United States. On the one hand, the Cold War situation created a
certain tension and local wars fitted into the context of a
confrontation between two blocs. Invariably parties to local wars
had support coming to them from one quarter or the other. Now local
wars have become separate. Take the ethnic conflict in Bosnia, for
example.
In other words, the Cold War structure collapsed and all the
ethnic contradictions have come to the surface. A vast number of
ethnic entities have appeared which want to be independent: Kosovo,
Abkhazia, Uiguria, perhaps, and I am sure new such regions will
appear.
Voice: Tuva.
Pushkov: Yes, this is an objective trend. But the way the
United States has opted to react to it has resulted in Europe
having more wars in the last ten years than in the Cold War years
when there was not a single war in Europe. So we are faced with a
paradox that the Cold War, from the viewpoint of peace in Europe,
although there was the threat of a nuclear war, it was nevertheless
more stable than the current situation of America's super might,
which, Condoleezza Rice told us, is very advantageous for promoting
the ideas of freedom, peace and democracy. Something must be done
with this because if it is now Iraq and then Iraq and so on, we
will not get decades of freedom, peace and democracy but rather
decades of endless wars, growing terrorist threats and this is
perfectly obvious.
It seems to me that Bush is either incapable of understanding
it or he believes he has no choice, and the answer to this will be
some terrorist answer, i.e. the complete destabilization of the
system of international relations, the striving of a huge number of
states for possession of nuclear weapons. This is quite obvious
because if the doctrine of preventive actions does not recognize
national sovereignty and says that as soon as there appears a
threat to America, it has the right to strike. In this situation
the only guarantee against the strike is nuclear weapons.
Everything is perfectly obvious.
That is why Iran will develop its nuclear arms in any case,
whether we build the plant in Busher or not -- in the world market
it is always possible to buy all that is needed to develop a
nuclear bomb. That is why I think that other states will also be
acquiring this. This is to say that we are going not toward the
epoch of stabilization around the United States, which could be
welcomed, if the US were the leader capable of stabilizing the
world around it. Now we are going toward the epoch of
destabilization around the United States. This is what causes our
concern.
And the last point. I have just talked to a prominent Western
diplomat and he told me he has just come from Washington. He is
amazed at the attitude of his former friends (in the past he was
ambassador to the United States) of his country, he said, toward
nuclear arms. This is to say that in the US ruling group the
attitude to the use of tactical nuclear warheads against terrorists
is regarded as almost a decided issue in practical terms. But this
is a Pandora's Box, isn't it? This is overcoming a certain taboo
which operated from the time when Hiroshima and Nagasaki were
destroyed (incidentally, also by Americans), but of course there
were some reasons, there was its "ratio" as they say but everything
can be taken to a point of absurdity. And if indeed there are such
feelings and notions now in America, I am afraid we are heading for
a very, very bad world.
And the last para, number five, concerns ourselves. It seems
to me that here we must understand what we support and what we wish
to support. You know, we are interested in the establishment of
this new instability under the aegis of the United States or we are
interested in creating such a balance of forces (and here I am in
agreement with Condoleezza Rice), a balance of forces favorable for
the world and freedom only but not quite favorable for the United
States, or to be more precise, for that group that is now at the
head of the US foreign policy and which may fail with its foreign
policy as failed those who started the war in Vietnam, and then the
American nation admitted the mistake, they were condemned, and
there was the Vietnam syndrome, there was general penitence,
conscience and so on.
But now they are trying to convince us that this is the only
possible way. What are we supporting? We are supporting the
illusion of the only possible way which, as I see it, is dangerous
for us and for the United States and for the Western world, and for
freedom, for democracy, for nuclear weapons non-proliferation and
so on. Or we support indeed a different balance of forces which so
far does not exist. I agree it is more difficult to accomplish than
simply support the United States, it is much more difficult but it
seems to me that this firstly will somewhat restrain the
unreasonableness of the new Roman Empire and that clearly manifests
itself and maybe it will help it to get slightly more reasonable
and as to us, this will permit us to exist in the surrounding which
is advantageous to us. That is why if we establish or rather if we
permit the establishment of an unreasonable Roman Empire, let there
be no mistake, so to say, -- it will be necessary -- taking any
decisions -- to travel each time to the Washington regional
committee of the party, as they used to joke under Yeltsin.
This is perfectly obvious. Because this is the logic of an
empire. The Roman Empire did not permit any question to be solved
without its participation. Incidentally, mankind has not changed at
all over these 2000 years in this sense. This is to say that human
psychology and human relations and if there is one center of power,
not balanced by anything, this center will take decisions. It is
perfectly clear and this is what Iraq means, as I see it.
Georgia here is something secondary, it is simply Georgia for
us, it is a test of whether or not we are capable of making
independent decisions. Clever or unreasonable decisions is a
different matter. We capable of independent decisions or we will
correlate all decisions with this center sort of strengthening the
US notions that its might and force and influence are boundless. It
seems to me that Georgia in this setting is a very tiny element in
the overall scale, so to say.
I am far from urging an attack on Georgia. We can decide not
to attack it but let us take the decision without checking it with
the George Bush administration. Very well. Let us take such a
decision, but again let us do it on our own. It seems to me that
this is the key issue of our policy.
Khakamada: But the decision to bomb we took ourselves.
Pushkov: Nobody took that decision. Who does the bombing?
Nobody took such a decision.
Voice: Who does the bombing? It is just a slight bombing.
(Laughter)
Pushkov: I will now finish my remarks. I think that my
introductory remarks have already brought quite a lively reaction.
And I suggest that each get ten minutes so as not to delay it, all
the people are well known and I think they will be able to
formulate their thoughts quite briefly. Yes, please, Andrei
Fyodorov, from the Foreign and Defense Policy Council.
Fyodorov: Maybe it is simpler for me to talk a little because
a couple of days ago I saw some of the people Alexei has mentioned
-- George Bush, Condoleezza Rice and so on. But the question has
been put into the right perspective. We are talking about the
formation of a new American empire, an empire that may last several
decades and one should not entertain any illusions about it. This
is the long-term task of the US administration, the present one and
several administrations that will follow.
And real changes in the world will happen after Iraq. And one
shouldn't entertain any illusions that Iraq will be a stumbling
block for US policy. We have come to a point, unfortunately, when
Iraq is becoming politically more and more isolated and I wouldn't
be surprised if Russia abstains in the vote on the new resolution
on Iraq. Technologically, the Americans are capable of solving the
problem of Iraq within two weeks. So, the big change in the world
will have come after Iraq, not after September 11.
What can I say by way of elaborating on the thoughts expressed
by Alexei? Yes, the next target will be Iran, it will take about
two or three years. But one has to make it clear that after Iraq
Russia will be confronted with an ultimatum from the United States
regarding the Bushehr nuclear power plant. It will happen
regardless of how the events around Iraq will develop. After Iraq,
Russia will be presented with an ultimatum, to shut down the
Bushehr project or else. We have to be prepared for that.
The next strategic goal of the United States, as far as I
could gather from my conversation with the above-mentioned
individuals, is the liquidation of OPEC. This is the strategic goal
of the United States. It would be easy to achieve after Iraq
because Iraq and a soft change of regime in Saudi Arabia will give
the United States control over 40-45 percent of the world's oil
production to solve all its energy problems.
By the way, Alexei did not mention it, but when we had a
delegation from the State Department recently, they told us
privately that after the victory over Iraq the United States
expects the fair price for oil to be 13 dollars per barrel and they
would not allow the price to go higher than that. And the current
energy summit in the United States is no more than a carrot because
if prices drop to 13 dollars per barrel, transportation of oil by
sea becomes meaningless. And Americans will legitimately renounce
the Russian offer of help because the Russian companies themselves
will renounce it.
Next point. Obviously, the new American empire will be built
with temporary support of Russia. Temporary. It needs Russia as
long as Iraq exists. Because to solve the issues of Saudi Arabia
and the Middle East (I mean Palestine and Israel), Russia's role
will be redundant. Iran is the only problem. Afghanistan, as I see
it, has ceased to be a worry for the United States. The Americans
have realized that no matter how much money you throw at that
country it will remain at the cave age tribal stage of development.
The next issue, North Korea, will solve itself. In four years
time these countries reunite into a normal democratic state. The
Americans don't need to step in and the latest contacts of the
American envoy with the North Koreans highlight this fact.
The biggest challenge to the American empire is China.
Everything that is being done at present will be with an eye to a
future global confrontation between the United States and China. We
have no part in it. It is obvious that the strategic goal of the
United States is to weaken China and put it out of the running
because it will be the only serious opponent.
As for what Alexei said about terrorism, I have grave doubts
that terrorism will flourish. In fact, with the liquidation of the
Middle East problem, and this can be done after Iraq, Iran can
easily be mopped up by removing Hezbollah and terrorism will
diminish. The elimination of the Middle East crisis will
dramatically reduce the danger of terrorism and the problem of
terrorism will be reduced to the problem of relations with Iran.
What should Russia do? Unfortunately, Russia is now in a tight
corner. We have very little room for maneuver. Neither our
political nor our economic position will permit us to pursue a
policy that meets our interests. Putin will under no circumstances
countenance a conflict with the United States. What we may try to
do is to balance the American advance a little big by broadening
our contacts with the European leaders, above all France and
Germany, and to some extent, perhaps, Italy, though it doesn't play
any important role.
And my most important point that I am now making public we
should gird ourselves for extremely serious economic problems in
the coming year or two because obviously the American economy
requires very low oil prices and the Americans would not stop at
anything to solve their economic problems and they would care
little about Russian problems. We should prepare ourselves for a
difficult economic period in an unfavorable external environment.
Thank you.
Pushkov: Thank you.
General [Leonid] Ivashov, yes please.
Ivashov: Speaking about what is happening and what will be, I
think that we must take as the point of departure the statement
made by Ms. Herta Daeubler-Gmelin, Germany's former Justice
Minister who compared Bush's policy with the politics of Hitler.
And indeed if one looks at that situation and at those events, at
the order of events which were happening on the eve of the Second
World War and at events in the modern world, I think there are
quite many things in common.
And that means that if, following this logic of comparing the
events, we can come to a visible result of what will happen. I will
cursorily look through the two analogies, the two periods. The goal
of Germany and the goal of the United States are similar -- it is
world domination. In both cases the object of striving is petroleum
in the first place, and widening of the Lebensraum, and here it is
the wider pursuit of major interests the world over.
Both Germany and the United States today are sort of bound by
these items of international-legal commitments which today, by
virtue of their economic and military might and the political
weight, are similar. There was the Treaty of Versailles which
restrained the aggressive aspirations of Germany. Here the entire
system of international norms which began to emerge back in 1648
and which is not permitting the Americans today to act within the
limits of its possibilities. And that is why Germany gradually
opted for the method of gradually untying its hands, increasing the
violations of the Peace Treaty of Versailles. And today we see how
the Americans are gradually destroying the principles laid down by
the Treaty of Westphalia and after the Second World war were
defined in the principles of the United Nations.
The ideology is about similar: for domestic and for external
consumption. For internal consumption it is "Deutschland,
Deutschland, uber alles" -- German, Germany above all, and the
attempt, so to say, to dominate, to impose its ideology in the
whole world. And today we are observing the same in the United
States -- the same ideology according to which the American
interests and the American internal world are above all.
On the surface, the ideology is an elitist ideology for
external consumption, also quite similar. While the basis for
German ideology was communism as the threat, then it was the rotten
regimes, as they were called, and the concern for the Germans
living outside the bounds of Germany. Today we see about the same
in the United States: terrorism, the regimes that threaten plus the
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Further on. We see attempts at forming coalitions. On the eve
of the Second World War, the basis, the foundation of that
aggressive ideology was the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo. Today we see the
same axis in the form of a triangle Washington-London-Tel Aviv. The
mode of action is the same: the gradual and consistent destruction
of the international field and taming the international community
to accept any actions, including the commission of aggressions, and
including interference in the internal affairs of states.
And then, I would even draw this parallel: look, one of the
methods of accomplishing those objectives, achieving domestic
concentration and for external manifestations was provocation --
the setting of Reichstag on fire, September 11, and minor
provocations. And then it is the buildup of the military component
-- it is the first strikes and one can mention Grenada, Panama,
Iraq, then Yugoslavia, then Iraq back again and so on.
As to how it all ended we are excellently informed. And I
would also say a few words about the big similarity, incidentally,
between Mein Kampf and the current US strategy or so far the draft
strategy of national security. The result of all this was the
Second World War, and as to what will happen now, we can only make
guesses. And of course the epilogue -- which is the Nuremberg
trials.
Now as regards Russia. Surprisingly, you know, it seems to me
that Russia is behaving in the same exemplary fashion as the Soviet
Union on the eve of the Second World War. Same attempts to be
friendly with the Germans, the friendship and the belief that the
friendship between Stalin and Hitler would not produce anything
dangerous. And they turned a blind eye to the actions of Germany
and Germany, in turn, closed its eyes to some of the actions of the
Union in the Baltics, in Bessarabia and elsewhere.
Moreover, the joint actions or the division of joint actions
are exemplified by Poland. Today we have sort of "prolonged"
ourselves into Central Asia and so on -- into Afghanistan.
Regarding the future, I will say literally a few words. I
agree with those who say that a blow to Iraq has been decided on
and then the events will follow. Andrei Fyodorov is correct of
course that they will not stop at that. They will not stop only
because the US strategy, formalized doctrinally and legislatively,
will operate until it meets with serious obstacle. It means one
ought to expect indeed that Iran, Saudi Arabia and so on, but the
events will be developing up to a point until the Americans get the
sense of the real danger, not the one they are now inventing in the
form of non-proliferation.
What is the way out of this situation and what could be the
conduct of Russia? It seems to me that the way out is quite obvious
-- it is pooling efforts to counteract such policy. It wouldn't be
quite correct or logical to say that this is impossible. Today
conditions exist for forming a normal geopolitical continental bloc
centered around Russia, China and other states which disagree with
the present logic of US behavior.
In fact, the basis for this exists, it is the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization. We could also invite India to form a
strategic triangle, Iran could immediately align itself with it and
then some European states, perhaps Germany. I am not saying that
this idea, the formation of such a bloc, can today prevent an
aggression against Iraq. But it will erect a barrier in the way of
such dangerous developments in the future.
Well, I have already spoken about Georgia. I think
Shevardnadze has a strategy with regard to Russia. It may be
cynical and unfriendly towards Russia, but Russia, unfortunately,
doesn't have a strategy and we keep losing all the time. And these
actions and calls for striking on Georgia really strengthen the
Shevardnadze regime and confirm him in his conviction that his
strategy and tactics with regard to Russia are correct. Thank you.
Pushkov: Thank you. Now Gleb Pavlovsky.
Pavlovsky: I would take issue with the previous speaker and on
the much-labored topic of the Westphalia agreements I would like to
remind you that the Nuremberg trials and the Yalta accords of which
the previous speaker seems to be so fond, were violations of the
Westphalia agreements. It is impossible to simultaneously espouse
the principles of the Westphalia agreements, that is the principle
of absolute sovereignty and the Yalta propositions which imposed
severe restrictions on that principle.
At present neither the first nor the second set of principles
is honored. And the list of agreements that are defunct would be
too long to enumerate. Let us proceed on the basis that reality is
something one cannot obstruct, but one can tamper with. For
instance, we can impede the mounting tide of revision of the status
quo in practically all regions. And the fact that this revision is
accomplished in some cases by military means and in other cases,
for example, in the Asia-Pacific region, so far by non-military
means does not make much difference. The process will continue and
in all the regions of the world it goes beyond the existing world
legal covenants.
Which brings us to the next question: Is preservation of the
status quo good for Russia? Are we interested in a status quo? I am
leaving aside the question as to whether anyone has the resources
to preserve the status quo. No, we are not interested in a status
quo. Being a country with blurred borders surrounded on all sides
by half-friends and half-enemies, a country beleaguered on all
sides by little guys on behalf of whom, if you touch them, bigger
guys are ready to step in -- this is by no means an ideal situation
for implementing our interests, both inside the country and in the
world. To some extent the tide of world revisionism, which is
mounting, is a process in which Russia is interested strategically.
Of course, we are very anxious to know what the limits of the
revision will be. And most importantly, any revision ends in some
kind of agreement and it is Russia's task to be part of these
agreements. For example, of the future Westphalia agreements.
So, this is the overriding task, to be parties to the
agreements and not to find ourselves in the position of Westphalia
itself which gave the name to the agreements but which by that time
had practically been turned into a wasteland. Therefore Nuremberg
is a glaring violation of Westphalia agreements and we cannot
envisage a future based on them.
And this brings me to the question of Iraq. We have discussed
it with our colleague Pushkov who is present here and I don't know,
Alexei, if you have received the materials of these discussions. By
the way, there is the British dossier on Iraq which has been fully
translated. Because so far it has been discussed without the
knowledge of the facts that it contains we would like to make it
public. Of course, a lot of it is propaganda, but there are also a
lot of real facts. As always in such white papers. And we should
react to both.
As for my position with regard to Iraq and whether it has
non-conventional weapons or weapons of mass destruction, the main
thing that should interest Russia is, strictly speaking, that it
should not have nuclear or chemical weapons because given the
present level of business relations with Iraq it is inconceivable
that Iraq could develop a traditional weapon of mass destruction
without our knowledge.
The problem lies elsewhere. Iraq quite openly and publicly
supports the development of a new unconventional type of weapon,
namely, mega-terrorist acts carried out with the help of suicide
terrorists. It openly finances them and Saddam Hussein admits it
openly, and there is an office on the territory of the Palestinian
authority which publicly and openly pays to the families of suicide
bombers, which amounts to funding the structure of extremely
dangerous mega-terror.
And it is particularly dangerous for Russia because it has
come to the Caucasus from the Middle East, it did not exist in
Chechnya before. And I don't understand what the Russian position
on that is because it takes a relaxed view of this circumstance
whereas, I stress, all forms of financing the families of suicide
terrorists amount to financing a new type of mass destruction
weapons because a suicide bomber attacking a nuclear waste dump
spells a regional catastrophe with which Russia would not be able
to cope because of financial constraints. Just like America
wouldn't have enough money to cope with the aftermath if the twin
towers were to fall flat sideways and not collapse.
I think this provides grounds for Russia to present Iraq with
an ultimatum. Whether it should be presented publicly or secretly
is another question. And if we are not doing it, then we can just
sit back and watch what the Americans and the English will do.
Russia is interested in a revision of the status quo because it
cannot be cast in any agreements at this stage, but Russia is not
interested in paying for this revision and work towards it by
committing its scarce military and financial resources.
[Alexei] Mitrofanov: Could I just chip in there. My colleague may also
have visited Iraq quite frequently. But I think I am one of the few
people who has been there very frequently and I still make frequent
visits. I have seen the facilities, I know the military commanders,
the factory managers and their potential. They have nothing that
belongs in the nuclear dossier or the chemical dossier. That has
long gone. The West is just misleading us. There are no facts. To
this day there are no facts other than the stories of Saddam
Hussein's mistress who claims she had seen bin Laden and chemical
weapons in the palace. But it is ridiculous to base propaganda on
this.
And I would like to remind you of another important thing.
After September 11, even the Israeli intelligence, Mossad, claimed
that there was no connection between al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein.
You may remember that the Israeli version said that there was no
link with bin Laden and that Iraq was not trying to acquire
chemical or other mass destruction weapons.
Pushkov: Yes, that's true, it was admitted by Condoleezza Rice
this time around.
Pavlovsky: But in 1997, the last of the dumps was officially
discovered and destroyed. Was it being preserved for the sake of
the mistresses? Or to get rid of the mistresses?
Mitrofanov: And a philosophical question to you as a
philosopher: Why aren't they allowed to do what others are allowed
to do? Why can Bush get away with what Saddam cannot?
Pavlovsky: Just hard luck for Saddam.
Pushkov: We have no answer to that. I would like to dot three
i's. First, let us separate September 11 from the principle of
fighting terrorism. Mitrofanov is right about September 11;
Pavlovsky is right when he says that Iraq supports terrorism.
Pavlovsky: It does so officially.
Pushkov: Yes. But this was the case before September 11 too.
Mitrofanov: Officially it supports the Palestinians.
Migranyan: Do Europe and the UN expect Spain to deliver a
strike?
Pushkov: Secondly, the US is confident that Iraq had been
preparing these programs for a long time. The question is not
whether it is a good or a bad state. It is a bad state. But it can
be disarmed peacefully or by military means. And this is the crux
of the problem and the substance of the debate at the UN between
Europe and America and us.
Mitrofanov: And they have never touched us. They have never
had any problems with us.
Pushkov: Mr. Kosachev.
[Konstantin] Kosachev: We have a wide spread of topics, President
Bush, the
funding of suicide terrorists. They are individuals. We have
listened to all the speakers with keen interest, but the discussion
is somewhat lacking in focus. But the focus is provided by what has
been mentioned here. What we observe is inevitable and
irreversible. And then there is nothing for Russia but to relax and
enjoy it. Or is it the case that the threat of a new Pax Americana
is somewhat exaggerated, has been provoked by the Americans
themselves and then the states other than the United States have a
chance to influence the situation.
Alexei Pushkov, as I see it, has presented this as an
inexorable trend, he has put Bosnia, Somalia, Kosovo and
Afghanistan on the same footing and predicted that this has set the
pattern for the future. I would take issue with that. To my mind
Afghanistan provides the climax of what the Americans have been
doing up until now, but it is by no means certain that this trend
will continue. Already we see in the case of Iraq that the
Americans are facing great difficulties in mobilizing public
opinion, as witnessed by today's remarks by Powell that inspectors
should on no account go to Iraq. In my view the Americans are
pretty unconvincing in terms of propaganda support of their future
campaign. But I agree that the campaign will go ahead regardless,
and I think that Iraq will surrender and fall very quickly.
I think the Americans can expect a similar walkover in the
case of Saudi Arabia, only the methods used will be slightly
different. But in Iran, which is a stronger regime, the Americans
may face serious problems.
And I think what is happening in the world can be compared to
a bicycle race where the United States already wears the leader's
yellow shirt, but it is not certain whether it will manage to
preserve its lead and each time the outcome depends not so much on
the leader but on the coordinated actions of those who form the
field and to what extent they get in each other's way or,
conversely, are building up a certain strategy to prevent the
leader from getting clear of them.
The Americans wear the yellow shirt for two reasons. First,
they have the economic and military might. And secondly, and
equally importantly, they have a clear strategy of using that force
for their own interests. So far, Russia is in the midst of this
melee and our only ideology, to simplify a little bit, is not to
lose face and not to be among the stragglers.
This was highlighted by the example of Georgia. I can see no
single and clear strategy behind Russia's actions. Our actions with
regard to Georgia have three components to them. On the one hand,
a real attempt to minimize a real threat posed by the bands there.
Secondly, there is the attempt on the part of our military to
divert the discussion away from our track record in conducting the
counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya, to find somebody to blame
for the fact that the operation has not worked out the way it was
conceived and to finger those who prevented the operation from
being a success so far. And there is a third factor and that is the
ambitions of politicians who in this situation are trying to match
the Americans and to demonstrate that we too have the right to
pursue an independent policy, to make our own decisions and take
advantage of the situation to further our ends.
But these three components, to my mind, do not add up to a
single strategy and I am afraid that whatever the outcome of the
present Russian-Georgian conflict, Russia will remain isolated even
if we deliver preventive strikes I don't think anyone will support
us, unlike the United States which in the case of Iraq can be
assured of the support if not of all, at least of a large number of
countries.
We have no strategy. The foreign policy doctrine that Russia
has was adopted in the past century, not only chronologically, but
from the point of view of content. In any case the discussions of
the kind that we are having today so far have been the only
discussions on the topic. I have no access to these councils, but
I doubt that such discussions are taking place at the Security
Council or in the President's Foreign Policy Directorate or in any
other structures which should do it. I am just referring to the
places where such a discussion ought to be taking place, but is not
taking place.
The philosophy at the basis of these discussions and a future
Russian strategy, which Russia definitely does not have at the
moment, should be an attempt to achieve some unity with the
surrounding world, to look for an ally with similar interests. I
think that our interests are identical in some ways with the United
States, and in some ways with Europe and in some ways with China,
but we design our foreign policy in a kind of vague and indirect
way without working with each of our potential partners
individually.
I am not suggesting that we should forge an anti-American
coalition with China or with Europe, we will simply be prevented
from doing so. But I think that if, sooner or later, we do get a
strategy of what we want to achieve in our relations with the
United States and with other countries, if we declare to the
Americans in advance that in the event of such and such actions we
would do this and that, that is, if we clearly formulate the
threats that we could implement, I don't mean the threat of using
nuclear weapons, but, for example, a threat to intensify
Russian-Chinese cooperation and relations with Europe then our
situation will make more sense.
Pushkov: Thank you. And now we will hear from Andrei Kokoshin
and then Andranik Migranyan. I think the prime question is what we
are trying to achieve. And Gleb Pavlovsky has made a very
interesting point there, namely, that we are interested in a
revision of the status quo because things are going to change in
any case. But what kind of revision of the status quo would we like
to see? And where would we be? For all I know, we ourselves may be
revised. We are a very large country and it would be great fun to
revise us. States, as the experience of Yugoslavia has shown, even
if they have existed throughout the 20th century, tend to break up
for some reason. Andrei, please.
[Andrei] Kokoshin: Let me say first, that not only in the operational,
foreign policy or military planning, but in the activities of a
broader circle of people linked with state politics we should try
to rule out worst case scenarios. And the danger stems from the
fact that the crises that occur are not always manageable as we
tend to believe. People are laboring under an illusion when they
think that they really are managing the super crisis into which we
are slipping. Several days ago I have suggested that potentially we
may get something similar to the Caribbean crisis and they may
miscalculate at this historical juncture where we are now and also
in the long-term and medium-term.
But surely, we too, should not miscalculate. We must be
mindful of the possibility of different scenarios. To put it in a
nutshell. Yes, the American oil companies are interested in fairly
high oil prices. But if they get access to Iraq's oil fields and
gain control over them, they may simply shut down a number of
projects, all the northern projects and partly the projects in the
Gulf of Mexico and switch to Iraqi oil.
Iraq has the second largest proven oil resources in the world,
within a few years it can produce 300 million tons of oil at the
cost of less than a dollar per barrel. Within a year it can reach
a level of output that would simply cover all the losses of
American oil companies in other places. And it would be correct and
reasonable for our government to proceed from the same projections
as some Western companies are doing which assume that the average
oil price next year will be 15 dollars per barrel.
This is the worst case scenario which is pretty unpleasant for
us. I am not going to pursue that topic any further, but there are
a lot of short-term and long-term adverse consequences, especially
on the eve of an election year. This is a very serious alarm bell
for us and I am afraid that we are not prepared for it either
psychologically or in organizational terms. And I call on my
colleagues at the Duma to give thought to it in further discussions
on our budgets, and risk insurance so that we shouldn't have to cut
budget spending as a matter of emergency.
Tsipko: Default.
Kokoshin: Don't use the word default unduly, although,
unfortunately, default cannot be ruled out because we may prove to
be insolvent.
Now about longer term consequences. I think that China can,
without our assistance, make a colossal breakthrough in building up
its strategic nuclear potential. That would be a real change of
status quo. China now faces a dilemma: either to wait for the time
being or to move to center stage. For a fairly long period the
Chinese very cleverly managed to keep a low profile stressing that
they are a developing country, that it is weak and poor. They have
made the most of their concept of sitting on a mount watching two
tigers fight each other. But now they have found themselves in a
trap. They have 18-20 warheads on strategic carriers and this is
such a low ceiling which of course will be neutralized by an
American NMD system within five or seven years. And the Chinese
cannot afford to lose face in the eyes of their Asian neighbors.
Tsipko: Assistance.
Kokoshin: No assistance. They have already helped themselves.
They have got the technology of producing modern nuclear warheads
from American laboratories. Talking about effective control of
nuclear materials. Who has better control of nuclear secrets, we or
the Americans?
Tsipko: It's about American aid. Can they --
Kokoshin: Don't interrupt me. One of the scenarios is that
they will have to build up their strategic forces to 200-300 or 400
nuclear warheads. During the same period Russia, for obvious
reasons, will scale down its nuclear arsenals. And the overall
picture and impression will be that a huge shift of power and
influence in the world is taking place naturally.
In terms of the total number of warheads on strategic carriers
we will still be ahead of them, but in terms of the rate of
introducing new strategic systems, the Chinese will outstrip both
us and the Americans, especially since the Americans have somewhat
downgraded the role of strategic nuclear weapons compared with
other means. However, the role of mini-nukes has soared, including
in tackling anti-terrorist tasks.
By the way, I do not rule out that nuclear weapons may for the
first time be used against targets which Americans suspect have
bacteriological weapons, just as a political demonstration in order
to show to their own people that the administration means business.
Another consideration is that India will come on the heels of
China. India is technologically poised for a breakthrough. India
has created wonderful rocket research and nuclear research and
computer research centers, it has made great strides on information
technologies and specialized areas of chemistry. The industrial and
scientific base in India exists, like in China.
And then there are several other candidates I am not going to
mention just now. I mentioned India just to show to you that it is
not inferior to China and is sure to develop intercontinental
strategic missiles. But with a certain lag in time. I think
therefore that in some ten years time we will have a totally
different configuration in the world and it will be a very odd kind
of a Pax Americana. There will not be a powerful coalition against
the United States because the disparities among the potential great
powers are too great. But the configuration, of course, will be
different than in the 1990s when the United States suddenly felt
that it had the potential to become the single super power or even
an analog of the Roman Empire. No, the world will be much more
interesting.
But I disagree with those of my colleagues who say that the
more nuclear powers there are the better. There are some purely
practical questions. As a practician in this area and as somebody
who has studied and compared our own practice with world practice,
I can tell you that it is extremely difficult to manage a conflict
when it comes to the use of nuclear weapons by countries. As soon
as the third player enters the game, it becomes a puzzle. And what
if there are four or five? And now we come to the situation when
the nuclear world will not be bipolar, it is still to a large
extent bipolar, but in five or six years time it will cease to be
bipolar.
It is a good job that we have signed some kind of an agreement
with the United States. That is an achievement. But it may be
erased by the events that will happen. When Iran becomes a nuclear
power, it will complete several new configurations. And we,
especially Russia, will face the most complex situation because all
the arrows in this sexahedron will to some extent be directed
against us, politically or militarily.
Our society clearly underestimates the threat of Iran becoming
a nuclear state. It is not that Iran is going to attack us over the
resources of the Caspian Sea. The strategic logic will be such that
we will feel uncomfortable and we will recall the conditions in
which we have lived up until now with nostalgia. And to manage
strategic stability in a world with six nuclear powers -- Iran,
Israel, India, Pakistan, China and Russia -- neither the Americans
nor we have even theoretical models for that.
And in general the problem of conflict management in the
context of a nuclear confrontation under new conditions becomes
very blurred. Everything that we have done up until now, partly due
to colossal efforts on our part and on the part of the United
States in the past is now put into question. Why did I protest so
strongly against the destruction of the ABM treaty and the American
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty? Not because it was playing a
particularly important role from the military point of view,
although it did play some role. The point was that the Americans
were withdrawing from it before new mechanisms of conflict and
crisis management had been put in place. Such mechanisms do not
exist and we are only starting to work on them. Two ministers on
our side and two ministers on their side -- that foursome -- are
only scratching the surface.
And considering the rate at which the system of international
relations is changing, the rate of the creation of new mechanisms
is obviously lagging behind.
Mitrofanov: I have a question. Why do you scare us so much
with Iran? Do we have any problems with Iran? We did have problem.
Okay, imagine that they get nuclear weapons. But we have never had
problems with Iran. As for Israel, let them sort it out between
them.
Pushkov: We understand your question.
Kokoshin: But it is a remark, rather than a question.
